On the assimilation of instructions : stimulus-response associations are implemented but not stimulus-task associations

The assimilation of instructions consists of two stages. First, a task model is formed on the basis of instructions. Second, this model is implemented, resulting in highly accessible representations, which enable reflexive behavior that guides the application of instructions. Research frequently demonstrated that instructions can lead to automatic response activation, which indicates that stimulus-response associations can be implemented on the basis of a task model. However, instructions not only indicate how to respond (stimulus-response mappings) but also when (i.e., the conditions under which mappings apply). Accordingly, we tested whether instruction implementation leads both to the activation of stimulus-response associations and of associations between stimuli and the context or task in which the instructed stimulus-response mappings are relevant (i.e., stimulus-task associations). In four experiments, we measured if implementing newly instructed stimulus-response mappings also leads to bivalence costs (i.e., shorter latencies when a stimulus can only occur in one task compared to when it can occur in two tasks), which indicate the presence of stimulus-task associations. We consistently observed automatic response activation on the basis of instructions, but no bivalence costs. A discrepancy thus exists between information conveyed in an instructed task model and the elements of that task model that are implemented. We propose that future research on automatic effects of instructions should broaden its scope and focus both on the formation of an instructed task model and its subsequent implementation

Feature integration and task switching: diminished switch costs after controlling for stimulus, response, and cue repetitions

This report presents data from two versions of the task switching procedure in which the separate influence of stimulus repetitions, response key repetitions, conceptual response repetitions, cue repetitions, task repetitions, and congruency are considered. Experiment 1 used a simple alternating runs procedure with parity judgments of digits and consonant/ vowel decisions of letters as the two tasks. Results revealed sizable effects of stimulus and response repetitions, and controlling for these effects reduced the switch cost. Experiment 2 was a cued version of the task switch paradigm with parity and magnitude judgments of digits as the two tasks. Results again revealed large effects of stimulus and response repetitions, in addition to cue repetition effects. Controlling for these effects again reduced the switch cost. Congruency did not interact with our novel "unbiased" measure of switch costs. We discuss how the task switch paradigm might be thought of as a more complex version of the feature integration paradigm and propose an episodic learning account of the effect. We further consider to what extent appeals to higher-order control processes might be unnecessary and propose that controls for feature integration biases should be standard practice in task switching experiments

Instruction-based response activation depends on task preparation

An increasing number of studies have demonstrated that a response in one task can be activated automatically on the basis merely of instructed stimulus-response (S-R) mappings belonging to another task. Such instruction-based response activations are considered to be evidence for the formation of S-R associations on the basis of the S-R mappings for an upcoming, but not yet executed, task. A crucial but somewhat neglected assumption is that instructed S-R associations are formed only under conditions that impose a sufficient degree of task preparation. Accordingly, in the present study we investigated the relation between task preparation and the instruction-based task-rule congruency effect, which is an index of response activation on the basis of instructions. The results from two experiments demonstrated that merely instructed S-R mappings of a particular task only elicit instruction-based response activations when that task is prepared for to a sufficient degree. Implications are discussed for the representation of instructed S-R mappings in working memory

Attention to future actions: the influence of instructed S-R versus S-S mappings on attentional control

Even though there is ample evidence that planning future actions plays a role in attentional processing (e.g., Downing Visual Cognition 11:689-703, 2000; Soto et al., Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12:248-342, 2008), it is not clear to what extent planning in itself (rather than the prior experience of the planned actions) controls attention. We suggest that attention can be biased towards stimuli that are associated with instructions for tasks that will be performed in the future even if those tasks have not yet been experienced. We performed two experiments in which participants receive instructions in which some objects were associated with a response (i.e., instructed S-R objects; "Experiment 1") or a stimulus property (i.e., instructed S-S objects; "Experiment 2"), whereas control objects were not. However, before participants were required to perform the S-R task ("Experiment 1") or perform an S-S memory task ("Experiment 2"), they performed a visual probe task in which target objects and control objects served as irrelevant cues. Our results show that attention was biased towards the S-R objects (compared to control stimuli) but not to S-S objects. These findings suggest that future plans can bias attention toward specific stimuli, but only when these stimuli are associated with a specific action. We discuss these findings in light of research concerning automatic effects of instructions and theories that view attention as a selection-for-action mechanism

Attention for future reward

When stimuli are consistently paired with reward, attention toward these stimuli becomes biased (e.g., Abrahamse, Braem, Notebaert & Verguts, et al., Psychological Bulletin 142:693–728, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000047). An important premise is that participants need to repeatedly experience stimulus–reward pairings to obtain these effects (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky & Theeuwes, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16:437–443, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.06.010). This idea is based on associative learning theories (e.g., Pearce & Bouton, Annual Review of Psychology 52:111–139, 2001) that suggest that exposure to stimulus–reward pairings leads to the formation of stimulus–reward associations, and a transfer of salience of the reward to the neutral stimulus. However, novel learning theories (e.g., De Houwer, Learning and Motivation 53:7–23, 2009, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2015.11.001) suggest such effects are not necessarily the result of associative learning, but can be caused by complex knowledge and expectancies as well. In the current experiment, we first instructed participants that a correct response to one centrally presented stimulus would be followed by a high reward, whereas a correct response to another centrally presented stimulus would be paired with a low reward. Before participants executed this task, they performed a visual probe task in which these stimuli were presented as distractors. We found that attention was drawn automatically toward high-reward stimuli relative to low-reward stimuli. This implies that complex inferences and expectancies can cause automatic attentional bias, challenging associative learning models of attentional control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Awh et al., 2012)