Quantitative Properties

Two grams mass, three coulombs charge, five inches long – these are examples of quantitative properties. Quantitative properties have certain structural features that other sorts of properties lack. What are the metaphysical underpinnings of quantitative structure? This paper considers several accounts of quantity and assesses the merits of eac

The turn of the valve: representing with material models

Many scientific models are representations. Building on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as we analyse what this claim involves by providing a general definition of what makes something a scientific model, and formulating a novel account of how they represent. We call the result the DEKI account of representation, which offers a complex kind of representation involving an interplay of, denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation. Throughout we focus on material models, and we illustrate our claims with the Phillips-Newlyn machine. In the conclusion we suggest that, mutatis mutandis, the DEKI account can be carried over to other kinds of models, notably fictional and mathematical models

Intrinsic Explanations and Numerical Representations

In Science Without Numbers (1980), Hartry Field defends a theory of quantity that, he claims, is able to provide both i) an intrinsic explanation of the structure of space, spacetime, and other quantitative properties, and ii) an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations of quantities (distances, lengths, mass, temperature, etc.) are appropriate or acceptable while others are not. But several philosophers have argued otherwise. In this paper I focus on arguments from Ellis and Milne to the effect that one cannot provide an account of quantity in ''purely intrinsic'' terms. I show, first, that these arguments are confused. Second, I show that Field's treatment of quantity can provide an intrinsic explanation of the structure of quantitative properties; what it cannot do is provide an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations are more appropriate than others. Third, I show that one could provide an intrinsic explanation of this sort if one modified Field's account in certain ways

Israel, "a light unto the nations"? Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem and the founding of the Jewish state.

Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem, two of the 20th century's greatest German Jewish thinkers, are commonly regarded as antagonists. This perception reflects their diverging views on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961, but represents a fundamental misreading of their political thought. While important ideological differences did indeed divide Arendt and Scholem, both shared a commitment to political radicalism and specifically regarded the Zionist movement as a revolutionary movement par excellence whose national-revolutionary potential could not, and, indeed, should not be exhausted in the creation of a state. In emphasizing the revolutionary dimension of Zionism, Arendt and Scholem thus both defined Zionism as a transformative form of politics, and consequently challenged both the liberal emphasis on individual rights and the nationalist emphasis on sovereignty. The task of Zionism, Arendt and Scholem argued against both paradigms, was not to adapt Jewish liberalism to its new transplanted surroundings in the Middle East, but to fundamentally transform the Jewish people from a victim of failed liberal assimilation in Europe into a "nation." While Scholem eventually accepted the idea of a Jewish state as a practical necessity, Arendt opposed it as a goal that was incongruous with the revolutionary mission of Zionism. Notwithstanding these differences, however, Arendt and Scholem's radically transformative understanding of Zionism represents a groundbreaking common effort to articulate a new theory of nationalism, and ultimately a new theory of politics.Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2004.School code: 0265