The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Markets: Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power

In 2000 a Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former president of the European Monetary Institute was appointed by the Economics and Finance Ministers Council to make recommendations on the regulation of the European securities markets. It proposed a four-level system to improve the legislative process while ensuring what it called a democratic and institutional balance. Our paper questions to what extent the concepts of two basic modes of delegation - agency and trust relationships - are appropriate tools to interpret the new structure set up by the Committee. It formulates hypotheses about its policy effectiveness and the balance of power between Community institutions. Evidence supports the agency hypothesis: the Lamfalussy process has reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the first framework directives at level 1 and it has facilitated the removal of bottlenecks in the process through parallel working at levels 1 and 2. In this sense, delegation has enhanced policy effectiveness in the securities sector. But it is much more difficult to assess the trustee hypothesis: that is, whether the Commission and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in fact act as trustees of the member states for the benefit of market actors. For the time being, whether CESR might evolve into a European securities regulator remains an open questio

Les enjeux institutionnels de la régulation des marchés boursiers européens : de la réforme Lamfalussy aux développements de 2008

En cours de réexamen suite à la crise des subprimes (crédits hypothécaires à risque), la réforme Lamfalussy constitue une refonte du système de décision et de mise en œuvre des règles communautaires, appliqué initialement au secteur des services d'investissement. La perspective de l'introduction de la monnaie unique, contrastée avec les barrières restantes à l'intégration des marchés financiers, a souligné le manque à gagner économique du maintien du système tel qu'il était. Il existe en effet, à côté des marchés, deux facteurs de nature institutionnelle qui expliquent cette réforme: l'inefficacité du système décisionnel et de mise en œuvre, et la présence d'un conflit institutionnel entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen en matière de comitologie. C'est ce que cet article s'attache à démontrer tout en relevant les premières mesures prises suite à la crise financière de 200

Comparing the federal regulatory architectures of the EU and the US in the field of investment services : an approach based on agency and trust

The dissertation explains how it comes that the EU and the US have different federal regulatory architectures in the field of investment services despite systemic similarities. Several independent variables are put forward to explain the form taken by the regulatory architecture in both entities, as well as to explain the difference in the degree of autonomy of their respective regulatory bodies, namely CESR and the SEC.(POL 3) -- UCL, 200

Les enjeux institutionnels de la régulation des marchés boursiers européens : de la réforme Lamfalussy aux développements de 2008

En cours de réexamen suite à la crise des subprimes (crédits hypothécaires à risque), la réforme Lamfalussy constitue une refonte du système de décision et de mise en œuvre des règles communautaires, appliqué initialement au secteur des services d'investissement. La perspective de l'introduction de la monnaie unique, contrastée avec les barrières restantes à l'intégration des marchés financiers, a souligné le manque à gagner économique du maintien du système tel qu'il était. Il existe en effet, à côté des marchés, deux facteurs de nature institutionnelle qui expliquent cette réforme: l'inefficacité du système décisionnel et de mise en œuvre, et la présence d'un conflit institutionnel entre le Conseil et le Parlement européen en matière de comitologie. C'est ce que cet article s'attache à démontrer tout en relevant les premières mesures prises suite à la crise financière de 200

The Lamfalussy Reform in the EU Securities Market : Fiduciary Relationships, Policy Effectiveness and Balance of Power

In 2000 a Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, former president of the European Monetary Institute was appointed by the Economics and Finance Ministers Council to make recommendations on the regulation of the European securities markets. It proposed a four-level system to improve the legislative process while ensuring what it called a democratic and institutional balance. Our paper questions to what extent the concepts of two basic modes of delegation – agency and trust relationships – are appropriate tools to interpret the new structure set up by the Committee. It formulates hypotheses about its policy effectiveness and the balance of power between Community institutions. Evidence supports the agency hypothesis: the Lamfalussy process has reduced the average time taken to negotiate and adopt the first framework directives at level and it has facilitated the removal of bottlenecks in the process through parallel working at levels 1 and 2. In this sense, delegation has enhanced policy effectiveness in the securities sector. But it is much more difficult to assess the trustee hypothesis: that is, whether the Commission and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) in fact act as trustees of the member states for the benefit of market actors. For the time being, whether CESR might evolve into a European securities regulator remains an open question