Europe’s new deal: a new version of an expiring deal

The article elaborates upon the reasons of institutional default (Part 1) and, in turn, upon the implications of economic default in Europe (Part 2). In relation to the reasons of institutional default, the paper cast light on three broadly interrelating elements: First, the conceptual issue that the EU has been operating as a community without democracy, which was clearly illustrated in the case of the economic crisis (Sect. 2.1). Second, the structural issue that EU democracy, where applicable, was deprived of politics, in the sense that founding ideology has been completely superseded by the inflexible dominance of free market (Sect. 2.2). And, third, the technical issue that EU politics, where applicable, especially after the Euro-zone launching, lacked principles that could keep the community intact (Sect. 2.3). In relation to the implications of economic default, the paper reveals three salient features. First, the political impact, namely that Europe seems to be puzzled by a sharp division between stability/cohesion and growth/monetarism, which mutates the essential mainstays of a Community (Sect. 3.1). Second, the social impact, i.e. increase of discrepancies within the EU, mostly as a result of diminution of labour rights and the correlating destruction of cohesion (Sect. 3.2). And, third, the psychological impact, which revolves around two antithetical poles, namely stereotyping and nationalism (Sect. 3.3). The epilogue reflects the view that the current depression is both a disaster and an opportunity for Europe, therefore the old messianic deal of the European integration needs an afresh look within the frame of democratic legitimacy and accountability and with an essential preservation of social state. © 2013 The Author(s)

The Historical Evolution of Central Banking

International audience"Central banking" is what a central bank does, but the definition of "central bank" is less straightforward than it may appear at first sight. Following Ugolini (2017), this chapter defines central banking as the provision of public policies aimed at fostering monetary and financial stability, and surveys the historical evolution of such policies in the West from the Middle Ages to today. It shows that institutional equilibria mattered a lot in shaping the way stabilization policies were implemented: central banking evolved in markedly distinct ways in city states (like Venice, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Barcelona, or Genoa), centralized territorial polities (like Naples, Sweden, England, Austria, or France), or decentralized territorial polities (like the United States or the European Union). As a result, the historical evolution of central banking does not appear to have been driven by the "survival of the fittest", but rather by the constant adaptation of policymaking to changing political economy equilibria