The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests

The fact that most eldealy individuals in the United States choose to maintain a flat age-wealth profile, rather than buy individual life annuities, stands in contrast to central implications of the standard life-cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based either on the cost of annuities, importantly including the element of that cost due to adverse selection, or on the interaction of that cost and an intentional bequest motive. Expected yields offered on individual life annuities in the United States are lower by some 4-6%, or 2 1/2-4 1/2% after allowing for adverse selection, than yields on alternative long-term fixed-income investments. Simulations of an extended model of life-cycle saving and portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain lifetimes and Social Security, show that yield differentials in this range can account for the observed behavior, even in the absence of a bequest motive, during the early years of retirement. By contrast, at older ages the combination of yield differentials in this range and a positive bequest motive is necessary to do so.

Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States

The observed reluctance of most individuals in the United States to buy individual life annuities, and the concomitant approximately flat average age-wealth profile, stand in sharp contradiction to the standard life cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based on the interaction of an intentional bequest motive and annuity prices that are not actuarially fair. Premiums charged for individual life annuities in the United States include a load factor of 32-48c per dollar,or18-33c per dollar after allowing for adverse selection, in comparison to actuarially fair annuity values. Load factors of this size are not out of line with those on other familiar (and almost universally purchased) insurance products. Simulations of an extended model of life cycle saving and portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain lifetimes and Social Security, show that the load factor charged would have to be far larger than this to account for the observed behavior in the absence of a bequest motive. By contrast, the combination of a load factor in this range and a positive bequest motive can do so for some plausible values of the assumed underlying parameters. Moreover,if this combination of factors is leading elderly individuals to avoid purchasing life annuities, it implies a typical bequest that is fairly large in comparison to their consumption.

A Multiple-range Self-balancing Thermocouple Potentiometer

A multiple-range potentiometer circuit is described that provides automatic measurement of temperatures or temperature differences with any one of several thermocouple-material pairs. Techniques of automatic reference junction compensation, span adjustment, and zero suppression are described that permit rapid selection of range and wire material, without the necessity for restandardization, by setting of two external tap switches

Taxing Retirement Income: Nonqualified Annuities and Distributions from Qualified Accounts

This paper explores the current tax treatment of non-qualified immediate annuities and distributions from tax-qualified retirement plans in the United States. First, we describe how immediate annuities held outside retirement accounts are taxed. We conclude that the current income tax treatment of annuities does not substantially alter the incentive to purchase an annuity rather than a taxable bond. We nevertheless find differences across different individuals in the effective tax burden on annuity contracts. Second, we examine an alternative method of taxing annuities that would avoid changing the fraction of the annuity payment that is included in taxable income as the annuitant ages, but would still raise the same expected present discounted value of revenues as the current income tax rule. We find that a shift to a constant inclusion ratio increases the utility of annuitants, and that this increase is greater for more risk averse individuals. Third, we examine how payouts from qualified accounts are taxed, focusing on both annuity payouts and minimum distribution requirements that constrain the feasible time path of nonannuitized payouts. We describe briefly the origins and workings of the minimum distribution rules and we also provide evidence on the fraction of retirement assets potentially affected by these rules.