30 research outputs found
Applying Benford’s law to detect accounting data manipulation in the banking industry
We utilise Benford’s Law to test if balance sheet and income statement data broadly used to assess bank soundness were manipulated prior to and also during the global financial crisis. We find that all banks resort to loan loss provisions to manipulate earnings and income upwards. Distressed institutions that have stronger incentives to conceal their financial difficulties resort additionally to manipulating loan loss allowances and non-performing loans downwards. Moreover, manipulation is magnified during the crisis and expands to encompass regulatory capital
CEO Profile and Earnings Quality
This paper introduces the PSCORE, which aggregates nine personal characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs), to signal the quality of earnings. The PSCORE is a composite score based on publicly available data on CEOs. The study reports strong positive relationships between the PSCORE and two different proxies for earnings quality, (i) discretionary accruals and (ii) financial statement errors, measured by deviations of the first digits of figures reported in financial statements from those expected by Benford’s Law. Further analyses indicate that the relationships between the PSCORE and the proxies for earnings quality become more pronounced when CEOs have high equity-based compensation incentives. The findings have some implications for practitioners
Was Arthur Andersen different? Further evidence on earnings management by clients of Arthur Andersen
Forestalling capital regulation or masking financial weakness? Evidence from loss reserve management in the property–liability insurance industry
Earnings management: Origins
This chapter seeks to describe the field of inquiry by defining the concepts of earnings quality, earnings management, fraud, and earnings manipulation. It presents the earnings management phenomenon, specifically, from whence it comes. It reviews the mainstream studies, and focuses on two types of earnings management: accruals earnings management and real activities earnings management. In addition, studies related to fraudulent financial reporting (or non-generally accepted accounting principles, i.e. non-GAAP earnings management) will be presented and discussed as well. Furthermore, this chapter presents studies on managerial incentives for earnings management. The most important incentives (or causes) for managing earnings are discussed and the contradictory results provided by some of them highlighted. Finally, a few offsetting causes that may interfere with these main incentives for managing earnings are presented