Regional Monetary Integration among Developing Countries: New Opportunities for Macroeconomic Stability beyond the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas?

Optimum Currency Area (OCA) approaches turn to be inadequate in the analysis of the new regional monetary integration schemes that have sprung up among developing and emerging market economies. Instead, in accordance with the concept of ‘original sin’ (Eichengreen et al.) we argue that regional monetary South-South integration schemes that, unlike North-South arrangements, involve none of the international reserve currencies, have specific monetary constraints and implications which need to be duly considered. A first comparative analysis of three cases of monetary South-South cooperation in South Africa (CMA), East Asia (ASEAN) and Latin America (Mercosur) shows that these can indeed provide macroeconomic stability gains but that this strongly depends on the existence of economic hierarchies within these integration schemes.regional monetary integration, monetary integration theory, development theory, ASEAN, Mercosur, CMA

South-south monetary integration: the case for a research framework beyond the theory of optimum currency area

Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory proves inadequate in the analysis of the new regional monetary integration schemes that have sprung up among developing and emerging market economies since the 1990s. Building on the concept of original sin developed by Eichengreen et al. we argue that a different conceptual framework is needed as these regional monetary South-South integration (SSI) schemes differ fundamentally from North-South arrangements because they involve none of the international reserve currencies. Insights from the cases of monetary south-south cooperation in Southern Africa, East Asia and Latin America suggest that SSI can have beneficial effects on macroeconomic stability. This paper sketches a first set of hypotheses on the necessary conditions for these stability gains to materialise. --Regional Monetary Integration , Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Theory , Development Theory , ASEAN , MERCOSUR , CMA

Borrowing Patterns in the Global Financial Safety Net: Does Governance Play a Role?

The global financial safety net (GFSN) has become a complex regime. Regional financial arrangements (RFAs) have emerged alongside established IMF structures. How relevant are RFAs and the IMF in moments of financial crisis? And more specifically: Do member countries resort to RFAs as complements or as substitutes to IMF lending? To answer these questions, we developed an original data-set on the GSFN use by the 61 emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) that are members of existing RFAs between 1976 and 2018. We find that not only economic criteria such as lending volume, timeliness and conditionality drive patterns of complementarity and substitution in crisis finance, but that RFA governance structure and regional independence matters. The data show that borrower-dominated RFAs are used much more frequently than creditor-dominated RFAs. Moreover, RFAs which lack regional policy autonomy but are dependent on the IMF are not called upon – even if they have far superior volumes of potential lending capacity

the case for a research framework beyond the theory of optimum currency area

Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory proves inadequate in the analysis of the new regional monetary integration schemes that have sprung up among developing and emerging market economies since the 1990s. Building on the concept of ‘original sin’ developed by Eichengreen et al. we argue that a different conceptual framework is needed as these regional monetary South-South integration (SSI) schemes differ fundamentally from North-South arrangements because they involve none of the international reserve currencies. Insights from the cases of monetary south-south cooperation in Southern Africa, East Asia and Latin America suggest that SSI can have beneficial effects on macroeconomic stability. This paper sketches a first set of hypotheses on the necessary conditions for these stability gains to materialise

The Scattered Global Financial Safety Net and the Role of Regional Financial Arrangements

The global financial safety net provides backstop during times of financial crises. Its elements underwent fundamental changes since the global financial crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced new facilities on the global level, new regional financial arrangements (RFAs) were created, and bilateral swap agreements emerged as a new element. In this paper, we ask how these changes influence the use of the different safety net options, and what role RFAs have in the safety net today. We created a database with all the cases in which a RFA member drew on one of the elements of the global safety net. This allows us to analyze which other options the country had at hand, and to examine their use along the institutional design in terms of timeliness, volume, and policy conditionality. We find today’s global financial safety net to be not a global, but a geographically and structurally scattered net. RFAs make the safety net safer only for small member countries. Just few countries can count on a bilateral swap line, their selection being subject to the discretion of the swap partner. Thus, a large number of countries fall through important knots of the safety net and have the IMF as their only option

Safety for whom? The scattered global financial safety net and the role of regional financial arrangements

The global financial safety net provides backstop during times of financial crises. Its elements underwent fundamental changes since the global financial crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced new facilities on the global level, new regional financial arrangements (RFAs) were created, and bilateral swap agreements emerged as a new element. In this paper, we ask how these changes influence the use of the different safety net options, and what role RFAs have in the safety net today. We created a database with all the cases in which a RFA member drew on one of the elements of the global safety net. This allows us to analyze which other options the country had at hand, and to examine their use along the institutional design in terms of timeliness, volume, and policy conditionality. We find today's global financial safety net to be not a global, but a geographically and structurally scattered net. RFAs make the safety net safer only for small member countries. Just few countries can count on a bilateral swap line, their selection being subject to the discretion of the swap partner. Thus, a large number of countries fall through important knots of the safety net and have the IMF as their only option

Did the Euro Area benefit from the Fund’s Experience in Crisis fighting?

The paper analyses how the IMF brought its experience gained in emerging market sovereign debt crises in the troika’s handling of the euro crisis. We link models of multiple equilibria with the IMF’s experience made in Latin American crises in the 2000s. We examine subsequent changes in the IMF’s policy guidelines and show that previous insights have been taken in, but applied only with a significant delay and partially against institutional rules and internal advice for the case of Greece. Hence, we argue that the inclusion of the IMF in Europe’s crisis fighting did not completely deliver what had been hoped for

a comparative perspective on Europe and the developing world

The current global financial “non-system” is marked by instability. In the absence of global solutions, a series of regional arrangements of monetary cooperation have been emerging to cope with such instability. The paper focuses on regional payment systems as an initial step of regional monetary cooperation. In order to evaluate their potential contribution to increase macroeconomic stability of the member countries, we develop a typology of payments systems and systematically compare historic and present initiatives in Europe, Asia and Latin America with reference to the original Keynes Plan. We show that regional payment systems entail beneficial effects by reducing transaction costs of intraregional trade, and by creating incentives for further macroeconomic cooperation. Their contribution to macroeconomic stabilization however depends on the specific design of the respective regional arrangement

an index for the quality of crisis finance

The Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) – the institutions and arrangements that provide short-term crisis finance – has turned into a highly complex, uncoordinated system of global, multilateral, and bilateral instruments. The present paper elaborates on a composite index of the GFSN to analyse its preparedness for shielding countries from financial crises. This first-of-its-kind index comprises six components that measure the vulnerability and resilience of individual countries to financial crises derived from economic and political economy financial crisis literature. We apply this index to data from 192 UN member countries we collected in the GFSN tracker for the period of the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of their asses to and use of the GFSN. This index, and the use of novel forms of graphical displaying, allow us to identify a hierarchy in the access to short-term liquidity by the GFSN. At the bottom, we find low-income countries with sole access to IMF standard conditional crisis finance, while we find at the top countries with access to bilateral currency swaps, especially those provided by the US Federal Reserve. Our analysis also reveals that first, the temporary reformed unconditional access of IMF crisis finance during the pandemic has temporarily improved those countries’ position in the GFSN hierarchy; second, bilateral swaps as crisis finance instruments reinforce the GFSN hierarchy. Since access to adequate emergency liquidity is decisive for a country’s financial crisis prevention capacity and the ability to engage in social cohesion and climate policy, we suggest to flatten the hierarchy by keeping access to IMF unconditional finance open beyond the COVID-19 crisis, expanding regional financial arrangements, and by coordinating GFSN elements, including currency swap providing central banks