On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.Separating equilibria;signalling games;Stackelberg competition

The earlier the better: a theory of timed actor interfaces

Programming embedded and cyber-physical systems requires attention not only to functional behavior and correctness, but also to non-functional aspects and specifically timing and performance. A structured, compositional, model-based approach based on stepwise refinement and abstraction techniques can support the development process, increase its quality and reduce development time through automation of synthesis, analysis or verification. Toward this, we introduce a theory of timed actors whose notion of refinement is based on the principle of worst-case design that permeates the world of performance-critical systems. This is in contrast with the classical behavioral and functional refinements based on restricting sets of behaviors. Our refinement allows time-deterministic abstractions to be made of time-non-deterministic systems, improving efficiency and reducing complexity of formal analysis. We show how our theory relates to, and can be used to reconcile existing time and performance models and their established theories

Scheduling Optimisations for SPIN to Minimise Buffer Requirements in Synchronous Data Flow

Synchronous Data flow (SDF) graphs have a simple and elegant semantics (essentially linear algebra) which makes SDF graphs eminently suitable as a vehicle for studying scheduling optimisations. We extend related work on using SPIN to experiment with scheduling optimisations aimed at minimising buffer requirements.We show that for a benchmark of commonly used case studies the performance of our SPIN based scheduler is comparable to that of state of the art research tools. The key to success is using the semantics of SDF to prove when using (even unsound and/or incomplete) optimisations are justified. The main benefit of our approach lies in gaining deep insight in the optimisations at relatively low cost

Een wetenschapper in de beleidswereld

Sinds 2001 heb ik een paar grotere, interessante projecten mogen doen, zoals het evaluatieonderzoek voor de Tweede Kamer naar de veiling van UMTS-frequenties. Daarnaast heb ik in opdracht van verschillende bedrijven diverse NMa-studies van commentaar voorzien. Vanuit mijn persoonlijke ervaring wil ik een aantal reacties op het artikel van Geurts en Raes geven

Auctions as Collusion Devices

This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction.I show that the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount (almost) equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices

Sociology in the Economic Mode

A Review Essay on James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990

Microfoundations

This paper gives an overview and evaluates the literature on Microfoundations