The design and sequencing of trade and investment policy reform : an institutional analysis

This paper analyzes from an institutional perspective the experiences of twelve countries with selected aspects of trade and investment policy reform. The analysis highlights two distinct but related determinants of the appropriate design of policy reform - the organizational capabilities of government bureaucracies, and the political flexibility of governments. There exists considerable variations among countries in their organizational capabilities and in their political commitment to change. It follows that the appropriate mix and sequence of policy reforms will be quite different. The design of lending programs supported by the World Bank should respond to these differences between countries.Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade and Regional Integration,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Enterprise Development&Reform

Can islands of effectiveness thrive in difficult governance settings ? the political economy of local-level collaborative governance

Many low-income countries contend with a governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In such countries, neither broad-based policy nor public management reforms are likely to be feasible. But are broad-based approaches necessary? Theory and evidence suggest that in such settings progress could be driven by"islands of effectiveness"-- narrowly-focused initiatives that combine high-quality institutional arrangements at the micro-level, plus supportive, narrowly-targeted policy reforms. This paper explores whether and how local-level collaborative governance can provide a platform for these islands of effectiveness. Drawing on the analytical framework developed by the Nobel-prize winning social scientist Elinor Ostrom, the paper reviews the underpinnings of successful collaborative governance. It introduces a simple model for exploring the interactions between collaborative governance and political economy. The model highlights the conditions under which coordination is capable of countering threats from predators seeking to capture the returns from collaborative governance for themselves. The relative strength in the broader environment of two opposing networks emerges as key --"threat networks"to which predators have access, and countervailing"trumping networks"on which protagonists of effective collaborative governance can draw. The paper illustrates the potential practical relevance of the approach with three heuristic examples: the governance of schools, fisheries, and road construction and maintenance. It concludes by laying out an agenda for further empirical research, and suggesting what might be the implications of the approach for future operational practice.Governance Indicators,National Governance,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Policy, Institutions and Governance

Indonesia's small and medium-size exporters and their support systems

The authors survey a sample of 91 small or medium-size exporters of garments, rattan furniture, the two are reasonably equally mixed. About 75 percent of the entrepreneures in garments and rattan furniture, and carved wooden furniture (Jepara), and interview people in public and nonprofit agencies active about issues affecting small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Indonesia's garment industry is dominated by entrepreneurs of Chinese descent and the Jepara industry by pribumi (Indonesian Malays); in rattan furniture, the two are reasonably equally mixed. About 75 percent of the entrepreneures in garments and rattan furniture have some university education; less than half of those in the more traditional, skill-based Jepara industry do. In most of the firms, international marketing was handled exclusively through private channels, that is also how most firms acquired technological capability. But such channels appeared to be more readily accessible by larger firms, by educated entrepreneurs, and by non-pribumi who could take advantage of the extended-family network that connects ethnic Chinese in the region. Relying exclusively on private channels means running the risk that participation in export markets will be limited to a relatively narrow base of entrepreneurs. Pribumi and smaller firms relied heavily on collective marketing support provided with a"light touch"- for example, support for participation in trade fairs. The Ministry of Trade's international network of offices geared to providing information and facilitating transactions was of little use to the firms surveyed. Collective technology support also appeared to be somewhat more important for smaller, pribumi firms, although its impact was modest. Employing expatriates was a powerful mechanism for acquiring technological capability, especially in the rattan and garment sectors, although it was concentrated disproportionately among the non-pribumi entrepreneurs. Indonesia's collective institutions suffer from pervasive organizational weaknesses that limit their ability to help broaden the base of private entrepreneurship in small and medium-size firms. Public institutions generally lack the commitment, resources, and flexibility needed to provide quality support to SMEs, and the industry association often lack the professionalism and accountability needed to gain SMEs'confidence. But public support can be useful when it involves relatively simple services, such as support to organize local fairs, to facilitate participation in fairs abroad, or to use foreign private consultants.Microfinance,Small Scale Enterprise,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Water and Industry,Public Health Promotion,Small Scale Enterprise,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Microfinance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Water and Industry

Development strategies : integrating governance and growth

A frontier challenge for development strategy is to move beyond prescribing optimal economic policies, and instead – taking a broad view of the interactions between economic, political and social constraints and dynamics -- to identify entry points capable of breaking a low-growth logjam, and initiating a virtuous spiral of cumulative change. The paper lays out four distinctive sequences via which the different dimensions might interact and evolve over time, and provides country-specific illustrations of each. Each sequence is defined by the principal focus of its initial step: 1) State capacity building provides a platform for accelerated growth via improved public sector performance and enhanced credibility for investors; strengthened political institutions and civil society come onto the agenda only over the longer term; 2) Transformational governance has as its entry point the reshaping of a country’s political institutions. Accelerated growth could follow, insofar as institutional changes enhance accountability, and reduce the potential for arbitrary discretionary action -- and thereby shift expectations in a positive direction; 3) For'just enough governance', the initial focus is on growth itself, with the aim of addressing specific capacity and institutional constraints as and when they become binding -- not seeking to anticipate and address in advance all possible institutional constraints; 4) Bottom-up development engages civil society as an entry point for seeking stronger state capacity, lower corruption, better public services, improvements in political institutions more broadly -- and a subsequent unlocking of constraints on growth. The sequences should not be viewed as a technocratic toolkit from which a putative reformer is free to choose. Recognizing that choice is constrained by history, the paper concludes by suggesting an approach for exploring what might the scope for identifying practical ways forward in specific country settings.Governance Indicators,National Governance,Parliamentary Government,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Political Economy

Public institutions and private transactions : the legal and regulatory environment for business private transactions in Brazil and Chile

Drawing on the new institutional economics, the authors examine the impact on businesses of Brazil's relatively complex, nontransparent legal and regulatory institutions and compare their costs with those of Chile's institutions, which are relatively simple. They examine four basic areas where legal and regulatory institutions could create critical obstacles to efficiency in the garment industries of Sao Paulo and Santiago: (a) the start-up of a new business (entry); (b) the regulation of business; (c) orders by customers of garment firms; and (d) sales with credit. They find that Chilean business transactions benefit from legal simplicity and more consistent enforcement than in Brazil, but that these perceived advantages are offset because of the differences between formal law and practice in Brazil. In two of these areas, Brazil has evolved some effective institutional substitutes to reduce the costs that would otherwise have been imposed by inefficient formal institutions. In the entry of new businesses, professions have evolved to transform the process of registering a new business from a potentially tortuous obstacle path into a fairly affordable one-stop process. In debt collection, information systems limit the need to resort to the formal legal system. Nevertheless, regulation raises the cost of transactions for Brazilian businesses. Costs are further raised by greater uncertainty and frequent renegotiation of orders.National Governance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Legal Products,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise

When love meets hate: The relationship between state policies on gay and lesbian rights and hate crime incidence

Do public policies on gay and lesbian rights affect the incidence of hate crimes based on sexual orientation? We propose that legal inequalities increase hate crimes because they provide discursive opportunities for bias, discrimination, and violence. Legal equality, however, will reduce violence. Using annual panel data from 2000 to 2012, a period of substantial policy change, we analyze how three state policies affect reported hate crimes: same-sex partnerships, employment non-discrimination, and hate crime laws. Hate crime and employment non-discrimination laws that include sexual orientation reduce hate crime incidence. Partnership recognition increases reported hate crimes, though it may not increase actual crime incidence. Because incidence is spatially correlated, policy changes in one state yield spillover benefits in other states. These results provide some of the first quantitative evidence that public policies affect hate crimes based on sexual orientation. Findings confirm the roles of institutional heterosexism and discursive opportunities in producing hate crimes

SANKSI PIDANA AKIBAT TINDAKAN MEMBOCORKAN RAHASIA INTELIJEN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana jenis-jenis perbuatan yang dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai tindakan membocorkan rahasia intelijen negara Republik Indonesia dan bagaimana pemberlakuan sanksi pidana akibat tindakan membocorkan rahasia intelijen negara Republik Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, maka hasil penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan: 1. Jenis-jenis perbuatan yang dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai tindakan membocorkan rahasia intelijen negara Republik Indonesia, yaitu tindakan dengan sengaja mencuri, membuka, dan/atau membocorkan Rahasia Intelijen atau karena kelalaian mengakibatkan bocornya Rahasia Intelijen. 2. Pemberlakuan sanksi pidana akibat tindakan membocorkan rahasia intelijen negara Republik Indonesia dapat dikenakan sanksi pidana sesuai dengan jenis-jenis perbuatan yang dilakukan berupa pidana penjara paling lama 5 (lima) sampai dengan 10 (sepuluh) tahun dan pidana denda paling banyak Rp.300.000.000,00 (tiga ratus juta rupiah) sampai dengan Rp.500.000.000,00 (lima ratus juta rupiah).Dalam hal tindak pidana dilakukan oleh Personel Intelijen Negara dalam keadaan perang dipidana dengan ditambah 1/3 (sepertiga) dari masing-masing ancaman pidana maksimumnya. Kata kunci:  Membocorkan rahasia, Intelejen Negara