254 research outputs found

    Introduction

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    EnThis paper analyses how the central bank's role in the monetary institutional setting can affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture.Using indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence,we claim that these legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification.Therefore,the trade off still holds between the supervisory and the central bank involvement "per se",however,monetary commitment and independence do also matter.In this rispect,in a institutional setting characterized by a central bank deeply and successfully involved in supervision,or legally independent,a multi-authority model is likely to occur

    Conclusion

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    Pandemic recession, helicopter money and central banking: Venice, 1630

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    This paper analyses the monetary policy that the Most Serene Republic of Venice implemented in the years of calamities using a modern equivalent of helicopter money, precisely an extraordinary money issuing, coupled with capital losses for the issuer. We consider the 1629 famine and the 1630-1631 plague as a negative macroeconomic shock that the incumbent government addressed using fiscal monetization. Consolidating the balance sheets of the Mint and of the Giro Bank, and having heterogenous citizens - inequality matters - we show that the Republic implemented what was, in effect, helicopter money driven by political economy reasons, in order to avoid popular riots

    Introduction

    Get PDF
    EnThis paper analyses how the central bank's role in the monetary institutional setting can affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture.Using indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence,we claim that these legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification.Therefore,the trade off still holds between the supervisory and the central bank involvement "per se",however,monetary commitment and independence do also matter.In this rispect,in a institutional setting characterized by a central bank deeply and successfully involved in supervision,or legally independent,a multi-authority model is likely to occur
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