Dynamical Inequality in Growth Models

A recent exponent inequality is applied to a number of dynamical growth models. Many of the known exponents for models such as the Kardar-Parisi-Zhang (KPZ) equation are shown to be consistent with the inequality. In some cases, such as the Molecular Beam Equation, the situation is more interesting, where the exponents saturate the inequality. As the acid test for the relative strength of four popular approximation schemes we apply the inequality to the exponents obtained for two Non Local KPZ systems. We find that all methods but one, the Self Consistent Expansion, violate the inequality in some regions of parameter space. To further demonstrate the usefulness of the inequality, we apply it to a specific model, which belongs to a family of models in which the inequality becomes an equality. We thus show that the inequality can easily yield results, which otherwise have to rely either on approximations or general beliefs.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

The Structure of Langevin's Memory Kernel From Lagrangian Dynamics

We obtain the memory kernel of the generalized Langevin equation, describing a particle interacting with longitudinal phonons in a liquid. The kernel is obtained analytically at T=0 Kelvin and numerically at T>0 Kelvin. We find that it shows some non-trivial structural features like negative correlations for some range of time separations. The system is shown to have three characteristic time scales, that control the shape of the kernel, and the transition between quadratic and linear behavior of the mean squared distance (MSD). Although the derivation of the structure in the memory kernel is obtained within a specific dynamical model, the phenomenon is shown to be quite generic.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, latex, include europhys.sty and euromacr.te

Guidance, flight mechanics and trajectory optimization. Volume 4 - The calculus of variations and modern applications

Guidance, flight mechanics, and trajectory optimization - calculus of variations and modern application

Microprocessor utilization in search and rescue missions

The position of an emergency transmitter may be determined by measuring the Doppler shift of the distress signal as received by an orbiting satellite. This requires the computation of an initial estimate and refinement of this estimate through an iterative, nonlinear, least squares estimation. A version of the algorithm was implemented and tested by locating a transmitter on the premises and obtaining observations from a satellite. The computer used was an IBM 360/95. The position was determined within the desired 10 km radius accuracy. The feasibility of performing the same task in real time using microprocessor technology, was determined. The least squares algorithm was implemented on an Intel 8080 microprocessor. The results indicate that a microprocessor can easily match the IBM implementation in accuracy and be performed inside the time limitations set

\u3ci\u3eEldred\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eLochner\u3c/i\u3e: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property

Since the ratification of the constitution, intellectual property law in the United States has always been, in part, constitutional law. Among the enumerated powers that Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress is the power to create certain intellectual property rights. To a remarkable extent, scholars who have examined the Constitution\u27s Copyright Clause have reached a common position. With striking unanimity, these scholars have called for aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area. The champions of this position--we refer to them as the IP Restrictors--represent a remarkable array of constitutional and intellectual property scholars. In this terms\u27s Eldred v. Aschroft, leading IP Restrictor Lawrence Lessig, representing petitioner Eric Eldred, sought to convince the Supreme Court that the IP Restrictors\u27 view of the Copyright Clause was the correct one. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court rejected Eldred\u27s claim and upheld the statute. But while the Court rejected the IP Restrictors\u27 vision, it did not offer a satisfactory competing conception of the Copyright Clause and how the courts should construe it. Critically, even though the standard of review was of central significance, the Court applied a deferential form of rational basis scrutiny without explaining why this was the appropriate standard. This paper develops the case for deferential review of congressional legislation in the area of intellectual property and, at a deeper level, offers a new paradigm for understanding the Copyright Clause. We propose that from the vantage point of constitutional law, intellectual property should be treated as a form of constitutional property. Deference to congressional judgments is warranted because congressional legislation affecting intellectual property is analytically similar to congressional legislation affecting other forms of property. Courts subject congressional legislation affecting traditional forms of property to deferential review because of concerns about institutional competence and respect for majoritarian decisionmaking. These two concerns in conjunction with proper regard for holistic constitutional interpretation should also lead courts to deferential review of congressional legislation affecting intellectual property.In developing our position, we draw on constitutional history and, in particular, the lessons of Lochner v. New York. In defense of their vision of the Constitution, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters in Eldred make claims about the original understanding that, to an astonishing extent, echo those made by proponents of Lochner-era jurisprudence. We argue, however, that these claims fail for two reasons. First, the IP Restrictors and the dissenters disregard the limited scope of judicial review at the time of the Founding. Additionally, the IP Restrictors and dissenters disregard the range of views among the Founders about monopolies

The New Privacy

This article reviews Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits of Privacy John Gilliom (2001). In 1964, as the welfare state emerged in full force in the United States, Charles Reich published The New Property, one of the most influential articles ever to appear in a law review. Reich argued that in order to protect individual autonomy in an age of governmental largess, a new property right in governmental benefits had to be recognized. He called this form of property the new property. In retrospect, Reich, rather than anticipating trends, was swimming against the tide of history. In the past forty years, formal claims to government benefits have become more tenuous rather than more secure. Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits of Privacy, by John Gilliom, an associate professor of political science at Ohio State University, demonstrates both the tenuousness of welfare rights today and the costs that this system imposes on individual autonomy. In Overseers of the Poor, Gilliom uses his case study of welfare recipients as the occasion for an attack on classic notions of privacy rights. Gilliom finds that welfare clients do not engage in privacy talk - indeed, he finds the concept to be devoid of value for the welfare recipients. Here, another comparison can be made with Reich\u27s new property. Reich explicitly tied his idea of a property right in government entitlements to privacy. He felt that the new property was needed to protect privacy and, in particular, individual autonomy. Reich\u27s notion of privacy reaches back to a classic concept of privacy, one that we term the old privacy. It is precisely this classic idea that Gilliom finds welfare recipients to have rejected. Theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy has pointed, however, to a new privacy. The new privacy is centered around Fair Information Practices ( FIPs ) and is intended to prevent threats to autonomy. The idea of privacy centered on FIPs is based not on a property interest in one\u27s information, but the idea that processors of personal data should be obliged to follow certain standards. If, as we will see, classic notions of privacy are not of much use in the welfare state, the new privacy may be. This review begins by examining Gilliam\u27s methodology and findings. It credits the insights of his look at the inner world of welfare recipients, but finds that he appears to ignore the need for income limits on aid recipients and the concomitant need for at least some personal information to enforce these limits. It also criticizes his failure to explore an interaction of an ethics of care among welfare recipients with possible use of retooled privacy rights or interests. In the second part of this review, The authors consider the extent to which theoretical work inside and outside of the legal academy points to a new privacy and discuss how Gilliam\u27s empirical research provides support for that scholarship. They also evaluate the extent to which the new privacy, centered on PIPs, can prevent the threats to personal autonomy so poignantly identified by Gilliom