On Conditions for Convergence to Consensus

A new theorem on conditions for convergence to consensus of a multiagent time-dependent time-discrete dynamical system is presented. The theorem is build up on the notion of averaging maps. We compare this theorem to results by Moreau (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 50, no. 2, 2005) about set-valued Lyapunov theory and convergence under switching communication topologies. We give examples that point out differences of approaches including examples where Moreau's theorem is not applicable but ours is. Further on, we give examples that demonstrate that the theory of convergence to consensus is still not complete.Comment: 5 pages, 2 columns, example adde

Consensus Strikes Back in the Hegselmann-Krause Model of Continuous Opinion Dynamics Under Bounded Confidence

The agent-based bounded confidence model of opinion dynamics of Hegselmann and Krause (2002) is reformulated as an interactive Markov chain. This abstracts from individual agents to a population model which gives a good view on the underlying attractive states of continuous opinion dynamics. We mutually analyse the agent-based model and the interactive Markov chain with a focus on the number of agents and onesided dynamics. Finally, we compute animated bifurcation diagrams that give an overview about the dynamical behavior. They show an interesting phenomenon when we lower the bound of confidence: After the first bifurcation from consensus to polarisation consensus strikes back for a while.Continuous Opinion Dynamics, Bounded Confidence, Interactive Markov Chain, Bifurcation, Number of Agents, Onesided Dynamics

Systemic risk in a network fragility model analyzed with probability density evolution of persistent random walks

We study the mean field approximation of a recent model of cascades on networks relevant to the investigation of systemic risk control in financial networks. In the model, the hypothesis of a trend reinforcement in the stochastic process describing the fragility of the nodes, induces a trade-off in the systemic risk with respect to the density of the network. Increasing the average link density, the network is first less exposed to systemic risk, while above an intermediate value the systemic risk increases. This result offers a simple explanation for the emergence of instabilities in financial systems that get increasingly interwoven. In this paper, we study the dynamics of the probability density function of the average fragility. This converges to a unique stable distribution which can be computed numerically and can be used to estimate the systemic risk as a function of the parameters of the model.Comment: 20 pages, 6 figure

Redistribution spurs growth by using a portfolio effect on human capital

We demonstrate by mathematical analysis and systematic computer simulations that redistribution can lead to sustainable growth in a society. The human capital dynamics of each agent is described by a stochastic multiplicative process which, in the long run, leads to the destruction of individual human capital and the extinction of the individualistic society. When agents are linked by fully-redistributive taxation the situation might turn to individual growth in the long run. We consider that a government collects a proportion of income and reduces it by a fraction as costs for administration (efficiency losses). The remaining public good is equally redistributed to all agents. We derive conditions under which the destruction of human capital can be turned into sustainable growth, despite the losses from the random growth process and despite the administrative costs. Sustainable growth is induced by redistribution. This effect could be explained by a simple portfolio-effect which re-balances individual stochastic processes. The findings are verified for three different tax schemes: proportional tax, taking proportional more from the rich, and proportionally more from the poor. We discuss which of these tax schemes is optimal with respect to maximize growth under a fixed rate of administrative costs, or with respect to maximize the governmental income. This leads us to some general conclusions about governmental decisions, the relation to public good games, and the use of taxation in a risk taking society.Comment: 12 pages, plus 8 Figures, plus matlab-code to run simulation and produce figur

Opinion Dynamics: the Effect of the Number of Peers Met at Once

The opinion dynamics model introduced by Deffuant and Weisbuch as well as the one by Hegselmann and Krause are rather similar. In both models individuals are assumed to have opinions about an issue, they meet and discuss, and they may adapt their opinions towards the other agents` opinions or may ignore each other if their positions are too different. Both models differ with respect to the number of peers they meet at once. Furthermore the model by Deffuant and Weisbuch has a convergence parameter that controls how fast agents adapt their opinions. By defining the reversed parameter as self-support we can extend the applicability of this parameter to scenarios with more than one interaction partner. We investigate the effects of changing the number of peers met at once, which is done for different population sizes, and the effects of changing the self-support. For describing the dynamics we look at different statistics, i.e. number of cluster, number of major clusters, and Gini coefficient.Opinion Dynamics, Communication Regime