15 research outputs found
Multiteam Systems Handling Time-Sensitive Targets: Developing Situation Awareness in Distributed and Co-located Settings
There is an increasing interest in how to organize operations carried out by multiteam systems (MTS). Large MTS typically operate with a dedicated integration team, responsible for coordinating the operation. We report a study of a military multiteam system that prosecute time-sensitive targets. We asked whether and how the integration team’s efficiency depends on its communication setting. Specifically, we studied how a co-located vs. a distributed communications setting influenced the shared situation awareness and whether the shared situation awareness again influenced the outcome of the decision processes. We found that performance fell when the integration team shifted from a co-located to a distributed setting. The fall in performance seemed to be mediated by a corresponding fall in situation awareness. Moreover, while the performance improved for each run in the co-located setting, we did not see such learning in the distributed setting. Qualitative observations revealed that misunderstandings lasted longer in a distributed configuration than in a co-located setting. We found that situation awareness at level 3 was the only level of situation awareness significant for predicting all dimensions of performance. Implications for theory, research, and practice are discussed.publishedVersio
The art of measuring nothing: The paradox of measuring safety in a changing civil aviation industry using traditional safety metrics
Measuring safety as an outcome variable within the ultra-safe civil aviation industry during periods of deliberate organizational change is a difficult, and often fruitless, task. Anticipating eroding safety processes, based on measuring nothing happening over time, does not adequately capture the true state of an evolving safe system, and this is particularly relevant for leaders and managers in a civil aviation industry responsible for maintaining and improving ultra-safe performance while simultaneously managing demanding strategic business goals. In this paper, I will look at the difficulties of measuring safety as an outcome measure in high reliability organizations (HROs) using the traditional measures of incident and accident reporting during periods of deliberate organizational change inspired by the desults from a three-year longitudinal case study of the Norwegian Air Navigation Services provider - Avinor. I will first review the current safety literature relating to Safety Management Systems (SMSs) used in the civil aviation industry. I will then propose a more holistic model that shifts the focus from the traditional safety monitoring mechanisms of risk analysis and trial and error learning, to the natural interactivity within socio-technical systems as found in High Reliability Organizations. And finally, I will present a summary of the empirical results of an alternate methodology for measuring perceived changes in safety at the operational level as leading indicators of evolving safety at at the organizational level
Does a Better Running Back Mean More Rushing? Game Theory and the NFL
In this paper I attempt to answer the question of whether or not teams in the National Football League (NFL) rush less with a better running back. This seems counterintuitive, but game theory supposes that this is true. Defenses facing a better running back will generally expect the offense to rush more and therefore defend the run more often. The offense, foreseeing the defense’s actions, will choose to pass more to counteract the run defense. This is the basis of the difference between the strategic effect and the direct effect in mixed strategies. The direct effect is when a player takes an improved strategy more often. The strategic effect is when a player takes an improved strategy less often. I attempt to verify the game theory assumption that the strategic effect dominates the direct effect by analyzing data from all 32 NFL teams over 14 seasons. The data measures offenses’ play selection, rushing efficiency, passing efficiency, and ratings for running backs, quarterbacks, and offensive lines. After running regressions and analyzing specific cases, the results show that game theory is incorrect and the direct effect dominates the strategic effect. Teams rush more often with a higher rated running back than with a lower rated running back
Jousting with dragons: A resilience engineering approach to managing SMS in the transport sector
System resilience is the ability for complex, dynamic-adaptive socio-technical systems to absorb and rebound from trauma or stress, and to avoid "jousting with dragons" where results are uncertain and often fatal. In a safety context, the term "dragons" originates from Professor David Woods at Ohio State University and the relatively new field of Resilience Engineering. Dragons are an illustration for the consequence of "surprise" as depicted in ancient seafarer maps that filled the seas beyond the known boundaries of the ancient world with fire-breathing dragons, and certain death. In a modern day sense, dragons represent the unintended, and often unforeseen and unpredictable, consequences of crossing operational boundaries that are difficult to identify precisely, are often influenced by various actors, and are continually changing. In particular, due to the complex, dynamic-adaptive behaviour of systems, classic statistical metrics used in current Safety Management Systems (SMS) no longer allow us to predict the next undesired event. We need to change our focus and find new ways of capturing the faint signals of impending failure. This will require structural, psychological and social changes in the way SMSs work. In this paper, I will address the issues of understanding and managing complex, dynamic-adaptive systems through the quality of resilience, and how to avoid "jousting with dragons" in the transport sector using a Resilience Engineering lens
Measuring the effects of strategic change on safety in a high reliability organization
This study explores how strategic organizational change affects safety as an outcome variable
in a high reliability organization (HRO). High reliability organizations are defined as
organizations operating in high-risk industries that achieve exceptionally high levels of safety
performance. Based on the assumption that HROs achieve these high levels of safety
performance through stable safety processes produced by common organizational structures
such as: learning environments, highly regulated activities, redundancy, local ownership of
tasks, and strong supporting safety cultures, I will study how potentially destabilizing
deliberate change processes affect safety as an outcome, over time, in a live single
longitudinal case study. This study sets out to answer two questions:
(1) How does the interaction between leadership choices and actions, and
organizational culture type affect attitudes towards change in a high reliability
organization?
(2) How do the relationships between leadership choices and actions during
strategic change, safety climate in place, and employee attitudes toward change,
affect safety as an outcome variable?
A deliberate strategic change initiative known as corporatization is studied over a three
year period in the Norwegian air navigation services provider - Avinor - with particular
focus upon four embedded units that experience three different phases of a common
deliberate change process. The findings indicate that the individuals at each embedded
unit experience the change process differently regarding both the local leadership and
the safety climate in place with varying effects on attitudes and perceptions. However,
the findings also show that the attitudes and perceptions toward the top leadership, and
the top leadership’s commitment to safety, in particular, are consistently reduced during
the time period studied and do not vary across the embedded units.
This study focuses on how a mismatch between organizational culture type and
strategic change type affects change implementation success. Furthermore, the study
shows how this mismatch affects individual attitudes and perceptions toward change,
and how these, in turn, affect perceptions of safety for front-line employees directly
responsible for safety outcomes. It is argued that different organizational culture types
demand specific change types to ensure success. It is also argued that a mismatch
between culture and change types can lead to a loss of trust in the leadership and
resistance to change that can, in the worst case, lead to the collapse of the change
process.
Propositions on how changes in perceptions and attitudes affect safety are presented in
a structural equation model, and show that individual perceptions of the leadership’s
commitment to safety and safety climate have strong positive causal relationships to
both attitudes toward change and perceptions of safety. The findings indicate that
individual perceptions of the leadership’s commitment to safety have important
implications to both change success and safety as an outcome
Cleared for Takeoff? A Snapshot of Context for Change in a High-Risk Industry
Civil aviation is a high-risk industry where actors are experiencing increasing focus on economic performance, greater international competition, and growing safety threats that require continual organizational adjustments. In this article, we present the findings of a case study conducted within the Norwegian national air traffic management organization—Avinor, in preparation for a major reorganization initiative. In this study, we mapped the aggregated readiness and positioning for organizational change in the three main air traffic control centers in Norway using a mixed-method approach to person–environment Fit to help organizational leaders better understand each unit’s positioning for change, and more specifically, individual preferences for change styles. The results suggest that participants at the different air traffic control centers had developed distinctly different change preferences at both the group and individual levels, and that each was distinctly different from the other units in their positioning and readiness for change
Du er ikke alene: Psykodrama kan hjelpe overgangen til høyere utdanning
Overgangen til studier i høyere utdanning, enten som ung eller voksen student, kan oppleves stressende og vanskelig og i verste fall medføre emosjonelle problemer og avslutning av studiet. Nye undersøkelser viser at mer enn 30 prosent av studenter ved høyskoler og universi- teter faller ut av studiet og er særlig sårbare det første året. Sosiale og økonomiske konsekvenser av dette for samfunnet har ført til et skjerpet søkelys på førsteårs- studenters erfaringer og alternative tilnærminger for å dempe denne trenden og faren for tidlig frafall. Interna- sjonalt har tradisjonelle strukturelle og psykologiske tiltak hatt minimal effekt i å redusere frafall det første året, og dagens muligheter for å skape sosiale nettverk dekker ikke sårbare studenters behov. Som en alternativ tilnær- ming fulgte dette aksjonsforskningsprosjektet en selv- valgt gruppe risikoutsatte førsteårsstudenter gjennom et ettårig prosjekt hvor psykodramateknikker ble brukt for å hjelpe studentene med å overleve det krevende første året. Vi fant at psykodramametoden signifikant reduserte det psykiske og emosjonelle stresset hos del- takende studenter, og at teknikkene som ble benyttet, fremmet mulighetene for deltakerne til å bearbeide sine utfordringer og evne til å takle forventninger og presta- sjonskrav ved bruk av mestringsferdigheter. Enda mer overraskende fant vi at arbeid i grupper med bruk av psykodramateknikker skapte en følelse av å tilhøre et sosialt nettverk som ikke var tilgjengelig gjennom tradisjonelle sosiale nettverksaktiviteter. Den økonomiske innsatsen som skal til for å gjennomføre denne typen intervensjon, antas å være minimal i forhold til de betydelige kostnadene frafall medfører for studentene, deres familier og samfunnet for øvrig
Multiteam Systems Handling Time-Sensitive Targets: Developing Situation Awareness in Distributed and Co-located Settings
There is an increasing interest in how to organize operations carried out by multiteam systems (MTS). Large MTS typically operate with a dedicated integration team, responsible for coordinating the operation. We report a study of a military multiteam system that prosecute time-sensitive targets. We asked whether and how the integration team’s efficiency depends on its communication setting. Specifically, we studied how a co-located vs. a distributed communications setting influenced the shared situation awareness and whether the shared situation awareness again influenced the outcome of the decision processes. We found that performance fell when the integration team shifted from a co-located to a distributed setting. The fall in performance seemed to be mediated by a corresponding fall in situation awareness. Moreover, while the performance improved for each run in the co-located setting, we did not see such learning in the distributed setting. Qualitative observations revealed that misunderstandings lasted longer in a distributed configuration than in a co-located setting. We found that situation awareness at level 3 was the only level of situation awareness significant for predicting all dimensions of performance. Implications for theory, research, and practice are discussed
Multiteam Systems Handling Time-Sensitive Targets: Developing Situation Awareness in Distributed and Co-located Settings
There is an increasing interest in how to organize operations carried out by multiteam systems (MTS). Large MTS typically operate with a dedicated integration team, responsible for coordinating the operation. We report a study of a military multiteam system that prosecute time-sensitive targets. We asked whether and how the integration team’s efficiency depends on its communication setting. Specifically, we studied how a co-located vs. a distributed communications setting influenced the shared situation awareness and whether the shared situation awareness again influenced the outcome of the decision processes. We found that performance fell when the integration team shifted from a co-located to a distributed setting. The fall in performance seemed to be mediated by a corresponding fall in situation awareness. Moreover, while the performance improved for each run in the co-located setting, we did not see such learning in the distributed setting. Qualitative observations revealed that misunderstandings lasted longer in a distributed configuration than in a co-located setting. We found that situation awareness at level 3 was the only level of situation awareness significant for predicting all dimensions of performance. Implications for theory, research, and practice are discusse