Molecular, morphological, and phytochemical evidence for a broad species concept of Plagiochila bifaria (Hepaticae)

Debate over the synonymy of the European Plagiochila killarniensis and the Neotropical P bifaria of R sect. Arrectae has focused on differences in secondary metabolite composition. The broad morphological species concept of R bifaria proposed in recent papers has now been tested by comparing nrDNA ITS1 and ITS2 sequences of R bifaria populations encompassing several different morpho- and chemotypes from the British Isles, Tenerife, Costa Rica, Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia, with sequences of other species of R sects. Arrectae, Rutilantes, and Fuscoluteae. Phylogenetic analyses demonstrate that specimens of P. bifaria form a well supported clade within Plagiochila sect. Arrectae. Sequences of R bifaria from the British Isles, Tenerife, and Ecuador, representing the "methyl everninate" chemotype, form a well supported subclade within the P bifaria clade. Sequences of specimens from Costa Rica, Brazil, and Bolivia are placed in the basal part of the R bifaria clade. The data support a broad species concept of P bifaria. The different chemotypes do not warrant distinct taxonomic ranks. Plagiochila centrifuga and P. compressula are treated as new synonyms of R bifaria

Financing The Palliser Triangle, 1908-1913

A decade ago, David C. Jones compellingly described the immense ecological and human tragedy that occurred in the southern, semiarid districts of Alberta and Saskatchewan in the late 1910s and early 1920s.1 Prior to World War I settlers poured into these provinces buoyed by dreams of a better life, but in the decade or so following 1915 many who had taken homesteads in the so-called Palliser Triangle saw their hopes shattered by successive years of drought and crop failure. One of the crucial vehicles in this tragedy was the financial institution. Between 1908 and 1913 investment firms made available huge sums of capital mainly from Britain to enable farmers to commence and expand their operations. As such they helped on the frontier to facilitate the ensuing disaster.2 The purpose of this paper is to develop that thesis. It is not, however, to point the finger of blame. The money managers were subject to some of the same influences that nourished an overestimation of the western frontier by the Canadian government, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and indeed, the farmers themselves who clamored for loans.3 What follows is simply an attempt to shed new light on this major historical event by viewing it through the eyes of those who helped finance it. Investment in the Canadian west must be seen as a reflection of the fact that in the course of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom, and in particular the city of London, had become the greatest ever international market for the export of capital. In real pounds of 1913, total flows to the rest of the world grew from an average of 40 million pounds per year between 1865 and 1874 to 173 million pounds over the decade preceding World War 1.4 The outward movement of capital from Britain greatly exceeded that from any other country and seems to have accounted for between 40 and 75 percent of the total from Europe as a whole.5 Historians have told us about the importance of the philosophy of British economic imperialism in channeling investment to the more independent states of the empire. That theory was based on the belief that the empire was no longer held together by diplomatic bonds but by the financial commitments made by many influential British investors. 6 Successive governments in England had made, and had encouraged the private sector to make, investments in the more independent dominions such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in part because it was felt that economic ties would bolster the mother country\u27s influence where it was being eroded in the strictly political sense. In the case of Canada, Britain\u27s perceived need to compete with a growing American presence seems to have been crucial. From the British angle, a politically independent, but economically dependent, Canada was an excellent offset to the rising power of the United States on the American continent, and brought both political and material gains. 7 Thus by the time the prairie wheat lands were being settled and expanded after the turn of the twentieth century there was already in place an ideology, a tradition, and an infrastructure for the exportation of British capital. However, in the period from 1908 to 1913, the flow of capital from the mother country to the prairie wheat farmers also involved a number of both push and pull forces that had at least as much to do with immediate economic circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic as with long-standing theories of empire. To British money managers, these forces strengthened the appeal of investment abroad in general while making the western wheat frontier seem more inviting than perhaps it was.

Financing The Palliser Triangle, 1908-1913

A decade ago, David C. Jones compellingly described the immense ecological and human tragedy that occurred in the southern, semiarid districts of Alberta and Saskatchewan in the late 1910s and early 1920s.1 Prior to World War I settlers poured into these provinces buoyed by dreams of a better life, but in the decade or so following 1915 many who had taken homesteads in the so-called Palliser Triangle saw their hopes shattered by successive years of drought and crop failure. One of the crucial vehicles in this tragedy was the financial institution. Between 1908 and 1913 investment firms made available huge sums of capital mainly from Britain to enable farmers to commence and expand their operations. As such they helped on the frontier to facilitate the ensuing disaster.2 The purpose of this paper is to develop that thesis. It is not, however, to point the finger of blame. The money managers were subject to some of the same influences that nourished an overestimation of the western frontier by the Canadian government, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and indeed, the farmers themselves who clamored for loans.3 What follows is simply an attempt to shed new light on this major historical event by viewing it through the eyes of those who helped finance it. Investment in the Canadian west must be seen as a reflection of the fact that in the course of the nineteenth century the United Kingdom, and in particular the city of London, had become the greatest ever international market for the export of capital. In real pounds of 1913, total flows to the rest of the world grew from an average of 40 million pounds per year between 1865 and 1874 to 173 million pounds over the decade preceding World War 1.4 The outward movement of capital from Britain greatly exceeded that from any other country and seems to have accounted for between 40 and 75 percent of the total from Europe as a whole.5 Historians have told us about the importance of the philosophy of British economic imperialism in channeling investment to the more independent states of the empire. That theory was based on the belief that the empire was no longer held together by diplomatic bonds but by the financial commitments made by many influential British investors. 6 Successive governments in England had made, and had encouraged the private sector to make, investments in the more independent dominions such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in part because it was felt that economic ties would bolster the mother country\u27s influence where it was being eroded in the strictly political sense. In the case of Canada, Britain\u27s perceived need to compete with a growing American presence seems to have been crucial. From the British angle, a politically independent, but economically dependent, Canada was an excellent offset to the rising power of the United States on the American continent, and brought both political and material gains. 7 Thus by the time the prairie wheat lands were being settled and expanded after the turn of the twentieth century there was already in place an ideology, a tradition, and an infrastructure for the exportation of British capital. However, in the period from 1908 to 1913, the flow of capital from the mother country to the prairie wheat farmers also involved a number of both push and pull forces that had at least as much to do with immediate economic circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic as with long-standing theories of empire. To British money managers, these forces strengthened the appeal of investment abroad in general while making the western wheat frontier seem more inviting than perhaps it was.

Development of Simulators for Electrochemical Responses: Experimental and Pedagogical Applications

The work carried out in this CRADA addressed the development of computational algorithms to simulate the response for commonly used electrochemical techniques. The goal was the incorporation of these algorithms into DigiSimR, a generalized simulator for cyclic voltammetry (CV). CV, a ubiquitously applied electroanalytical technique used by nonelectrochemists as well as electrochemists, is sometimes referred to as "electrochemical spectroscopy". The latest version, DigiSimR 2.1, is now being sold by the industrial partner, Bioanalytical Systems, Inc. The response of the electrochemical community to this latest program (as well as its predecessors, DigiSimR 2.0 and the DOS version; versions 2.0 and 2.1 are for Windows), has been uniformly positive and numerous publications are now appearing which feature its application

Account Guarantee Survey

This paper surveys 27 account guarantee (AG) programs across 14 Key Design Decisions. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the importance of considering the effects of AG programs on other parts of the financial system or other jurisdictions, (b) the ability to address moral hazard through heightened supervision, which removes a potential obstacle to adopting AG programs in response to the acute phase of crises, (c) the necessity of developing guarantees that are credible and timely, and (d) the need to design standing AG programs with an eye toward how they will function during crises

Debating big data: A literature review on realizing value from big data

This is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this recordBig data has been considered to be a breakthrough technological development over recent years. Notwithstanding, we have as yet limited understanding of how organizations translate its potential into actual social and economic value. We conduct an in-depth systematic review of IS literature on the topic and identify six debates central to how organizations realize value from big data, at different levels of analysis. Based on this review, we identify two socio-technical features of big data that influence value realization: portability and interconnectivity. We argue that, in practice, organizations need to continuously realign work practices, organizational models, and stakeholder interests in order to reap the benefits from big data. We synthesize the findings by means of an integrated model

Bank Debt Guarantee Programs

One of the hallmarks of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was the rapid evaporation of the non-deposit, wholesale funding many financial institutions had become increasingly reliant upon in the years leading up to the crisis. In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, governments became increasingly concerned about even fundamentally sound institutions’ ability to access necessary funding. In response, beginning in October 2008, authorities across the globe began introducing guarantee programs enabling institutions to issue debt that would be backed by a guarantee from the government in exchange for a guarantee fee. While the specific details of these programs varied (sometimes widely in ways that allow for interesting comparisons), some version of this basic idea was implemented by over twenty countries. The programs saw significant use in the aggregate but were not uniformly utilized. They are generally seen as having achieved their objectives but may also in certain circumstances have had unintended consequences such as market distortions based on flawed fee structures and the crowding out of non-guaranteed debt

Blanket Guarantees Survey

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees to address underlying problems without complementary liquidity support and restructuring measures; (b) the importance of credibility, particularly as related to the amount of liabilities guaranteed relative to fiscal resources; (c) the need to address the moral hazards that a blanket guarantee creates, by restricting banks’ behavior during the acute phase of a crisis—for example, through interest-rate caps or bans on aggressive marketing—and by promising to increase official supervisory oversight as the crisis extends into its chronic phase; (d) the importance of effective communication; and (e) the importance of clear political support for a program that represents potentially substantial fiscal costs, which authorities may be unable to quantify at the time of the announcement