When is Reputation Bad?

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In “Bad Reputation,” Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad. ” We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.

Effect of double bonds on the dynamics of hydrocarbon chains

©1992 American Institute of PhysicsThe electronic version of this article is the complete one and can be found online at: http://link.aip.org/link/?JCPSA6/97/1240/1DOI:10.1063/1.463250Brownian dynamics simulations of isolated 18-carbon chains have been performed, both for saturated and unsaturated hydrocarbons. The effect of one or several (nonconjugated) double bonds on the properties of the chains is discussed in terms of both equilibrium and dynamic properties. The introduction of a cis double bond increases the relaxation rates of the unsaturated chain with respect to the saturated alkane. On the other hand, coupling effects in the torsional transitions around a trans double bond make the dynamics of this unsaturated chain very similar to the saturated one. Based on these results, the parameters and moves of a dynamic Monte Carlo algorithm are tuned to reproduce the observed behavior, providing an efficient method for the study of more complicated systems

When is Reputation Bad?

In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In "Bad Reputation," Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is "bad. We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the "Stackelberg type" used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.

Exploring the capabilities approach in a sport for development and peace setting.

Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) has become a popular approach to development. However, critical scholars remain skeptical of SDP’s effectiveness. Utilizing a holistic approach that includes local voices may help a program’s effectiveness. Scholars are searching for a framework flexible enough to accommodate the varied nature of programs. One theoretical approach is the Capabilities Approach, which evaluates well-being based on what people can do and be. This case study explored the Capabilities Approach in an SDP setting. Youth Odyssey, a non-profit organization that works with at-risk youth through adventure programming, was the case. This case study explored what role does an SDP program play in participants achieving their capabilities, focusing on identifying functionings, barriers, and capabilities. Twenty-one interviews, 43 field observations and over 100 document/artifacts provided a holistic analysis of the case through triangulation. RQ1 asked what functionings are being supported by Youth Odyssey? RQ2 explored how does Youth Odyssey help remove barriers for participants? RQ3 asked what capabilities are Youth Odyssey creating for its participants? The findings add to the limited literature exploring SDP using the Capabilities Approach. It highlighted the Capabilities Approach’s potential to use local context and address concerns of critical scholars regarding SDP from a planning/execution/evaluation standpoint. It was one of the first studies to understand the role an SDP organization played in increasing an individual’s functionings, freedoms, and capabilities using qualitative data

Understanding the Relationship Between Economic and Institutional Trends and Public University Presidential Turnover

Presidents are leaving public colleges and universities at higher rates than they previously were over the last several decades. Previous studies on college and university presidential departure primarily have focused on internal institutional factors to offer explanations of understanding of why they leave office. Public university presidents earn less than private ones, and have to add successful (or unsuccessful) navigation of state politics to their skill sets. This study focused on both internal institutional factors and external environmental factors specifically within each state the public college or university is located. These include both external economic and political factors. These external factors include income level in the state, percent in poverty in each state, and age ranges of the population by state. In addition, the study examined changes to factors affecting presidential turnover before and after the recent housing crisis in the United States, a significant economic event. There was increased turnover after recessions. The outcomes of both logistic and OLS regressions, with both a one- and two- year lag, yielded the same results across both models and found variables that were important included enrollment, adjusted state appropriations, democratic control of the state legislature, percentage of the population in the state aged 18 to 24 years. Enrollment had a negative relationship, state appropriations had a strong positive relationship. Democratic control of the legislature, and percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 years had weak negative relationships. Student retention rate had a weak positive relationship, state appropriations a strong positive relationship, and percentage of the population in each state aged 18 to 24 years had a strong negative significant relationship when dividing out the data before the housing crisis. Only the internal institutional factor of admit rate was significant and was weak and negative when dividing after the housing crisis

When is Reputation Bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.Economic