Separation of body and soul in Plato’s Phaedo : an unprecedented ontological operation in the affinity argument

Instituto de Ciências Humanas (ICH)Departamento de Filosofia (ICH FIL

The Life and Death of Barn Beetles: Faunas from Manure and Stored Hay inside Farm Buildings in Northern Iceland

This research was funded by the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission and received support from the Research Budget of the Department of Archaeology at the University of Aberdeen. This project was undertaken as part of doctoral studies supervised by Dr Karen Milek, to whom V.F. is especially grateful for her support and advice. Thomas Birch, Sigrún Inga Garðarsdóttir, and Paul Ledger provided invaluable assistance during fieldwork. V.F. would like to dedicate this paper to Tom and Sía, who met during this fieldwork and are getting married this year. Many people from Fornleifastofnun Íslands – Garðar Guðmundsson, Ólöf Þorsteinsdóttir, Þóra Pétursdóttir, Adolf Friðriksson and Uggi Ævarsson – as well as Unnstein Ingason, Ágústa Edwald, and Mark Young, helped with fieldwork logistics. Special thanks are due to all the Icelandic farmers and their families who kindly allowed us to collect insects on their farms and provided help when needed: Hermann Aðalsteinsson, Hermína Fjóla Ingólfsdóttir, Guðmundur Skúlason, Sigrún Á. Franzdóttir, Dúna Magnúsdóttir, Sverrir Steinbergsson, Valgeir Þorvaldsson, Reynir Sveinsson, Jónas Þór Ingólfsson, and Ívar Ólafsson. Eva Panagiotakopulu, Jan Klimaszewski, Ales Smetana, Georges Pelletier, Gabor Pozsgai, and Jenni Stockham helped with some of the beetle identifications. A.J.D. acknowledges the support of National Science Foundation through ARC 1202692. Consultation of the BugsCEP database (Buckland & Buckland, 2006) aided the redaction of this paper. The authors would like to thank David Smith and two anonymous reviewers for insightful comments that helped improve the quality of this paper.Peer reviewedPostprin

On what a theory of natural law is supposed to be

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.Una determinada teoría se puede denominar, propiamente, teoría de ley natural, si su operación se verifica de acuerdo con presupuestos o contenidos reconocibles bajo ese adjetivo, o si presenta una interpretación convincente de alguna teoría conocidamente aceptada en conformidad con la tradición de ley natural, en términos generales. Funciona como tal teoría si recoge referencias a la ley natural para ‘contextualizar’ la ley humana. Tiene un contenido reconocible si hace referencia a la teología natural providencial, como fundamento de una ley que figura recibida antes de cualquier acuerdo. Estaría claramente ubicada en la tradición, y correctamente aceptada como tal teoría, si fuera una interpretación convincente del Tratado de Ley de Aquino, que es el locus classicus para el tratamiento filosófico de la ley natural. Pero la Nueva Ley Natural, por primera vez expuesta en Ley Natural y Derechos Naturales (LNDN) de John Finnis, no satisface ninguno de estos criterios. Cabe interpretar mejor LNDN, como una contribución al debate sobre «ley y moralidad,» pero no como una teoría de ley natural. Esta obra solamente ofrece otro «método de ética» como muchas otras obras producidas en el siglo 20. Si esto es así, el trabajo filosófico necesario para provocar el estímulo contemporáneo acerca de la ley natural sigue pendiente de aparecer

On what a theory of natural law is supposed to be

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.Una determinada teoría se puede denominar, propiamente, teoría de ley natural, si su operación se verifica de acuerdo con presupuestos o contenidos reconocibles bajo ese adjetivo, o si presenta una interpretación convincente de alguna teoría conocidamente aceptada en conformidad con la tradición de ley natural, en términos generales. Funciona como tal teoría si recoge referencias a la ley natural para ‘contextualizar’ la ley humana. Tiene un contenido reconocible si hace referencia a la teología natural providencial, como fundamento de una ley que figura recibida antes de cualquier acuerdo. Estaría claramente ubicada en la tradición, y correctamente aceptada como tal teoría, si fuera una interpretación convincente del Tratado de Ley de Aquino, que es el locus classicus para el tratamiento filosófico de la ley natural. Pero la Nueva Ley Natural, por primera vez expuesta en Ley Natural y Derechos Naturales (LNDN) de John Finnis, no satisface ninguno de estos criterios. Cabe interpretar mejor LNDN, como una contribución al debate sobre «ley y moralidad,» pero no como una teoría de ley natural. Esta obra solamente ofrece otro «método de ética» como muchas otras obras producidas en el siglo 20. Si esto es así, el trabajo filosófico necesario para provocar el estímulo contemporáneo acerca de la ley natural sigue pendiente de aparecer