Environmental Policies and Mergers’ Externalities

A Cournot oligopolistic setting model of trade is characterized by local and foreign firms competing in the presence of pollution quota and tax. Local firms are foreign-owned (FDI) and repatriate their profits. First, we analyze the impact on welfare given by the merger of the local firms, as a response to external firms’ competition and pollution abatement costs. Second, when merger is welfare decreasing, we study the best response of the government in order to compensate this negative externality. Finally, we compare the pollution quota and tax in order to determine their efficiency as a policy instrument.environmental policies, mergers, emission permits

Life Cycle Assessment with BIM Towards Sustainable Energy Policy-Making: The Case of Urban Transformation in Istanbul

Buildings are responsible for almost forty percent of global energy. Due to their high consumption of energy, buildings are on the front line of sustainability researches. In Turkey, six million out of twenty-two million buildings need to be demolished and rebuilt to meet seismic standards. These buildings are also far below the standards in terms of energy efficiency. Therefore, urban transformation can be thought of as a great opportunity for energy efficiency. This study investigates four things: (i) the energy-efficient urban transformation strategy in GaziosmanpaÅŸa-Istanbul region, which is selected as a case study; (ii) the effect of energy efficiency in this market; (iii) the adequacy of energy standards of Turkey; and (iv) contribution of digitalization in construction to sustainability with Building Information Modelling (BIM) and energy analysis. According to the energy efficiency scenarios, energy analyses were carried out on the BIM model. The most cost-effective strategy was determined with the Life Cycle Cost method. When compared with the current situation, it is possible to save energy up to 227 GWh a year, which is equal to the annual heating energy demand of approximately 30,000 housing, in the case study area with the most efficient scenario to be realized

Transboundary Pollution From Consumption In A Reciprocal Dumping Model

We analyse transboundary pollution externalities caused by consumption of goods. The model is of a reciprocal dumping type in which there are two countries and two firms. Each firm produces a homogeneous good to be consumed in both markets. There are two policies available to the governments of the two countries: consumption taxes and import tariffs. We characterise the Nash optimal levels of the instruments in the two countries. Our results suggest that the conditions satisfying higher consumption taxes in one country satisfy lower tariffs in that country. It is found that starting from non-cooperative solutions, an infinitesimal uniform reduction is unambiguously Pareto improving for each country and for the global welfare. This is because the gain from an increase in consumer surplus due to reform is larger than the loss in the tax revenues of the governments. Moreover, a revenue neutral reform which increases consumption taxes and reduce tariffs, is strictly Pareto improving.

Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Linkages: FDI versus Imports

Desarrollamos un modelo donde el gobierno del país huésped intenta atraer IED en presencia de competidores foráneos que exportan al país huésped un bien imperfectamente sustituto. El gobierno del país huésped es un agente maximizador de bienestar con dos estrategias de política impositiva: un impuesto por unidad de producto de las empresas foráneas,y una tarifa por unidad de producto sobre las importaciones. Mostramos que una tarifa positiva y un impuesto negativo al producto será el óptimo. Sin embargo, cuando ambas políticas impositivas se determinan simultáneamente, la política óptima es subsidiar a la IED. También, cuando las políticas impositivas son aplicadas uniformemente (como un impuesto al consumo) el impuesto óptimo es negativo

Domestic lobbying and foreign direct investment. The role of policy instruments

Following the Common Agency approach to political equilibrium, we examine how domestic interest groups can influence national policies toward FDI and how the choice of instrument by the government can affect lobbying activities. Domestic firms lobby for lower subsidies when a discriminatory subsidy on FDI is applied. However, when a subsidy is applied uniformly to both groups, they may lobby for higher subsidies. The nature of lobbying is also different for proportional and lump-sum profit subsidies when uniformly applied. The qualitative effect of the number of domestic firms or the degree of corruption on the equilibrium depends on the choice of instruments. Finally, with the help of numerical simulation, we examine whether there is any potential conflict between the government and the lobby groups on the choice of the instrument.Foreign direct investment, lobbying, subsidies,

Political contributions, subsidy and mergers

A partir de un modelo oligopolístico de equilibrio parcial, modelamos los efectos de las fusiones y el cabildeo político doméstico para definir políticas nacionales de subsidio. Empresas locales y foráneas compiten en un mercado de bienes homogéneos en un país huésped de inversión. La producción óptima de las empresas va a depender de la política de subsidio. Las empresas locales ofrecen cabildear con contribuciones económicas al gobierno para afectar la decisión de política. El gobierno establece la política óptima maximizando el peso entre las contribuciones políticas y el bienestar social agregado, tomando en cuenta las fusiones que hacen las empresas locales como respuesta a la competencia foránea