517 research outputs found
Actions Made Explicit in BDI
The Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI) architecture is increasingly being used in a wide range of complex applications for agents. Many theories and models exists which support this architecture and the recent version is that of capability being added as an additional construct. In all these models the concept of action is seen in an endogenous manner. We argue that the result of an action performed by an agent is extremely important when dealing with composite actions and hence the need for an explicit representation of them. The capability factor is supported using a RES construct and it is shown how the components of a composite action is supported using these two. Further, we introduce an OPP (opportunity) operator which in alliance with result and capability provides a better semantics for practical reasoning in BDI
Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action
Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others are proprietary: reasons of oneâs own that have no direct practical significance for other participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature of joint action. Advocates of âteam reasoningâ link the special collective intention individual participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of practical reasoning that purports to put individuals in touch with group or collective reasons. Such views entail the surprising conclusion that one cannot engage in joint action for proprietary reasons. Suppose we understand the contrast between minimal and robust forms of joint action in terms of the extent to which participants act on proprietary reasons as opposed to shared reasons. Then, if the team reasoning view of joint intention and action is correct, it makes no sense to talk of minimal joint action. As soon as the reason for which one participates is proprietary, then one is not, on this view, genuinely engaged in joint action
What's the point of knowing how?
Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge-how? Using Edward Craigâs discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge and knowledge-how as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge-how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge-how: pooling capacities, and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge-how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that the evidence is much more equivocal. My suggested diagnosis is that the concept of knowledge-how plays both functions, meaning that the concept of knowledge-how is inconsistent, and that the debate about knowledge-how is at least partly a metalinguistic negotiation. In closing, I suggest a way to revise the philosophical concept of knowledge how
Why We Conform
Are humans fundamentally helpful, or does coercion inevitably come with altruism? Julia Fischer examines this question in her review of Michael Tomasello's new book, Why We Cooperate
Interacting mindreaders
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition
Rationality as the Rule of Reason
The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account
The Integrated Theory of Emotional Behavior Follows a Radically Goal-Directed Approach
Formal Agent Development: Framework to System
Much work in the field of agent-based systems has tended to focus on either the development of practical applications of agent systems on the one hand, or the development of sophisticated logics for reasoning about agent systems on the other. Our own view is that work on formal models of agent-based systems are valuable inasmuch as they contribute to a fundamental goal of computing of practical agent development. In an ongoing project that has been running for several years, we have sought to do exactly that through the development of a formal framework that provides a conceptual infrastructure for the analysis and modelling of agents and multi-agent systems on the one hand, and enables implemented and deployed systems to be evaluated and compared on the other. In this paper, we describe our research programme, review its achievements to date, and suggest directions for the future
An agent-based approach to assess driversâ interaction with pre-trip information systems.
This article reports on the practical use of a multi-agent microsimulation framework to address the issue of assessing driversâ
responses to pretrip information systems. The population of drivers is represented as a community of autonomous agents,
and travel demand results from the decision-making deliberation performed by each individual of the population as regards
route and departure time. A simple simulation scenario was devised, where pretrip information was made available to users
on an individual basis so that its effects at the aggregate level could be observed. The simulation results show that the
overall performance of the system is very likely affected by exogenous information, and these results are ascribed to demand
formation and network topology. The expressiveness offered by cognitive approaches based on predicate logics, such as the
one used in this research, appears to be a promising approximation to fostering more complex behavior modelling, allowing
us to represent many of the mental aspects involved in the deliberation process
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