The Viability of the $30 Casebook: Intellectual Property, Voluntary Payment, Open Distribution, and Author Incentives

It is not uncommon for a new hardbound copy of today’s law school casebooks to exceed $200. And, each year, the prices inch ever higher. After exploring the various dynamics in the traditional publishing market that have led to the current prices for casebooks, this article describes the experiences of Semaphore Press, a publisher of law school casebooks that offers a very different approach to providing law school casebooks. Semaphore Press offers digital copies of required textbooks for law school classes, (in pdf format with no digit rights management (DRM) restrictions), at a suggested price of$30. In addition, students can alter the price they pay, paying less or more than the suggested price, or they even download a copy of a required casebook for free. Semaphore Press’s commitment, embodied in this design, is that - whatever else happens - the student obtains access to the course materials. This article explores the viability of this model, sharing data gathered over past semesters. Approximately 83% of students enrolled in courses in which a Semaphore Press book was assigned paid for the book. The article details the amounts of student payments, and explores why students may be paying for digital books that they know they can obtain for free. The Semaphore Press experience with digital casebooks containing no DRM suggests that under current market conditions, a voluntary payment distribution model with a suggested $30 price is not only a model welcomed by law students, but it is a viable option both for authors and adopting professors

Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement

Part I of this Article examines the historical evolution of criminal copyright infringement in this country, culminating in the adoption of the NET Act. Part I also provides an overview of the changes in criminal copyright infringement affected by the NET Act. Part II analyzes why, after 100 years, Congress eliminated the requirement of a profit motive for criminal liability and significantly expanded the reach of the criminal sanctions of the Copyright Act. Part II also describes not just the decisional impetus for the amendment to the Copyright Act, United States v. LaMacchia, but the underlying pressures placed on copyright law by the digitization of copyrighted works and the commodification of the intangible rights granted by copyright law. Part III explores the possible reach of this new Act, questioning whether it casts the net of criminal infringement too wide. Finally, Part IV addresses the importance of the element of willfulness retained in the statute. This section discusses the interpretation of the term “willful” by the Supreme Court in other areas of law and the interpretation that term has been given by lower courts in the context of the Copyright Act. This section proposes that to prove criminal copyright infringement the government should be required to show that the defendant intentionally violated a known legal duty and that the defendant lacked a good faith belief that the conduct at issue was lawful. Only with this standard in place can the NET Act be kept within reasonable bounds and not risk deterring the lawful and socially productive activity which underlying policies of the Copyright Act seek to encourage

Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?

The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. solidified the treatment of fair use as an affirmative defense. However, treating fair use as an affirmative defense shifts the burden to the defendant while in most fair use cases plaintiffs are able to easily prove a prima facie case of infringement. This Article identifies that, despite its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken a thorough analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. In fact, as explored in this Article, the legislative history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an affirmative defense; a defense, yes, but not an affirmative defense. The negative consequences of labeling fair use an affirmative defense support shifting back to what Congress intended. Fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead be treated as a defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights

The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users\u27 Rights

A Review of The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users\u27 Rights by L. Ray Patterson and Stanley W. Lindber

The Bridge and Playful Thunder of Keith Aoki

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