Optimal Income Taxation with Uncertain Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of uncertainty has evolved since Mirrlees’ original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to uncertainty alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under uncertainty when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no-risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.optimal income taxation, wage risk

Public Debt Accumulation and Fiscal Consolidation

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between interest rates on government bonds (GB) and fiscal consolidation rule by using an overlapping generation model with endogenous and stochastic growth settings. Our key findings are summarized as follows. First, interest rates of GB may be declining as public debt accumulates relative to private capital, as opposed to the conventional view that buildup of public debt accompanies a rise in interest rates. Second, fiscal consolidation rule plays a key role in determining interest rates in equilibrium. Third, the economy may exhibit discrete changes with interest rates diverging, implying that our observation of relatively low GB interest rates does not assure the continuation of that trend in the future. Fourth, a preventive tax increase to contain public debt at sustainable levels will not gain the political support of existing generations, whose life span is limited. Citizens prefer to shift the ultimate burden of public debt to future generations.Overlapping generation model, interest rate on government bond, fiscal consolidation rule, default risk

The context effect in the choice of earthquake insurance contracts in Japan

In this paper, we investigate the context effect in the choice of public and private earthquake insurance contracts using data from a questionnaire survey completed by an identical set of approximately 2,000 households in 2008 and again in 2009. According to the 2008 survey, the public earthquake insurance (PEI) was not popular among those who felt that the premiums were too high. On the other hand, the 2009 survey demonstrates that the choice of earthquake insurance changed substantially when a hypothetical private earthquake insurance contract, much more expensive than the PEI, was added to a choice menu. In particular, those who had initially felt that PEI was too expensive tended to find it less expensive relative to private insurance, and worth purchasing. A crucial advantage of the above choice architecture is that including additional options helps private insurance companies to develop market activities.earthquake insurance, public insurance, context effects

Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance

Politicians typically do not know what policies are best for achieving their broad objectives, so rely on bureaucrats for advice. Bureaucrats are better informed, so can manipulate outcomes by proposing policies that suit their interests. We capture this conflict of interests using a model of political decision-making that focuses on the interaction between politicians and the bureaucracies that advise them. In the basic model, a representative bureaucrat, knowing the characteristics of a given project, recommends to a representative politician whether to adopt it. If the politician chooses to adopt the project, its characteristics are revealed ex post. On the basis of the revealed outcome, the politician decides whether to discipline the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat anticipates imperfectly the chances of discipline when making an ex ante recommendation. When project characteristics are multi-dimensional, the politician can choose whether to seek advice from one bureaucrat or more than one. We compare outcomes in these centralized and decentralized regimes.bureaucracy, governance

Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector

An optimal commodity tax approach is taken to compare trade taxes and VATs when some commodities are produced informally. Trade taxes apply to all imports and exports, including intermediate goods while the VAT applies only to sales by the formal sector and imports. The VAT can achieve production efficiency within the formal sector, but unlike the trade tax regime, it cannot indirectly tax pure profits. Making the size of the informal sector endogenous in each regime is potentially decisive. The ability of the government to change the size of the informal sector through costly enforcement may also tip the balance in favor of the VAT.informal sector, optimal taxation, value-added tax, trade taxes

Default Risk on Government Bonds, Deflation, and Inflation

This paper analyzes the impact of deflation and inflation on the real interest rates of GBs using an overlapping generations model with the relationship between the real interest rate of GBs and the fiscal consolidation rule. We find that deflation may lower the real interest rate of GBs to the same level of public debt to capital, even if the fiscal consolidation rule is the same, as opposed to the conventional view that the real interest rate of GBs is determined independent of deflation if the Fisher equation holds. Our results are consistent with how the real interest rates of Japanese GBs react in periods of deflation. This paper also addresses the impact of fiscal inflation (i.e., monetizing all parts of the GB’s default using monetary policy). We calculate the expected fiscal inflation when the default rate in the event of fiscal consolidation is raised. The fiscal inflation may be extremely high if the extent of the required tax increase in fiscal consolidation is low. Initial inflation accelerates the expected fiscal inflation, but initial deflation suppresses it.Overlapping generations model, real interest rate, fiscal consolidation rule, default risk, fiscal inflation

"leadership meets soft budget"

In this paper, it is shown that real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria generically arises in most matching models with perfectly divisible fiat money. In other words, the real indeterminacy follows from the condition for stationarity of money holdings, and surprisingly it has nothing to do with the other specifications, e.g., the bargaining procedures, of the models. Thus if we assume the divisibility of money in money search models, it becomes quite difficult to make accurate predictions of the effects of some policies.

Entrepreneurship and Asymmetric Information in Input Markets

Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets. And, entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. Multiple equilibria can occur. Stable equilibria can be in the interior, or at a corner in which no entrepreneurs enter. Stable interior equilibria can involve involuntary unemployment, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of new firms. With involuntary unemployment, there will be too few new firms, but with full employment, there may be too many or too few. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and employment can be used to achieve a second-best optimum. Alternative information assumptions are explored.entrepreneurship, asymmetric information, adverse selection

Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition

Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full coordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.tax competition, tax coordination, witholding tax