247 research outputs found
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System
Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs since the 1960s: Which Institutions Really Mattered?
How have labor market institutions and welfare-state transfers affected jobs and productivity in Western Europe, relative to industrialized Pacific Rim countries? Orthodox criticisms of European government institutions are right in some cases and wrong in others. Protectionist labor-market policies such as employee protection laws seem to have become more costly since about 1980, not through overall employment effects, but through the net human-capital cost of protecting senior male workers at the expense of women and youth. Product-market regulations in core sectors may also have reduced GDP, though here the evidence is less robust. By contrast, high general tax levels have shed the negative influence they might have had in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, other institutions closer to the core of the welfare state have caused no net harm to European jobs and growth. The welfare state%u2019s tax-based social transfers and coordinated wage bargaining have not harmed either employment or GDP. Even unemployment benefits do not have robustly negative effects.
The Curious Dawn of American Public Schools
Three factors help to explain why school enrollments in the Northern United States were higher than those in the South and in most of Europe by 1850. One was affordability: the northern states had higher real incomes, cheaper teachers, and greater local tax support. The second was the greater autonomy of local governments. The third was the greater diffusion of voting power among the citizenry in much of the North, especially in rural communities. The distribution of local political voice appears to be a robust predictor of tax support and enrollments, both within and between regions.
The unequal lag in Latin American schooling since 1900: follow the money
Special Issue on Latin American Inequality.Focusing on education–income anomalies, in which a richer country delivers less education than a poorer country, seems a promising way to harvest a part of the rich history that does not lend itself to econometrics. To test the chain of alleged causation from unequal power and wealth to poor schooling, one must follow the public money, or lack of it, in as many contexts as the data will allow. Public funding for mass schooling is the hitherto untested middle link in the chain. The key to Latin America’s poor schooling was the failure to supply tax money, not gender discrimination or any shortfall in market demand for skills. The most glaring anomalies were the Venezuelan and Argentine failures to supply the levels of tax support for mass schooling that their high income could have afforded.Este artículo estudia algunas irregularidades de la relación entre educación y renta, por la que los países ricos ofrecen menos educación que los pobres. Esta relación no parece encajar con la historia de los países ricos ni se presta a una comprobación econométrica. Para comprobar la cadena causal acreditada entre la desigualdad de poder o riqueza y baja escolarización, uno tiene que seguir el dinero público o la ausencia de éste en tantos contextos como sea posible. La financiación pública de la escolarización de masas aún no ha sido examinada en el eslabón medio en la cadena. La clave de la baja escolarización latinoamericana fue un problema de ingreso fiscal, no de discriminación de género o de un fallo de mercado en la demanda de mano de obra cualificada. Las irregularidades más flagrantes las encontramos en Venezuela y Argentina que fallaron en el nivel de apoyo fiscal a la escolarización de masas en relación con los ingresos medios disponibles
Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?
The world economy has become more unequal over the last two centuries. Since within- country inequality exhibits no ubiquitous trend, it follows that virtually all of the observed rise in world income inequality has been driven by widening gaps between nations, while almost none of it has driven by widening gaps within nations. Meanwhile, the world economy has become much more globally integrated over the past two centuries. If correlation meant causation, these facts would imply that globalization has raised inequality between nations, but that it has had no clear effect on inequality within nations. This paper argues that the likely impact of globalization on world inequality has been very different from what these simple correlations suggest. Globalization probably mitigated rising inequality between participating nations. The nations that gained the most from globalization are those poor ones that changed their policies to exploit it, while the ones that gained the least did not, or were too isolated to do so. The effect of globalization on inequality within nations has gone both ways, but here too those who have lost the most from globalization typically have been the excluded non-participants. In any case far too small to explain the observed long run rise in world inequality.
The free-lunch puzzle: hard times for critics of social spending
From the US to Britain and across the European Union, governments have been ramping up public spending to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. For a long time, common wisdom dictated that social spending drags down the growth and level of GDP. Peter H. Lindert says that history shows otherwise. He writes that over the past 140 years larger social-spending budgets have not accompanied any net loss of GDP, skills, or work
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