DRE-ip : A Verifiable E-Voting Scheme without Tallying Authorities

Nearly all verifiable e-voting schemes require trustworthy authorities to perform the tallying operations. An exception is the DRE-i system which removes this requirement by pre-computing all encrypted ballots before the election using random factors that will later cancel out and allow the public to verify the tally after the election. While the removal of tallying authorities significantly simplifies election management, the pre-computation of ballots necessitates secure ballot storage, as leakage of precomputed ballots endangers voter privacy. In this paper, we address this problem and propose DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced privacy). Adopting a different design strategy, DRE-ip is able to encrypt ballots in real time in such a way that the election tally can be publicly verified without decrypting the cast ballots. As a result, DRE-ip achieves end-to-end verifiability without tallying authorities, similar to DRE-i, but with a significantly stronger guarantee on voter privacy. In the event that the voting machine is fully compromised, the assurance on tallying integrity remains intact and the information leakage is limited to the minimum: only the partial tally at the time of compromise is leaked

Focus group views on Prêt à Voter 1.0

This paper discusses the findings of a series of four focus group sessions carried out on a variant of the original Prêt à Voter prototype implementation [2]. The aim of these sessions was to investigate users' ability to use the system, to discover any inadequacies of the system, and to gauge the participants' understanding of its security mechanisms. The groups also discussed general issues around security in election systems

The Hidden Harms of Targeted Advertising by Algorithm and Interventions from the Consumer Protection Toolkit

Developments in pervasive data collection and predictive data analytics are allowing firms to target consumers with increas ingly precise personalisedbehavioural and contextual advertising. These techniques give rise to new risks of harm in the attention economy by unduly influencing or manipulating consumers' deci sions and choices, and by narrowing the product options visible and available to them. In many countries, the legal response to concerns about targeted advertising by algorithm has been focused on privacy protection and data rights. These are important initiatives. However; consent-based data rights are unlikely to provide a comprehensive or even adequate response to the risks of harm to consumers occasioned by the kinds of algo- rithmically targeted advertising that are now possible. This paper suggests that a suite of responses from the consumer protection toolkit are required to address the different and potentially harm ful manifestations of algorithmic ally targeted advertising. These include bans and warnings as well as making use of standard safe- ty-net prohibitions on misleading and unconscionable/unfair con duct already in place in many jurisdictions

Testing Voters' Understanding of a Security Mechanism Used in Verifiable Voting

Proposals for a secure voting technology can involve new mechanisms or procedures designed to provide greater ballot secrecy or verifiability. These mechanisms may be justified on the technical level, but researchers and voting officials must also consider how voters will understand these technical details, and how understanding may affect interaction with the voting systems. In the context of verifiable voting, there is an additional impetus for this consideration as voters are provided with an additional choice; whether or not to verify their ballot. It is possible that differences in voter understanding of the voting technology or verification mechanism may drive differences in voter behaviour; particularly at the point of verification. In the event that voter understanding partially explains voter decisions to verify their ballot, then variance in voter understanding will lead to predictable differences in the way voters interact with the voting technology. This paper describes an experiment designed to test voters’ understanding of the ‘split ballot’, a particular mechanism at the heart of the secure voting system Prˆet `a Voter, used to provide both vote secrecy and voter verifiability. We used a controlled laboratory experiment in which voter behaviour in the experiment is dependent on their understanding of the secrecy mechanism for ballots. We found that a two-thirds majority of the participants expressed a confident comprehension of the secrecy of their ballot; indicating an appropriate level of understanding. Among the remaining third of participants, most exhibited a behaviour indicating a comprehension of the security mechanism, but were less confident in their understanding. A small number did not comprehend the system. We discuss the implications of this finding for the deployment of such voting systems

Enabling successful transition-Evaluation of a transition to adult care program for pediatric liver transplant recipients

BACKGROUND: This study aimed to evaluate the transition to adult care program instituted for liver transplant recipients (LTRs) at a large tertiary pediatric hospital in Melbourne, Australia. Evaluation included the change in a Global Assessment Measure (GAM) before and after the transition program, satisfaction with the program, and measures of transition success including rejection rates and attendance at appointments post-transfer. We hypothesized that the introduction of our structured transition program would improve disease understanding, health system understanding, and self-care. We also hypothesized that those who had undergone the transition program would have lower failure to attend rates and lower rates of rejection than historical controls. METHODS: A LTR transition program was instituted at our service from 2013 to 2015. The program involved initial assessment of competencies with a Global Assessment Measure (GAM), followed by the introduction of a personalized goal setting program addressing issues identified in dedicated transition clinics. Assessment of competencies was compared between the commencement of the program and immediately prior to transfer. Patient satisfaction with the transition process was assessed at an interview 6-12 months after transfer to the adult service. Rejection rates and failure to attend rates were compared between the intervention group and a group of LTRs who did not receive the intervention. RESULTS: Twenty-eight LTRs participated in the study; 20 received the transition intervention and 8 served as controls. Within the intervention group, all domains of transition competency and reported anxiety regarding transferring had significantly improved at the conclusion of the intervention and all reported satisfaction with the transition program with most (81%) reporting readiness to transfer. There were no significant differences in rejection rates or failure to attend rates between those who did and did not receive the transition intervention. CONCLUSION: A longitudinal holistic transition program has the potential to positively impact the competencies and readiness of LTRs to successful transition and transfer to adult care