quantreg. nonpar: An R Package for performing nonparametric series quantile regression

The R package quantreg.nonpar implements nonparametric quantile regression methods to estimate and make inference on partially linear quantile models. quantreg.nonpar obtains point estimates of the conditional quantile function and its derivatives based on series approximations to the nonparametric part of the model. It also provides pointwise and uniform confidence intervals over a region of covariate values and/or quantile indices for the same functions using analytical and resampling methods. This paper serves as an introduction to the package and displays basic functionality of the functions contained within.https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.08329Published and Accepted manuscript versions

quantreg. nonpar: An R Package for performing nonparametric series quantile regression

The R package quantreg.nonpar implements nonparametric quantile regression methods to estimate and make inference on partially linear quantile models. quantreg.nonpar obtains point estimates of the conditional quantile function and its derivatives based on series approximations to the nonparametric part of the model. It also provides pointwise and uniform confidence intervals over a region of covariate values and/or quantile indices for the same functions using analytical and resampling methods. This paper serves as an introduction to the package and displays basic functionality of the functions contained within.https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.08329Published and Accepted manuscript versions

During elections, candidates who discuss the same issues can end up confusing voters

With the 2014 mid-term elections looming ever closer, it is only a matter of time before the calls for candidates to have greater dialogue on issues begins. But is this dialogue, or ‘issue convergence’ helpful for voters? New research by Keena Lipsitz into what happens when candidates address the same issues at the same time finds that individuals hear from both candidates, they are often easily confused, especially if their level of political interest is not high

The costs and benefits of noncompete agreements

Noncompete agreements are elements of workers' contracts that limit the worker's job mobility in the event of a job separation. In this dissertation, I address two major questions: first, why are noncompete agreements used, especially among workers earning low wages? Second, what are the ramifications of use of noncompete agreements, both for the firms using them and for the markets in which those firms exist? In the first chapter, co-authored with Matthew Johnson, I show that low wage workers sign noncompete agreements when their wages are constrained. I use a novel sample of owners of hair salons to empirically demonstrate that, when wage constraints are more binding due to a greater minimum wage or a greater labor supply, noncompete agreements are used more frequently. I show that use in this context may not maximize the firm's joint surplus, suggesting that policy interventions may be welfare-enhancing. In the second chapter, I generalize the theory of the first chapter, allowing for intertemporal changes in labor markets. I posit the existence of noncompete agreement cycles, which may explain recent trends in use among low wage employees. In a noncompete agreement cycle, workers who separate must exit the labor market. Low labor supply decreases use of noncompete agreements, allowing labor supply to increase and leading to use of noncompete agreements once again. I examine the costs and benefits of a policy prohibiting NCAs, analyzing such a policy's sensitivity to various parameters. In the final chapter, I consider the effects of noncompete agreements on the effort exertion of workers. If a worker is able to exert effort in order to increase the value of an asset, that worker may wish to spin off a new firm to leverage its value. The worker's current employer faces a tradeoff: a noncompete agreement induces the employee to stay but decreases the employee's incentive to exert effort. I show that, when the value of a spinoff is unknown ex ante, noncompete agreements may cause large ex post efficiency losses by limiting creation of highly profitable spinoffs