16 research outputs found
Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality
Fair groves mechanisms
The original publication can be found at www.springerlink.comWe study allocation problems in which a costly task is to be assigned and money transfers are used to achieve fairness among agents. We consider a series of fairness notions (k-fairness for k epsilon {1, ... , n} where n is the number of agents) of decreasing restrictiveness that are based on Rawls' maximin equity criterion and impose welfare lower bounds. These fairness notions were introduced by Porter et al. (J Econ Theory 118:209-228, 2004) who also introduced two classes of Groves mechanisms that are 1-fair and 3-fair, respectively, and generate deficits that are bounded above. We show that these classes are the largest such classes of Groves mechanisms. We generalize these mechanisms for each k epsilon {2, ... , n} and show that the corresponding mechanisms generate the smallest deficit for each economy among all k-fair Groves mechanisms.Murat Atlamaz and Duygu Yengi
Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
In an estate division problem an estate has to be divided among several players whose total entitlement to the estate exceeds its size. This paper extends the non-cooperative approach through a claim game, as initiated by OʼNeill (1982), by allowing players to put multiple claims on the same part of the estate, and by considering the case where individual entitlements may exceed the estate. A full characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of the claim game is obtained both for restricted estate division problems, where individual entitlements do not exceed the estate, and for the general case. Variations on the claim game are considered, which result in proportional division in equilibrium
The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations
Bargaining, Concession, Pre-donation, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, C7, D7,