On "Indifference" and Backward Induction in Games with Perfect Information

Indifference of a player with respect to two distinct outcomes of a game cannot be handled by small perturbations, because the actual choice may have significant impact on other players, and cause them to act in a way that has significant impact of the indifferent player. It is argued that ties among rational choices can be resolved by refinements of the concept of rationality based on the utilities of other players. One such refinement is the concept of Tit-for-Tat

Remarks on Utility in Repeated Bets

The use of von Neumann -- Morgenstern utility is examined in the context of multiple choices between lotteries. Different conclusions are reached if the choices are simultaneous or sequential. It is demonstrated that utility cannot be additive

The parameterized complexity of some geometric problems in unbounded dimension

We study the parameterized complexity of the following fundamental geometric problems with respect to the dimension $d$: i) Given $n$ points in \Rd, compute their minimum enclosing cylinder. ii) Given two $n$-point sets in \Rd, decide whether they can be separated by two hyperplanes. iii) Given a system of $n$ linear inequalities with $d$ variables, find a maximum-size feasible subsystem. We show that (the decision versions of) all these problems are W[1]-hard when parameterized by the dimension $d$. %and hence not solvable in ${O}(f(d)n^c)$ time, for any computable function $f$ and constant $c$ %(unless FPT=W[1]). Our reductions also give a $n^{\Omega(d)}$-time lower bound (under the Exponential Time Hypothesis)

Data-Collection for the Sloan Digital Sky Survey: a Network-Flow Heuristic

The goal of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey is ``to map in detail one-quarter of the entire sky, determining the positions and absolute brightnesses of more than 100 million celestial objects''. The survey will be performed by taking ``snapshots'' through a large telescope. Each snapshot can capture up to 600 objects from a small circle of the sky. This paper describes the design and implementation of the algorithm that is being used to determine the snapshots so as to minimize their number. The problem is NP-hard in general; the algorithm described is a heuristic, based on Lagriangian-relaxation and min-cost network flow. It gets within 5-15% of a naive lower bound, whereas using a ``uniform'' cover only gets within 25-35%.Comment: proceedings version appeared in ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (1998

Hybrid Rounding Techniques for Knapsack Problems

We address the classical knapsack problem and a variant in which an upper bound is imposed on the number of items that can be selected. We show that appropriate combinations of rounding techniques yield novel and powerful ways of rounding. As an application of these techniques, we present a linear-storage Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) and a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) that compute an approximate solution, of any fixed accuracy, in linear time. This linear complexity bound gives a substantial improvement of the best previously known polynomial bounds.Comment: 19 LaTeX page

Computing the Least-core and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games

Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable profit allocation in multi-agent systems. \emph{Core}, \emph{least-core} and \emph{nucleolus} are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on the least-core and nucleolus of threshold cardinality matching games (TCMG). A TCMG is defined on a graph $G=(V,E)$ and a threshold $T$, in which the player set is $V$ and the profit of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is 1 if the size of a maximum matching in $G[S]$ meets or exceeds $T$, and 0 otherwise. We first show that for a TCMG, the problems of computing least-core value, finding and verifying least-core payoff are all polynomial time solvable. We also provide a general characterization of the least core for a large class of TCMG. Next, based on Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in matching theory, we give a concise formulation of the nucleolus for a typical case of TCMG which the threshold $T$ equals $1$. When the threshold $T$ is relevant to the input size, we prove that the nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial time in bipartite graphs and graphs with a perfect matching

An Efficient Interior-Point Method for Online Convex Optimization

A new algorithm for regret minimization in online convex optimization is described. The regret of the algorithm after $T$ time periods is $O(\sqrt{T \log T})$ - which is the minimum possible up to a logarithmic term. In addition, the new algorithm is adaptive, in the sense that the regret bounds hold not only for the time periods $1,\ldots,T$ but also for every sub-interval $s,s+1,\ldots,t$. The running time of the algorithm matches that of newly introduced interior point algorithms for regret minimization: in $n$-dimensional space, during each iteration the new algorithm essentially solves a system of linear equations of order $n$, rather than solving some constrained convex optimization problem in $n$ dimensions and possibly many constraints