Executive Pay in the Public Sector: The Case of CEOs in UK Universities

We analyse top management public sector pay using a panel data of university Vice Chancellors (VC) in UK. We assess how institutional performance, hierarchical effects, and personal characteristics determine VC pay. VC personal data covers personal details, qualifications and career history, which let us distinguish between internal promotions and hires from outside academia. We use the results of three Research Assessment Exercises as academic performance indicators, and university financial positions as measures of sound executive management. We analysed the importance of university salary structure and how they affect VC pay. Fixed and random institutional effects are also identified and analysed.pay, public sector, CEO, universities

Things Can Only get Worse? An Empirical Examination of the Peter Principle.

The results reported in this paper suggest the possible operation of the Peter Principle in a large hierarchical financial sector firm. This result holds even after we allow for variation in optimal effort over stages in the hierarchy. The method also allows us to attribute the contributory factors for the observed fall in performance after a promotion. It appears that approximately 2/3 of the fall is due to the Peter Principle and 1/3 due to lessening incentives.We acknowledge helpful comments received from Hans Hvide, and session participants at the 2005 Scottish Economic Society Conference where and earlier version of this paper was presented

Doctor Behaviour Under a Pay for Performance Contract: Evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework

Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the denominator is the number of patients the practices declares are suitable for the indicator. The number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.Quality. Incentives. Gaming. Pay for performance.

Doctor Behaviour Under a Pay for Performance Contract: Further Evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework

Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the denominator is the number of patients the practices declare are suitable for the indicator. The number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.Quality. Incentives. Gaming. Pay for performance.

Determinants of General Practitioners' Wages in England

We analyse the determinants of annual net income and wages (annual net income/hours) of general practitioners (GPs) using a unique, anonymised, non-disclosive dataset derived from tax returns for 21,657 GPs in England for the financial year 2002/3. The average GP had a gross income of £189,300, incurred expenses of £115,600, and earned an annual net income of £73,700. The mean wage was £35 per hour. Net income and wages depended on gender, experience, list size, partnership size, whether or not the GP worked in a dispensing practice, whether or not they worked in a Primary Medical Service (PMS) practice, and the characteristics of the local population (limiting long term illness rate, proportion from ethnic minorities, population density, Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000). The findings have implications for discrimination by GP gender and country of qualification, economies of scale by practice size, incentives for competition for patients, compensating differentials for local population characteristics, and the attractiveness of PMS versus General Medical Services contracts.Physician, family. General practitioner. Income. Wages. Contract.

Face-To-Face Driver Model: Effects on the Academic Performance and Attitude towards Mathematics of 4th Grade Learners

This experiment was conducted to determine the effects of Face-to-Face Driver Model to the academic performance and attitude towards Mathematics of fourthgrade learners. The researcher used Quasi-Experimental design. Sixty respondentscame from two sections of 4th grade learners in one of the Elementary Schools inDasmariñas. Control and experimental groups were statistically equated at the startof the experiment. Findings revealed that there was a significant difference in themean achievement in Mathematics and academic performance mean scores of eachgroups. The group exposed in the integration of technology obtained a higher meangain. There is no significant difference in the attitude of the control group.However, there is a significant difference in the attitude of the experimental group.There is a significant difference in the gain score between the experimental andcontrol groups, but no significant difference exists on achievement and attitude ofthe group according to types of learner. There is a significant difference in thechange in attitude and performance of the students in the experimental and controlgroup while there is no significant difference in the change on attitude andperformance of different type of learners. Likewise, the interaction effect oftreatment (Control and Experimental) and type of learner (Auditory, Visual andTactile) is not significant. The result indicated that learners’ performance andpositive attitude of learning towards Mathematics increased when technology isintegrated. The findings also led to conclusion that Face-to-Face Driver Modelproves to be a better approach in teaching 4th grade Mathematics