14 research outputs found
Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?
The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.Access regulation; Endogenous merger; Policy coordination
Cross border mergers and strategic trade policy with two-part taxation: is international policy coordination beneficial?
We analyse how national taxation of firms are likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this is then an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national policy makers out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making. -- Das Papier untersucht die möglichen Wirkungen der nationalen Besteuerung auf Anreize für Fusionen in internationalen Märkten. Dabei wird vor allem gefragt, ob unkoordinierte Handelspolitik zu grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen führt, die insgesamt ineffizient sind und ob das für die internationale Koordination der Handelspolitik spricht. Im vorgestellten Modellrahmen nutzen Politikentscheider zweiseitige Zölle um Exportfirmen zu besteuern. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass zwar nichtkoordinierte Politik grenzüberschreitende Fusionen hervorbringt, indem die beteiligten Firmen ihre nationalen Gesetzgeber gegeneinander ausspielen können; allerdings ist das Ergebnis durchaus wohlfahrtssteigernd im Vergleich zu dem Marktergebnis, das sich aus koordinierter Handelspolitik ergibt.Strategic trade policy,two-part taxation,endogenous merger,policy coordination
Cross-border mergers and strategic trade policy with two-part taxation: is international policy coordination beneficial?
"Das Papier untersucht die möglichen Wirkungen der nationalen Besteuerung
auf Anreize für Fusionen in internationalen Märkten. Dabei wird vor allem
gefragt, ob unkoordinierte Handelspolitik zu grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen
führt, die insgesamt ineffizient sind und ob das für die internationale Koordination
der Handelspolitik spricht. Im vorgestellten Modellrahmen nutzen Politikentscheider
zweiseitige Zölle um Exportfirmen zu besteuern. Die Untersuchung
zeigt, dass zwar nichtkoordinierte Politik grenzüberschreitende Fusionen
hervorbringt, indem die beteiligten Firmen ihre nationalen Gesetzgeber gegeneinander
ausspielen können; allerdings ist das Ergebnis durchaus wohlfahrtssteigernd
im Vergleich zu dem Marktergebnis, das sich aus koordinierter
Handelspolitik ergibt." (Autorenreferat)"We analyse how national taxation of firms are likely to affect merger incentives
in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade
policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this is
then an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address
this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting
firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce
cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national policy
makers out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare
enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making." (author's abstract
Does wage rank affect employees' well-being?
How do workers make wage comparisons? Both an experimental study and an analysis of 16,000 British employees are reported. Satisfaction and well-being levels are shown to depend on more than simple relative pay. They depend upon the ordinal rank of an individual's wage within a comparison group. “Rank” itself thus seems to matter to human beings. Moreover, consistent with psychological theory, quits in a workplace are correlated with pay distribution skewness
Access regulation and cross-border mergers : is international coordination beneficial?
The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can never-theless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation
Access regulation and cross-border mergers: Is international coordination beneficial?
The international integration of regulated markets poses new challenges for regulatory policy. One question is the implications that the overall international regulatory regime will have for cross-border and/or domestic merger activity. In particular, do non-coordinated policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and is this then an argument for international coordination of such policies? The paper addresses this issue in a setting where firms must have access to a transportation network which is controlled by national regulators. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated regulatory policies may induce cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national regulators out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated regulation.Access regulation; Endogenous merger; Policy coordination
Company Taxation and Merger Incentives in International Oligopoly: on International Policy Coordination with Strategic Trade
strategic trade policy, two-part taxation, endogenous merger, policy coordination, F13, L13, L41, L50,