Ignorance is not always Bliss: Feedback and Dynamics in Public Good Experiments

In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions and earnings on the dynamics of contributions in a repeated public good game. We include treatments where subjects can freely choose whether to obtain additional information about individual contributions or individual earnings. We find that, in the aggregate, contributions decline less fast when additional information about contributions and earnings is provided on top of aggregate information. We also find that there exist substantial but intuitively appealing differences in the way individuals react to feedback. Particularly, individuals with a high propensity to contribute tend to imitate the highest contributor more often and are more inclined to obtain feedback about individual contributions than about individual earnings than individuals with a lower propensity to contribute.voluntary contributions;experiment;repeated interaction;feedback;imitation

An experiment on experimental instructions

In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good game, we study how the instructions' format affects the participants' understanding of the experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer instructions do not significantly improve the subjects' understanding of the experiment; on-screen instructions shorten average decision times with respect to on-paper instructions, and requiring forced inputs reduces waiting times, in particular for the slowest subjects. Consistent with cognitive load theory, we find that short, on-screen instructions which require forced inputs improve on subjects' comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task, and they contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting the overall pattern of contributions.

Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence

Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.

Teams or Tournaments? A Field Experiment on Cooperation and Competition in Academic Achievement

This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students’ effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.

Integration algorithms of elastoplasticity for ceramic powder compaction

Inelastic deformation of ceramic powders (and of a broad class of rock-like and granular materials), can be described with the yield function proposed by Bigoni and Piccolroaz (2004, Yield criteria for quasibrittle and frictional materials. Int. J. Solids and Structures, 41, 2855-2878). This yield function is not defined outside the yield locus, so that 'gradient-based' integration algorithms of elastoplasticity cannot be directly employed. Therefore, we propose two ad hoc algorithms: (i.) an explicit integration scheme based on a forward Euler technique with a 'centre-of-mass' return correction and (ii.) an implicit integration scheme based on a 'cutoff-substepping' return algorithm. Iso-error maps and comparisons of the results provided by the two algorithms with two exact solutions (the compaction of a ceramic powder against a rigid spherical cup and the expansion of a thick spherical shell made up of a green body), show that both the proposed algorithms perform correctly and accurately.Comment: 21 pages. Journal of the European Ceramic Society, 201

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end.

Spectral tensor-train decomposition

The accurate approximation of high-dimensional functions is an essential task in uncertainty quantification and many other fields. We propose a new function approximation scheme based on a spectral extension of the tensor-train (TT) decomposition. We first define a functional version of the TT decomposition and analyze its properties. We obtain results on the convergence of the decomposition, revealing links between the regularity of the function, the dimension of the input space, and the TT ranks. We also show that the regularity of the target function is preserved by the univariate functions (i.e., the "cores") comprising the functional TT decomposition. This result motivates an approximation scheme employing polynomial approximations of the cores. For functions with appropriate regularity, the resulting \textit{spectral tensor-train decomposition} combines the favorable dimension-scaling of the TT decomposition with the spectral convergence rate of polynomial approximations, yielding efficient and accurate surrogates for high-dimensional functions. To construct these decompositions, we use the sampling algorithm \texttt{TT-DMRG-cross} to obtain the TT decomposition of tensors resulting from suitable discretizations of the target function. We assess the performance of the method on a range of numerical examples: a modifed set of Genz functions with dimension up to $100$, and functions with mixed Fourier modes or with local features. We observe significant improvements in performance over an anisotropic adaptive Smolyak approach. The method is also used to approximate the solution of an elliptic PDE with random input data. The open source software and examples presented in this work are available online.Comment: 33 pages, 19 figure

Ancestors of Governmentality: Accounting and Pastoral Power in the 15th century

Foucault identified the roots of governmentality in religious beliefs and religious history with its genealogical core the equivalent of pastoral power, the art of governing people by relying on a dualistic logic; individualization and totalization. This technology of power arose and matured within the Roman Catholic Church and provided a model for many states in the achievement and exercise of power. Informed by the work of Foucault on pastoral power the present work examines the genealogical core of governmentality in the context of the Roman Catholic Church at a time of great crisis in the 15th century when the Roman Catholic Church was undergoing reform instituted by Pope Eugenius IV (1431–1447). The contributions of accounting to pastoral power are shown in this study to have been pivotal in restoring the Church's standing and influence. Accounting was one of the technologies that allowed the bishops to control both the diocese as a whole and each priest, to subjugate the priests to the bishops’ authority and, thereby, to govern the diocese through a never-ending extraction of truth

Experimental investigation of the elastoplastic response of aluminum silicate spray dried powder during cold compaction

Mechanical experiments have been designed and performed to investigate the elasto-plastic behaviour of green bodies formed from an aluminum silicate spray dried powder used for tiles production. Experiments have been executed on samples obtained from cold compaction into a cylindrical mould and include: uniaxial strain, equi-biaxial flexure and high-pressure triaxial compression/extension tests. Two types of powders have been used to realize the green body samples, differing in the values of water content, which have been taken equal to those usually employed in the industrial forming of traditional ceramics. Yielding of the green body during compaction has been characterized in terms of yield surface shape, failure envelope, and evolution of cohesion and void ratio with the forming pressure, confirming the validity of previously proposed constitutive models for dense materials obtained through cold compaction of granulates.Comment: 17 pages; Journal of the European Ceramic Society, 201

Accounting for Hegemony: Fascist Ideology and the Shifting Roles of Accounting at the University of Ferrara and the Alla Scala Opera House (1922-1943)

Accounting researchers have shown how accounting is implicated in the creation of power relations. Most studies assume a unidirectional relationship between the ideological beliefs of those in power and accounting practices. The study adopts Gramsci’s understanding of power relations to analyse how Italian Fascists enlisted accounting information to ensure that two important organisations, the University of Ferrara and the Alla Scala Opera House, would become a conduit for the diffusion of Fascist ideology. The paper shows how there is not an uncomplicated, unidirectional relationship between ideology and accounting. The illusorily neutral appearance of accounting allows it to be adapted to play different roles and acquire different meanings even in the achievement of the same set of ideological beliefs. The study also shows how Gramsci’s thought offers an alternative reading of power relations to that of Foucault and Marx and considers a set of ideological beliefs which are scarcely analysed in accounting history studies