Administrative Process Reform in a Discretionary Age: The Role of Social Consequences

The basic rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act have remained intact for thirty-eight years, but now Congress is seriously considering reform of those generic rules. To evaluate the merits of these reform proposals, we must develop criteria against which to judge them. Although procedural reforms are commonly judged against the goals of fairness, accuracy, and procedural efficiency, Professors Schroeder and Magat argue that these are insufficient criteria to apply to administrative process reforms at a time when agencies possess substantial discretion in the rulemaking process. In such a context, procedures have an impact on society in ways not adequately evaluated by the traditional criteria. Discretion means that agencies may choose from a set of possible rules, none of which has been foreclosed by the enabling legislation of the agency. Procedures influence which choices the agency makes and, because these choices alter the regulations and restrictions under which society operates, they affect the social consequences of regulation. This article describes a model of participant behavior necessary to trace the effects of procedures on the social consequences of regulation, articulates a set of criteria to evaluate these social consequences, and then analyzes two frequently proposed generic reforms to the APA: mandatory regulatory impact analysis and oversight by the Office of Management and Budget

Consumer Product Safety Regulation in the United States and the United Kingdom: The Case of Bicycles

We study the effects of bicycle safety regulations in both the United States and the United Kingdom on bicycle accident rates for various population age groups. We find small, statistically significant decreases in the accident rates as the stock of bicycles increases its compliance with the regulations. This result is independent of country, season, and trend effects and holds across a range of age groups. The results run counter to those in similar studies. This appears to reflect our focus on a specific standard, rather than on broad enabling legislation, and the longer time series available.

Smoking Status and Public Responses to Ambiguous Scientific Risk Evidence

Situations in which individuals receive information seldom involve scientific consensus over the level of the risk. When scientific experts disagree, people may process the information in an unpredictable manner. The original data presented here for environmental risk judgments indicate a tendency to place disproportionate weight on the high risk assessment, irrespective of its source, particularly when the experts disagree. Cigarette smokers differ in their risk information processing from nonsmokers in that they place less weight on the high risk judgment when there is a divergence in expert opinion. Consequently, they are more likely to simply average competing risk assessments

Regulation and the Rate and Direction of Induced Technical Change

This article examines the effect of three forms of regulation (rate of return, ceiling-price, and markup) upon the rate and direction of technical advance selected by a myopic profit maximizing firms. With a homothetic production function ceiling-price regulation induces a faster rate of technical progress than would result without regulation, and faster than that which would result with markup regulation. In addition, our results lend no support for Smith's conjecture that technical advance causes an increase in the discrepancy between the resource allocations selected by a rate of return regulated firm and those chosen by an unregulated firm.