Müller, H-W.

Archive of European Integration

English

Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Energy and Research on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council (Doc. 381/78) for a regulation on Community financial measures for
intra-Community trade in power station coal. EP Working Documents, document 582/78, 6 February 1979

For a finitely generated group $\Gamma$ denote by $\mu(\Gamma)$ the growth
coefficient of $\Gamma$, that is, the infimum over all real numbers $d$ such
that $s_n(\Gamma)<n!^d$. We show that the growth coefficient of a virtually
free group is always rational, and that every rational number occurs as growth
coefficient of some virtually free group. Moreover, we describe an algorithm to
compute $\mu$

A. Maróti

B. Huppert

C. C. Sims

J.-P. Serre

Jan-Christoph Schlage-Puchta

T. W. Müller

arXiv.org e-Print Archive

Crossref

Ghent University Academic Bibliography

The subgroup growth spectrum of virtually free groups

Ambach, W.

Müller, F.

Electronic Publication Information Center

Determination of Net Accumulations from Gross Beta Activity Measurements in the North Water Region

Eichberger, J.

Güth, W.

Müller, W.

Research Papers in Economics

Attitudes towards risk: An experiment.

Spiegel, Y.

A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direst test for heteroskedasticity.

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation.

An experiment on sequential rent-seeking.

An experimental study of commitment and observability in Stackelberg games.

Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment.

Commitment and observability in games.

Commitment under imperfect observability: Why it is better to have followers who know thattheydon’t know ratherthanthose whodon’t knowthattheydon’t know.Discussion paperNo.103.Bellcore Economics.

Does noise undermine the ﬁrst-mover advantage? An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell’s example.

Dummy variables: Mechanics v.

Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment.

Fairness in Stackelberg games. In:

Forward induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes games.

From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence.

Game-playing agents: Unobservable contracts as precommitments.

Games with imperfectly observable commitment.

Measuring treatment effects in experimental cross-sectional time series. In: Königstein,

Observable contracts: Strategic delegation and cooperation.

Perfect versus imperfect observability: An experimental test of Bagwell’s result.

Reference Manual, release 6.

Regression standard errors in clustered samples.

Simultaneous and sequential price competition on heterogeneous duopoly markets: Experimental evidence.

Stackelberg beats Cournot—On collusion and efﬁciency in experimental markets.

Strategic delegation: An experiment.

The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge.

The limitations of the positional order effect.

The quality of the signal matters: A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves.

The Strategy of Conﬂict.

The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs.

The value of commitment with imperfect observability and private information.

Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ‘weak link’ coordination games.

Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information.

Unobserved delegation.

z-Tree, Zurich Toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Working paper 21. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,

Noisy leadership: An experimental approach.

Potters, J.J.M.

Cournot duopoly with two production periods.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership.

Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria.

Quantity setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing.

Stackelberg vs. Cournot oligopoly equilibrium.

Endogenous preemption on both sides of a market.

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing.Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all?We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).preemption;endogenous timing