Essays on auction theory

This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that the optimal mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller's expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller's expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auction

How to Sell to Buyers with Crossholdings

This paper characterizes the optimal selling mechanism in the presence of horizontal crossholdings. We find that this mechanism imposes a discrimination policy against the stronger bidders so that the seller¿s expected revenue is increasing in both the common crossholding and the degree of asymmetry in crossholdings. Furthermore, it can be implemented by a sequential procedure that includes a price-preferences scheme and the possibility of an exclusive deal with the weakest bidder. We also show that a simple sequential negotiation mechanism, although suboptimal, yields a larger seller¿s expected revenue than both the first-price and the second-price auctions

Esquemas de Incentivos y Carteras de Inversión Innovadoras

This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.En el contexto de la administración delegada de carteras de inversión, este artículo caracteriza las propiedades que el esquema de compensación debe poseer para incentivar la selección de portafolios con alto riesgo y alto retorno esperado. En particular, se proporcionan condiciones que permiten esquemas remunerativos no monótonos que premian resultados extremos y castigan resultados moderados

Eficiencia Bancaria en Chile: Un Enfoque de frontera de beneficios

This paper characterizes the evolution of the efficiency X in the Chilean banking industry over 1987 to 2007, based on a profit frontier approach. Our results suggest that over this period the Chilean banking sector has attained just a 15% over its maximum profits. This inefficiency basically arises from a technical source rather than an assignative one, and mainly affects domestic and small banks. Nevertheless, the level of efficiency X of the industry as a whole has dramatically improved since the late 1990´s, which is consistent with important economic, technological and regulatory transformations.Este estudio caracteriza la evolución de la eficiencia X en la banca chilena durante el período 1987-2007, bajo un enfoque de frontera de beneficios. Nuestros resultados sugieren que durante ese período la banca chilena ha alcanzado, en promedio, sólo un 15% de su potencial máximo de beneficios. Estas ineficiencias provienen fundamentalmente de un componente técnico más que asignativo, y afectan preponderantemente a bancos nacionales y de menor tamaño. No obstante, la eficiencia de toda la industria ha mejorado sustancial y sostenidamente desde fines de los años noventa, fenómeno consistente con importantes cambios económicos, tecnológicos e institucionales