Germany and the use of force: the evolution of German security policy 1990-2003

Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a sophisticated and innovative framework to understand developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to '9/11' and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. The study then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the 'domestics' of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. The book concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture and argues that it will continue to define Berlin's approach to the use of force. Crucially, this may mean that Germany's perspectives may depart substantially from those of its key partners and allies. This book is essential reading for all those interested in contemporary European security as well as German politics

Germany and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003

Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a sophisticated and innovative framework to understand developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to '9/11' and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. The study then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the 'domestics' of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. The book concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture and argues that it will continue to define Berlin's approach to the use of force. Crucially, this may mean that Germany's perspectives may depart substantially from those of its key partners and allies. This book is essential reading for all those interested in contemporary European security as well as German politics

Derisory Results or Reasons to be Cheerful? Evaluating the Implantation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Natolin Research Paper 01/January 2011

This paper considers the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The paper presents a portrait of the three neighbours in terms of their current political and socio-economic profiles, as well as the status of their relations with the European Union. Subsequently, it provides an overview of the development of ENP. A general set of conclusions are offered in relation to the key issue of good governance, where, the paper argues, ENP has delivered derisory results, with patchy effects across the region. Moreover, the paper identifies the democratic back-sliding in Ukraine and entenched authoritarianism in Belarus, which ENP has done very little to address. The EU’s willingness to provide better mobility options for ENP citizens to visit and work in the EU is a key test for the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the coming year. This paper sees that whilst there are reasons to be cheerful here, with the EU’s recent offer of greater Visa Liberalisation for Ukraine and Moldova, there remains much to be done and in the meantime the EU remains a ‘Fortress Europe’. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for ENP, which include the need to finally tackle corruption in the region, bring more differentiation into ENP, soften the EU’s borders through more generous Visa regimes, develop a more robust Belarus strategy and to think more creatively about the use of ENP funds for regional and cross- border activities

Phytoremediation combined with biorefinery on the example of two agricultural crops grown on Ni soil and degraded by P. chrysosporium

During the last few decades, phytoremediation process has attracted much attention because of the growing concerns about the deteriorating quality of soil caused by anthropogenic activities. Here, a tandem phytoremediation/biorefinery process was proposed as a way to turn phytoremediation into a viable commercial method by producing valuable chemicals in addition to cleaned soil. Two agricultural plants (Sinapis alba and Helianthus annuus) were grown in moderately contaminated soil with ca. 100 ppm of Ni and further degraded by a fungal lignin degrader - Phanerochaete chrysosporium. Several parameters have been studied: the viability of plants, biomass yield and their accumulating and remediating potentials. Further down-stream processing showed that up to 80% of Ni can be easily extracted from contaminated biomass by aqueous extraction at mild conditions. Finally, it was demonstrated that the grown onto contaminated soil plants can be degraded by Phanerochaete chrysosporium and the effect of nickel and biomass pre-treatment on the solid state fermentation was studied. The proposed and studied in this work methodology can pave the way to successful commercialization of the phytoremediation process in the near futur

Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms.

The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in the literature, the article disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and mediatized crisis learning. The combined effect of these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries

Safety, immunogenicity, and reactogenicity of BNT162b2 and mRNA-1273 COVID-19 vaccines given as fourth-dose boosters following two doses of ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 or BNT162b2 and a third dose of BNT162b2 (COV-BOOST): a multicentre, blinded, phase 2, randomised trial

Background Some high-income countries have deployed fourth doses of COVID-19 vaccines, but the clinical need, effectiveness, timing, and dose of a fourth dose remain uncertain. We aimed to investigate the safety, reactogenicity, and immunogenicity of fourth-dose boosters against COVID-19.Methods The COV-BOOST trial is a multicentre, blinded, phase 2, randomised controlled trial of seven COVID-19 vaccines given as third-dose boosters at 18 sites in the UK. This sub-study enrolled participants who had received BNT162b2 (Pfizer-BioNTech) as their third dose in COV-BOOST and randomly assigned them (1:1) to receive a fourth dose of either BNT162b2 (30 µg in 0·30 mL; full dose) or mRNA-1273 (Moderna; 50 µg in 0·25 mL; half dose) via intramuscular injection into the upper arm. The computer-generated randomisation list was created by the study statisticians with random block sizes of two or four. Participants and all study staff not delivering the vaccines were masked to treatment allocation. The coprimary outcomes were safety and reactogenicity, and immunogenicity (antispike protein IgG titres by ELISA and cellular immune response by ELISpot). We compared immunogenicity at 28 days after the third dose versus 14 days after the fourth dose and at day 0 versus day 14 relative to the fourth dose. Safety and reactogenicity were assessed in the per-protocol population, which comprised all participants who received a fourth-dose booster regardless of their SARS-CoV-2 serostatus. Immunogenicity was primarily analysed in a modified intention-to-treat population comprising seronegative participants who had received a fourth-dose booster and had available endpoint data. This trial is registered with ISRCTN, 73765130, and is ongoing.Findings Between Jan 11 and Jan 25, 2022, 166 participants were screened, randomly assigned, and received either full-dose BNT162b2 (n=83) or half-dose mRNA-1273 (n=83) as a fourth dose. The median age of these participants was 70·1 years (IQR 51·6–77·5) and 86 (52%) of 166 participants were female and 80 (48%) were male. The median interval between the third and fourth doses was 208·5 days (IQR 203·3–214·8). Pain was the most common local solicited adverse event and fatigue was the most common systemic solicited adverse event after BNT162b2 or mRNA-1273 booster doses. None of three serious adverse events reported after a fourth dose with BNT162b2 were related to the study vaccine. In the BNT162b2 group, geometric mean anti-spike protein IgG concentration at day 28 after the third dose was 23 325 ELISA laboratory units (ELU)/mL (95% CI 20 030–27 162), which increased to 37 460 ELU/mL (31 996–43 857) at day 14 after the fourth dose, representing a significant fold change (geometric mean 1·59, 95% CI 1·41–1·78). There was a significant increase in geometric mean anti-spike protein IgG concentration from 28 days after the third dose (25 317 ELU/mL, 95% CI 20 996–30 528) to 14 days after a fourth dose of mRNA-1273 (54 936 ELU/mL, 46 826–64 452), with a geometric mean fold change of 2·19 (1·90–2·52). The fold changes in anti-spike protein IgG titres from before (day 0) to after (day 14) the fourth dose were 12·19 (95% CI 10·37–14·32) and 15·90 (12·92–19·58) in the BNT162b2 and mRNA-1273 groups, respectively. T-cell responses were also boosted after the fourth dose (eg, the fold changes for the wild-type variant from before to after the fourth dose were 7·32 [95% CI 3·24–16·54] in the BNT162b2 group and 6·22 [3·90–9·92] in the mRNA-1273 group).Interpretation Fourth-dose COVID-19 mRNA booster vaccines are well tolerated and boost cellular and humoral immunity. Peak responses after the fourth dose were similar to, and possibly better than, peak responses after the third dose