105 research outputs found

    Beyond chance? The persistence of performance in online poker

    Get PDF
    A major issue in the widespread controversy about the legality of poker and the appropriate taxation of winnings is whether poker should be considered a game of skill or a game of chance. To inform this debate we present an analysis into the role of skill in the performance of online poker players, using a large database with hundreds of millions of player-hand observations from real money ring games at three different stakes levels. We find that players whose earlier profitability was in the top (bottom) deciles perform better (worse) and are substantially more likely to end up in the top (bottom) performance deciles of the following time period. Regression analyses of performance on historical performance and other skill-related proxies provide further evidence for persistence and predictability. Simulations point out that skill dominates chance when performance is measured over 1,500 or more hands of play

    Split or Steal? Cooperative Behavior When the Stakes Are Large

    Get PDF
    We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a “big peanuts” phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, we find evidence that people have reciprocal preferences. Surprisingly, there is little support for conditional cooperation in our sample. That is, players do not seem to be more likely to cooperate if their opponent might be expected to cooperate. Further, we replicate earlier findings that males are less cooperative than females, but this gender effect reverses for older contestants because men become increasingly cooperative as their age increases

    Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma

    Get PDF
    Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when “playing” for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected

    Number preferences in lotteries

    Get PDF
    We explore people's preferences for numbers in large proprietary data sets from two different lottery games. We find that choice is far from uniform, and exhibits some familiar and some new tendencies and biases. Players favor personally meaningful and situationally available numbers, and are attracted towards numbers in the center of the choice form. Frequent players avoid winning numbers from recent draws, whereas infrequent players chase these. Combinations of numbers are formed with an eye for aesthetics, and players tend to spread their numbers relatively evenly across the possible range

    Alternative phenotypes of male mating behaviour in the two-spotted spider mite

    Get PDF
    Severe intraspecific competition for mates selects for aggressive individuals but may also lead to the evolution of alternative phenotypes that do not act aggressively, yet manage to acquire matings. The two-spotted spider mite, Tetranychus urticae, shows male mate-guarding behaviour and male–male combat for available females. This may provide opportunity for weaker males to avoid fighting by adopting alternative mating behaviour such as sneaker or satellite tactics as observed in other animals. We investigated male precopulatory behaviour in the two-spotted spider mite by means of video-techniques and found three types of male mating behaviour: territorial, sneaker and opportunistic. Territorial and sneaker males associate with female teleiochrysales and spend much time guarding them. Territorial males are easily disturbed by rival males and engage themselves in fights with them. However, sneaker males are not at all disturbed by rival males, never engage in fights and, strikingly, never face attack by territorial males. Opportunistic males wander around in search of females that are in the teleiochrysalis stage but very close to or at emergence. To quickly classify any given mate-guarding male as territorial or sneaker we developed a method based on the instantaneous response of males to disturbance by a live male mounted on top of a brush. We tested this method against the response of the same males to natural disturbance by two or three other males. Because this method proved to be successful, we used it to collect territorial and sneaker males, and subjected them to morphological analysis to assess whether the various behavioural phenotypes are associated with different morphological characters. However, we found no statistical differences between territorial and sneaker males, concerning the length of the first legs, the stylets, the pedipalps or the body. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10493-013-9673-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users
    corecore