Detecting variable responses in time-series using repeated measures ANOVA: Application to physiologic challenges.

We present an approach to analyzing physiologic timetrends recorded during a stimulus by comparing means at each time point using repeated measures analysis of variance (RMANOVA). The approach allows temporal patterns to be examined without an a priori model of expected timing or pattern of response. The approach was originally applied to signals recorded from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) volumes-of-interest (VOI) during a physiologic challenge, but we have used the same technique to analyze continuous recordings of other physiological signals such as heart rate, breathing rate, and pulse oximetry. For fMRI, the method serves as a complement to whole-brain voxel-based analyses, and is useful for detecting complex responses within pre-determined brain regions, or as a post-hoc analysis of regions of interest identified by whole-brain assessments. We illustrate an implementation of the technique in the statistical software packages R and SAS. VOI timetrends are extracted from conventionally preprocessed fMRI images. A timetrend of average signal intensity across the VOI during the scanning period is calculated for each subject. The values are scaled relative to baseline periods, and time points are binned. In SAS, the procedure PROC MIXED implements the RMANOVA in a single step. In R, we present one option for implementing RMANOVA with the mixed model function "lme". Model diagnostics, and predicted means and differences are best performed with additional libraries and commands in R; we present one example. The ensuing results allow determination of significant overall effects, and time-point specific within- and between-group responses relative to baseline. We illustrate the technique using fMRI data from two groups of subjects who underwent a respiratory challenge. RMANOVA allows insight into the timing of responses and response differences between groups, and so is suited to physiologic testing paradigms eliciting complex response patterns

Biominerals - source and inspiration for novel advanced materials

Biomineralization seems an odd sort of word. How can you combine biology and minerals? However, a quick look around brings to light many familiar objects that are examples of biominerals. Most dramatic are the coral reefs and sea shells of the marine environment (calcium carbonate) and human bone and teeth (calcium hydroxyapatite) but there are many other examples. In the past 10 years, an increasing number of biominerals has been reported (Table 1). Interest in the biological and chemical processes that lead to biomineralization, howeyer, has only developed rather recently. Early observations were made by paleontologists who were interested in the preservation, through geological time, of the hard parts of organisms such as shells and skeletons but only in 1989 did the field really come of age with the almost simultaneous publication of three monographs covering current knowledge of the biological, biochemical, chemical and taxonomic aspects of biomineralization (Mann et al. 1989; Lowenstam & Weiner 1989; Simkiss & Wilbur 1989)

Cargo/Logistics Airlift System Study (CLASS), Executive Summary

The current air cargo system is analyzed along with advanced air cargo systems studies. A forecast of advanced air cargo system demand is presented with cost estimates. It is concluded that there is a need for a dedicated advance air cargo system, and with application of advanced technology, reductions of 45% in air freight rates may be achieved

Cargo/Logistics Airlift System Study (CLASS), Volume 2

Air containerization is discussed in terms of lower freight rates, size and pallet limitations, refrigeration, backhaul of empties, and ownership. It is concluded that there is a need for an advance air cargo system as indicated by the industry/transportation case studies, and a stimulation of the air cargo would result in freight rate reductions

Cargo/Logistics Airlift System Study (CLASS), Volume 1

Current and advanced air cargo systems are evaluated using industrial and consumer statistics. Market and commodity characteristics that influence the use of the air mode are discussed along with a comparison of air and surface mode on typical routes. Results of on-site surveys of cargo processing facilities at airports are presented, and institutional controls and influences on air cargo operations are considered

The Bankruptcy Tribunal

The United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code)1 and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)2 are powerful statutory schemes. Each one demands a broad scope of influence and preempts many other fields of law, state and federal. The capacious nature of these statutes creates a challenging tension when they come into conflict. On the one hand, bankruptcy law is in its very essence a collective multiparty dispute resolution procedure that cannot be waived or altered by private contract. On the other hand, the FAA embodies a general federal policy in favor of allowing parties to contract into private dispute resolution procedures. This Symposium focuses on resolving that tension. Doing so requires an examination of important questions about the scope and operation of bankruptcy law.3 In our view, the interaction between the FAA and the Code is a version of a familiar and fundamental bankruptcy problem: When, and under what circumstances, should parties be allowed to opt in or out of the “bankruptcy tribunal” for the resolution of bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related matters? This Article develops a general principle for thinking about that bankruptcy tribunal problem in the corporate bankruptcy context. As a definitional matter, we use “bankruptcy tribunal” to mean a federal court applying the Code and following the procedures commonly associated with bankruptcy cases as opposed to courts in other jurisdictions or in federal courts presiding over cases not brought under the Code. A more formal way to say the same thing is that, in the United States,4 a bankruptcy tribunal is a court exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334.5 We consciously avoid the term “bankruptcy court,” which creates a false distinction between a bankruptcy proceeding in a United States Bankruptcy Court and a bankruptcy proceeding in a United States District Court. For our purposes here, the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court are constituent parts of the same bankruptcy tribunal and function in the same role when presiding over bankruptcy matters.6 Our general principle is that the bankruptcy tribunal should be the exclusive tribunal to resolve a dispute if sending that dispute elsewhere would thwart the Code’s purpose of providing a collective forum where parties can coordinate to resolve multiparty disputes that involve distressed firms.7 When a case is brought into the bankruptcy tribunal, bankruptcy rules displace a substantial portion of non-bankruptcy law and private ordering. Because bankruptcy law’s essential function is coordinating a collective muti-party resolution, the displacement of private ordering is predominantly procedural and requires coordination even when that coordination conflicts with the procedures that would exist under non-bankruptcy law.8 To bring the parties toward one global resolution, bankruptcy law brings their substantive claims into the bankruptcy tribunal and subjects them to one set of mandatory procedural rules. The FAA, on the other hand, has no similarly broad unifying purpose. It embodies a preference for private ordering of procedure. It reflects the view that parties should be able to choose for themselves whether future disputes should be resolved through arbitration. But that is the same private ordering of procedure that bankruptcy law must displace to achieve its collective coordinating purpose. This creates an inherent conflict.9 Subordinating the Code to the FAA allows a two-party option to avoid the bankruptcy tribunal. The purpose of bankruptcy law is to address the collective action problems that arise when a firm is in financial distress. Any two parties could use a private arbitration provision to remove from the bankruptcy tribunal a dispute that affects the rights of other parties. Such a removal would be the equivalent of allowing those two parties to force all other claimants to waive their right to have their claims collectively resolved in the bankruptcy tribunal. That is fundamentally inconsistent with the Code’s purpose of coordinating multilateral behavior. As a result, our analysis suggests that the Code must generally trump the FAA in order to remain effective. An alternative rule would gut the Code of its essential function. But the opposite is not true. The FAA still has effect and covers a large and important sphere of contractual disputes even when subordinated to the Code, As we move beyond arbitration and look at bankruptcy law more broadly, we suggest that all questions about whether parties can keep certain disputes out of the bankruptcy tribunal—not just those involving arbitration—can and should be resolved by looking to bankruptcy’s essential purpose of providing a forum in to coordinate the resolution of multiparty disputes. This Article examines the bankruptcy tribunal question in its various forms to show the broad relevance of our principle. For example, tribunal choice is at the heart of questions about arbitration,10 forum selection, third-party releases,11 and the use of entity partitions and voting structures (golden shares and director seats). For each of these examples, the question of whether a proceeding should be inside or outside the bankruptcy system is really a question about governing law and procedure and whether certain parties should be able to opt out of the bankruptcy’s mandatory collective procedures. The questions should be resolved by asking how enforcing a contractual agreement to opt out of bankruptcy affects the collective proceedings. If enforcement would implicate only the interests of the parties to the contract, the contractual opt-out should be respected. On the other hand, if enforcement could prevent third parties from availing themselves of the collective proceeding bankruptcy provides, bankruptcy considerations should prevail and the opt-out should be denied. An additional implication of our framework is that in some situations the law should not only prohibit opt-out but should reach out coercively and bring additional disputes into the bankruptcy tribunal. For example, bankruptcy courts might need the authority to order third-party releases when doing so reduces the opportunism that arises among stakeholder entangled in a distressed debtor’s web of relationships. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the debate about bankruptcy law’s purpose and how it relates to questions about the bankruptcy tribunal and identifies areas of general agreement about bankruptcy’s essential collective nature, particularly with regard to coordinating behavior among those with claims against the bankruptcy estate. Part II describes the bankruptcy-tribunal problem in the arbitration context. Part III outlines our general principle and applies it to various other bankruptcy tribunal contexts. Part IV considers the more difficult question of when the bankruptcy purpose test justifies expanding the bankruptcy tribunal’s authority to reach disputes that do not directly involve the debtor

In Defense of Chapter 11 for Mass Torts

This Essay argues that bankruptcy proceedings are well-suited to resolving mass tort claims. Mass tort cases create a collective action problem that encourages claimants who are worried about available recoveries to race to the courthouse to collect ahead of others. This race can destroy going concern value and lead to the dismemberment of valuable firms. Coordination among claimants is difficult as each one seeks to maximize its own recoveries. These are the very collective action and holdout problems that bankruptcy proceedings are designed to solve. As such, bankruptcy proceedings are appropriate means of resolving mass torts as long as they leave tort victims no worse off than they would have otherwise been. We further argue that legal innovations such as third-party releases and divisional mergers, which facilitate efficient bankruptcy proceedings and reduce holdout problems, should be welcomed as long as courts are attentive to the potential for abuse. Of course, the bankruptcy process is not fully immune to abuse. For example, incumbent managers may have outsized bargaining leverage in bankruptcy or may take advantage of information asymmetries to push for reorganizations that divert value away from tort claimants. To control for such abuse, this Essay explores potential reforms aimed at ensuring that bankruptcy proceedings effectively mitigate collective action problems without disadvantaging tort victims as a class. Some of these reforms, such as giving tort claimants a priority claim, will sound familiar to bankruptcy scholars. Others, such as giving tort claimants a right to propose a plan of reorganization are more extreme. Because all these proposals have costs and benefits, our aim is not to endorse any one set of reforms; rather, we emphasize that it is possible to address potential abuses through internal reforms that facilitate mass tort resolutions within the bankruptcy system without resorting to measures that prohibit or make such proceedings unnecessarily expensive

In Defense of Chapter 11 for Mass Torts

This Essay argues that bankruptcy proceedings are well-suited to resolving mass tort claims. Mass tort cases create a collective action problem that encourages claimants who are worried about available recoveries to race to the courthouse to collect ahead of others. This race can destroy going concern value and lead to the dismemberment of valuable firms. Coordination among them is difficult as each claimant seeks to maximize its own recoveries. These are the very collective action and hold-out problems that bankruptcy proceedings are designed to solve. As such, bankruptcy proceedings are appropriate means of resolving mass torts as long as they leave tort victims no worse off than they would have otherwise been. We further argue that legal innovations such as third-party releases and divisional mergers, which facilitate efficient bankruptcy proceedings and reduce holdout problems, should be welcomed as long as courts are attentive to the potential for abuse. Of course, the bankruptcy process is not fully immune to abuse. For example, incumbent managers may have outsized bargaining leverage in bankruptcy or may take advantage of information asymmetries to push for reorganizations that divert value away from tort claimants. To control for such abuse, this Essay explores potential reforms aimed at ensuring that bankruptcy proceedings effectively mitigate collective action problems without disadvantaging tort victims as a class. Some of these reforms, such as giving tort claimants a priority claim, will sound familiar to bankruptcy scholars. Others, such as giving tort claimants a right to propose a plan of reorganization are more extreme. Because all these proposals have costs and benefits, our aim is not to endorse any one set of reforms; rather we emphasize that it is possible to address potential abuses through internal reforms that facilitate mass tort resolutions within the bankruptcy system without resorting to measures that prohibit or make such proceedings unnecessarily expensive