Legal protection to foreign investors

Foreign investment is typically considered an important source of growth for developing countries. This article describes the legal protection granted to foreign investors and its enforcement mechanisms. Governments have signed international investment agreements intended to protect foreign investors from the risk of expropriation and have increasingly chosen to issue sovereign debt in international financial centers, which expose defaulting governments to litigations in foreign national courts. In most cases, governments have complied with unfavorable rulings of international arbitration courts, and many recent sovereign default episodes were followed by relatively friendly debt restructuring agreements. But there have been cases in which expropriated investors or holders of sovereign debt in default have not been compensated, which suggests that the actual legal protection granted to foreign investors is limited.Economic growth ; Business cycles

Online Appendix to "Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: solution methods"

This document describes how we evaluate the accuracy of the solution of the baseline sovereign default model using the test proposed by den Haan and Marcet (1994). We show that the solutions obtained using Chebyshev collocation and cubic spline interpolation approximate the equilibrium with reasonable accuracy and illustrate the challenges that arise when the test is applied to the solution obtained using the discrete state space technique.

Mortgage defaults

We incorporate house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM) model. We calibrate the model to match U.S. data and we show that the model also ac- counts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the life-cycle profile of home ownership, and the mortgage default rate. In addition, we show that the average coefficients that measure the agents' ability to self-insure against income shocks are similar to those of a SIM model without housing (as presented by Kaplan and Violante, 2010). However, incorporating housing increases the values of these coefficient for younger agents, which narrows the gap between the SIM model's implications and the data. The response of consumption to house price shocks is minimal. We also study the effects of default prevention policies. Introducing a minimum down payment requirement of 15% reduces defaults on mortgages by 30%, reduces the home ownership rate up to only 0.2 percentage points (if the aggregate house price level does not adjust), and may cause house prices to decline up to 0.7% (if home ownership does not adjust). Garnishing defaulters' income in excess of 43% of median consumption for one year produces a similar decline in defaults; but, since it reduces the median equilibrium down payment from 19% to 9%, it boosts home ownership up to 4.3 percentage points (if the aggregate house price level does not adjust) and may increase house prices up to 16.1% (if home ownership does not adjust). The introduction of minimum down payments or income garnishment benefit a majority of the population.Mortgage loans ; Default (Finance)

Quantitative models of sovereign default and the threat of financial exclusion

Business cycles ; Debt ; Default (Finance)

Sovereign default risk with heterogenous borrowers

We study a standard quantitative model of sovereign default in which the government in a small open economy (SMO) decides how much to save and whether to default on its debt. In contrast with previous quantitative studies, we do not assume that a defaulting country is exogenously excluded from capital markets, and we assume that political parties with different discount factors alternate in power. Preliminary quantitative results indicate that even without assuming exogenous exclusion, after a default episode, the model generates difficulties in market access---in average, for the same level of debt, spreads are higher after default; due to this increase in borrowing costs, capital inflows are initially decreased, and recover slowly after that. We also describe the strategic interaction of governments with different patienceSovereign Default, Strategic Behavior; Endogenous Borrowing Constraints; Markov Perfect Equilibrium.

Quantitative properties of sovereign default models: solution methods

We study the sovereign default model that has been used to account for the cyclical behavior of interest rates in emerging market economies. This model is often solved using the discrete state space technique with evenly spaced grid points. We show that this method necessitates a large number of grid points to avoid generating spurious interest rate movements. This makes the discrete state technique significantly more inefficient than using Chebyshev polynomials or cubic spline interpolation to approximate the value functions. We show that the inefficiency of the discrete state space technique is more severe for parameterizations that feature a high sensitivity of the bond price to the borrowing level for the borrowing levels that are observed more frequently in the simulations. In addition, we find that the efficiency of the discrete state space technique can be greatly improved by (i) finding the equilibrium as the limit of the equilibrium of the finite-horizon version of the model, instead of iterating separately on the value and bond price functions and (ii) concentrating grid points in asset levels at which the bond price is more sensitive to the borrowing level and in levels that are observed more often in the model simulations. Our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets. (Copyright: Elsevier)Emerging economies; Sovereign debt; Default; Numerical methods

Debt dilution and sovereign default risk

We measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and show how these effects can be mitigated with debt contracts promising borrowing-contingent payments. First, we calibrate a baseline model à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to match features of the data. In this model, bonds' values can be diluted. Second, we present a model in which sovereign bonds contain a covenant promising that after each time the government borrows it pays to the holder of each bond issued in previous periods the difference between the bond market price that would have been observed absent current-period borrowing and the observed market price. This covenant eliminates debt dilution by making the value of each bond independent from future borrowing decisions. We quantify the effects of dilution by comparing the simulations of the model with and without borrowing-contingent payments. We find that dilution accounts for 84% of the default risk in the baseline economy. Similar default risk reductions can be obtained with borrowing-contingent payments that depend only on the bond market price. Using borrowing-contingent payments is welfare enhancing because it reduces the frequency of default episodes.Business cycles ; Financial institutions ; Financial markets