Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games: What is Hard and What is Easy

We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of them acts as leader. In particular, we address the cases where the players either have the same action spaces (i.e., the set of resources they can choose is the same for all of them) or different ones, and where their costs are either monotonic functions of the resource congestion or not. We show that, in the case where the players have different action spaces, the cost the leader incurs in a Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be approximated in polynomial time up to within any polynomial factor in the size of the game unless P = NP, independently of the cost functions being monotonic or not. We show that a similar result also holds when the players have nonmonotonic cost functions, even if their action spaces are the same. Differently, we prove that the case with identical action spaces and monotonic cost functions is easy, and propose polynomial-time algorithm for it. We also improve an algorithm for the computation of a socially optimal equilibrium in singleton congestion games with the same action spaces without leadership, and extend it to the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium for the case where the leader is restricted to pure strategies. For the cases in which the problem of finding an equilibrium is hard, we show how, in the optimistic setting where the followers break ties in favor of the leader, the problem can be formulated via mixed-integer linear programming techniques, which computational experiments show to scale quite well

Computing a Pessimistic Stackelberg Equilibrium with Multiple Followers: The Mixed-Pure Case

The search problem of computing a Stackelberg (or leader-follower)equilibrium (also referred to as an optimal strategy to commit to) has been widely investigated in the scientific literature in, almost exclusively, the single-follower setting. Although the optimistic and pessimistic versions of the problem, i.e., those where the single follower breaks any ties among multiple equilibria either in favour or against the leader, are solved with different methodologies, both cases allow for efficient, polynomial-time algorithms based on linear programming. The situation is different with multiple followers, where results are only sporadic and depend strictly on the nature of the followers' game. In this paper, we investigate the setting of a normal-form game with a single leader and multiple followers who, after observing the leader's commitment, play a Nash equilibrium. When both leader and followers are allowed to play mixed strategies, the corresponding search problem, both in the optimistic and pessimistic versions, is known to be inapproximable in polynomial time to within any multiplicative polynomial factor unless $$\textsf {P}=\textsf {NP}$$. Exact algorithms are known only for the optimistic case. We focus on the case where the followers play pure strategies—a restriction that applies to a number of real-world scenarios and which, in principle, makes the problem easier—under the assumption of pessimism (the optimistic version of the problem can be straightforwardly solved in polynomial time). After casting this search problem (with followers playing pure strategies) as a pessimistic bilevel programming problem, we show that, with two followers, the problem is NP-hard and, with three or more followers, it cannot be approximated in polynomial time to within any multiplicative factor which is polynomial in the size of the normal-form game, nor, assuming utilities in [0, 1], to within any constant additive loss stricly smaller than 1 unless $$\textsf {P}=\textsf {NP}$$. This shows that, differently from what happens in the optimistic version, hardness and inapproximability in the pessimistic problem are not due to the adoption of mixed strategies. We then show that the problem admits, in the general case, a supremum but not a maximum, and we propose a single-level mathematical programming reformulation which asks for the maximization of a nonconcave quadratic function over an unbounded nonconvex feasible region defined by linear and quadratic constraints. Since, due to admitting a supremum but not a maximum, only a restricted version of this formulation can be solved to optimality with state-of-the-art methods, we propose an exact ad hoc algorithm (which we also embed within a branch-and-bound scheme) capable of computing the supremum of the problem and, for cases where there is no leader's strategy where such value is attained, also an $$\alpha$$-approximate strategy where $$\alpha > 0$$ is an arbitrary additive loss (at most as large as the supremum). We conclude the paper by evaluating the scalability of our algorithms via computational experiments on a well-established testbed of game instances

The biological origins of rituals: An interdisciplinary perspective

Ritual behavior is ubiquitous, marking animal motor patterns, normal and psychopathological behavior in human individuals as well as every human culture. Moreover, formal features of rituals appear to be highly conserved along phylogeny and characterized by a circular and spatio-temporal structure typical of habitual behavior with internal repetition of non-functional acts and redirection of attention to the "script" of the performance. A continuity, based on highly conserved cortico-striatal loops, can be traced from animal rituals to human individual and collective rituals with psychopathological compulsions at the crossing point. The transition from "routinization" to "ritualization" may have been promoted to deal with environmental unpredictability in non-social contexts and, through motor synchronization, to enhance intra-group cohesion and communication in social contexts. Ultimately, ritual, following its biological constraints exerts a "homeostatic" function on the environment (social and non-social) under conditions of unpredictability

Black Hole and Galaxy Growth over Cosmic Time: the Chandra COSMOS Legacy Survey

The study of supermassive black hole (SMBH) accretion during their phase of activity (hence becoming active galactic nuclei, AGN), and its relation to the host-galaxy growth, requires large datasets of AGN, including a significant fraction of obscured sources. X-ray data are strategic in AGN selection, because at X-ray energies the contamination from non-active galaxies is far less significant than in optical/infrared surveys, and the selection of obscured AGN, including also a fraction of heavily obscured AGN, is much more effective. In this thesis, I present the results of the Chandra COSMOS Legacy survey, a 4.6 Ms X-ray survey covering the equatorial COSMOS area. The COSMOS Legacy depth (flux limit f=2x10^(-16) erg/s/cm^(-2) in the 0.5-2 keV band) is significantly better than that of other X-ray surveys on similar area, and represents the path for surveys with future facilities, like Athena and X-ray Surveyor. The final Chandra COSMOS Legacy catalog contains 4016 point-like sources, 97% of which with redshift. 65% of the sources are optically obscured and potentially caught in the phase of main BH growth. We used the sample of 174 Chandra COSMOS Legacy at z>3 to place constraints on the BH formation scenario. We found a significant disagreement between our space density and the predictions of a physical model of AGN activation through major-merger. This suggests that in our luminosity range the BH triggering through secular accretion is likely preferred to a major-merger triggering scenario. Thanks to its large statistics, the Chandra COSMOS Legacy dataset, combined with the other multiwavelength COSMOS catalogs, will be used to answer questions related to a large number of astrophysical topics, with particular focus on the SMBH accretion in different luminosity and redshift regimes