The Moral Duty of Self-Preservation

UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020This chapter provides an in-depth examination of Kant’s view of suicide. After a contextualization of Kant’s prohibition of suicide (§2.1), seven different arguments against the moral permissibility of suicide are identified: three from the Lectures on Ethics (§2.2) and four from the published writings (§2.3). Each argument is presented (with possible variations) and explained. Strengths and flaws are pointed out, and possible objections and counter-objections are discussed, taking into consideration the abundant bibliography on the subject. The conclusion is that, against a recent trend in secondary literature, which tends to read Kant as justifying not only a right, but even a duty to suicide, Kant does not allow for any exception to his strict prohibition of suicide.authorsversionpublishe

Penal Disenfranchisement

This paper considers the justifiability of removing the right to vote from those convicted of crimes. Firstly, I consider the claim that the removal of the right to vote from prisoners (or serious offenders) is necessary as a practical matter to protect the democratic process from those who have shown themselves to be untrustworthy. Secondly, I look at the claim that offenders have broken the social contract and forfeited rights to participate in making law. And thirdly, I look at the claim that the voting ban is essential part of the justified punishment of serious offenders. These arguments have in common the feature that they attempt to articulate the sense in which rights imply responsibilities, particularly that voting rights should be conditional on one's having met one's civic responsibilities. I argue that the only interpretation of this view that could justify prisoner disenfranchisement is that which thinks of disenfranchisement as fair and deserved retributive punishment for crime. Against widespread opposition to, and confusion about, the importance of retributive punishment, I offer a brief defence. However, I conclude that even if legitimate retributive purposes could in principle justify prisoner disenfranchisement, the significance of disenfranchisement is such that it should be reserved for the most serious crimes. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht