Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Bloc for Multilateral Liberalization?

Increasingly, in regional agreements, large economies, e.g. U.S. and E.U., offer lower trade barriers in exchange for cooperation by small economies in environmental, intellectual property and other issues. What is the effect of such agreements on multilateral trade liberalization? We show that, even in the absence of trade creation or diversion, such preferential agreements increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions for the goods exported from small to large countries. This occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that large countries can use in preferential agreements causing a loss in their bargaining power. The result is due to current exceptions in the WTO to the most-favorite-nation rule which allow for lower than MFN tariffs, e.g. art. XXIV and GSP. By explicitly modeling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations we analyze the effects on multilateral tariffs and welfare of strengthening the MFN rule and show that large and small countries may not prefer the same regime of rules.Multilateral trade negotiations; most-favorite-nation; regional integration; cross-border externalities; environment; labor standards; bargaining; repeated games.

Why is there an Anti-trade Bias in Trade Policy?

Small economies rarely embrace free trade, a fact that is commonly explained as a consequence of the government's use of trade policy to redistribute income. But why is this redistribution typically biased in favor of import-competing sectors and is consequently trade restricting rather than trade promoting? This remains an important puzzle in trade policy. Most models assume the puzzle away by restricting the government set of policies or else generate the opposite, and empirically counterfactual, prediction--that trade policy has a pro-trade bias (e.g. Grossman-Helpman AER 1994). We show that if the government's objective reflects a concern for inequality, or diminishing marginal political support from factor owners, then trade policy exhibits anti-trade bias. Importantly the mechanism that we analyze generates the anti-trade bias independently of whether factors are specific or mobile across sectors. The mechanism also generates an anti-trade bias between large countries even after they sign reciprocal trade agreements that eliminate any terms-of-trade motivation for the use of trade protection.trade policy; protectionism; anti-trade bias; inequality

Trade and Investment under Policy Uncertainty: Theory and Firm Evidence

We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that policy uncertainty can significantly affect firm level investment and entry decisions in the context of international trade. When market entry costs are sunk, policy uncertainty can create a real option value of waiting to enter foreign markets until conditions improve or uncertainty is resolved. Using a dynamic, heterogeneous firms model we show that: (i) investment and entry into export markets is reduced when trade policy is uncertain, and (ii) preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are valuable to exporters even if applied trade barriers are currently low or zero. We derive a structural equation that predicts how firm entry responds to changes in applied tariffs and a theory-based measure of policy uncertainty. Our novel approach using observable trade policies allows us to estimate the impact of policy uncertainty and quantify its aggregate implications. We apply this method to Portugal's accession to the European Community in 1986 using new firm-level trade data. We find that (i) the trade policy reform accounted for a large fraction of the observed Portuguese exporting firms' entry and sales upon accession (ii) the accession removed uncertainty about future preferences and (iii) this uncertainty channel accounted for a large fraction of the predicted growth. These results have broader implications for other PTAs and our approach can be applied to analyze other sources of policy uncertainty.

Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution

We present a bargaining model of the interaction between a government and interest groups in which, unlike most existing models, neither side is assumed to have all the bargaining power. The government finds it optimal to constrain itself in the use of transfer policies to improve its bargaining position. In a model of redistribution to lobbies, the government finds it optimal to cap the size of lump-sum transfers it makes below the unconstrained equilibrium level. With a binding cap on efficient subsidies in place, less efficient subsidies will be used for redistribution even when they serve no economic function. Analogously, if it must choose either efficient or inefficient transfers, it may find it optimal to forego use of the former if its bargaining power relative to the lobby is sufficiently low. Even if the lobby can bargain over the type of redistribution policy with the government, the inefficient policy may still be used in equilibrium. If policymakers are elected, rational fully informed voters may choose a candidate who implements the inefficient policy over one who would implement the efficient policy and may prefer the candidate with the lower weight on voter welfare We thus offer an alternative theory that explains why governments may optimally choose to restrict efficient lump-sum transfers to interest groups and replace them with relatively less efficient transfers.

Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence

The theoretical debate over whether countries can and should set tariffs in response to the foreign export elasticities they face goes back to Edgeworth (1894). Despite the centrality of the optimal tariff argument in trade policy, there exists no evidence about whether countries actually exploit their market power in trade by setting higher tariffs on goods that are supplied inelastically. We estimate disaggregate foreign export supply elasticities and find evidence that countries that are not members of the World Trade Organization systematically set higher tariffs on goods that are supplied inelastically. The typical country in our sample sets tariffs 9 percentage points higher in goods with high market power relative to those with low market power. This large effect is of a magnitude similar to the average tariffs in the data and market power explains more of the tariff variation than a commonly used political economy variable. The result is robust to the inclusion of other determinants of tariffs and a variety of model specifications. We also find that U.S. trade restrictions that are not covered by the WTO are significantly higher in goods where the U.S. has more market power. In short, we find strong evidence that these importers have market power and use it in setting non-cooperative trade policy.

The financial leverage of large Portuguese firms in the European context

The Financial Leverage of Large Portuguese Firms in the European Context This paper studies the leverage, cost of debt servicing ability and structure of debt maturity of large Portuguese firms, over the pre-crisis (2006-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2013) periods through a comparative analysis with other European peers. We document that large Portuguese firms have been reducing their leverage since the end of 2009. We find that this decrease in leverage is not a consequence higher Equity levels but rather a result of asset’s downsizing. We also document that Portuguese firms are still more leveraged than their European peers, even though this difference has decreased over time. High corporate debt levels are transversal across industries

Policy Choice: Theory and Evidence from Commitment via International Trade Agreements

Why do governments employ inefficient policies to redistribute income towards special interest groups (SIGs) when more efficient ones are available? To address this puzzle we derive and test predictions for a set of policies where detailed data is available and an efficiency ranking is feasible: tariffs vs. non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice model a government bargaining with domestic SIGs can gain by constraining tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of the less efficient NTBs. This generates two key testable predictions (i) there is imperfect policy substitution, i.e. tighter tariff constraints are not fully offset by the higher NTBs they generate and (ii) the decision to commit to constraints depends on the government's bargaining power relative to SIGs. Using detailed data, we confirm that tariff constraints in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTBs. We also provide a structural estimate that indicates NTBs are less efficient than the tariffs they imperfectly replace. Moreover, we find parametric and non-parametric evidence that the higher the government bargaining power relative to a SIG the more relaxed the tariff constraint it chooses. This result is stronger for organized industries, which further supports the theory. The main theoretical insights and empirical approach can be applied to other policies to provide additional evidence on inefficient redistribution.

Electronic state spectroscopy of C₂Cl₄

The VUV spectrum of C2Cl4 is reported in the energy range 3.8-10.8 eV (325-115 nm). Several photoabsorption features are observed for the first time, including a very weak low-lying band which is provisionally attributed to a π → π* triplet transition. Recent ab initio calculations of the molecule’s electronic transitions [Arulmozhiraja et al. J. Chem. Phys. 129 (2008) 174506] provide the basis for the present assignments below 8.5 eV. An extended ndπ series is proposed to account for several higher-energy Rydberg bands. The identification of vibrational structure, dominated by symmetric C=C and CCl2 stretching in excitations from the HOMO, largely agrees with previous spectroscopic studies. The present absolute photoabsorption cross sections cover a wider energy range than the previous measurements and are used to calculate UV photolysis lifetimes of this aeronomic molecule at altitudes between 20 and 50 km

Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence

The theoretical debate over whether countries can and should set tariffs in response to the foreign export elasticities they face goes back to Edgeworth (1894). Despite the centrality of the optimal tariff argument in trade policy, there exists no evidence about whether countries actually exploit their market power in trade by setting higher tariffs on goods that are supplied inelastically. We estimate disaggregate foreign export supply elasticities and find evidence that countries that are not members of the World Trade Organization systematically set higher tariffs on goods that are supplied inelastically. The typical country in our sample sets tariffs 9 percentage points higher in goods with high market power relative to those with low market power. This large effect is of a magnitude similar to the average tariffs in the data and market power explains more of the tariff variation than a commonly used political economy variable. The result is robust to the inclusion of other determinants of tariffs and a variety of model specifications. We also find that U.S. trade restrictions that are not covered by the WTO are significantly higher in goods where the U.S. has more market power. In short, we find strong evidence that these importers have market power and use it in setting non-cooperative trade policy