Why are capital flows so much more volatile in emerging than in developed countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks (“crises”) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) – the most important one – shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.Capital flows, emerging countries, volatility, crises, contagion, persistence

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentals and asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomic variables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of “effective” fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).Currency crises; emerging markets; stock prices; overshooting; credit markets

Globalization and risk sharing

We study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare. Like previous literature, we assume that countries cannot commit to repay their debts. Unlike previous literature, we assume that countries cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when repaying their debts. This creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets. (i) Increases in domestic trade raise the bene.ts of enforcement and facilitate international trade. In fact, in our setup countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of default penalties. (ii) Increases in foreign trade .i.e. globalization.raise the costs of enforcement and hamper domestic trade. As a result, globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lower welfare. We show how these e¤ects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods and explore the roles of borrowing limits, debt renegotiations, and trade policy.Globalization, risk sharing, sovereign risk, domestic markets, international markets

Why are Capital Flows so Much More Volatile in Emerging Than in Developed Countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks (“crises”) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) – the most important one – shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.

Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the government lowers the probability of a rollover crisis, transferring risk to bondholders. In equilibrium, this risk is re‡ected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost. Therefore, the government faces a trade-o¤ between safer long-term debt and cheaper short-term debt. Second, we construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance. We show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium (a higher risk premium on long-term bonds than on short-term bonds). During crises, the term premium increases, with issuance shifting towards shorter maturities. The evidence suggests that investor risk aversion is important to understand the debt structure in emerging economiesemerging market debt; financial crises; investor risk aversion

Effect of Military Law Enforcement Interviews on Victims of Military Sexual Trauma

Effect of Military Law Enforcement Interviews on Victims of Military Sexual Trauma by Paul Brian Broner MS, Chaminade University, 2011 BA, Chaminade University, 2004 Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Criminal Justice Administration Walden University May 201

Enforcement problems and secondary markets

There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.Enforcement, default, secondary markets, sovereign risk, weak law enforcement

Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets

Conventional wisdom says that, in the absence of sufficient default penalties, sovereign risk constrains credit and lowers welfare. We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets. Once this assumption is relaxed, there is always an equilibrium in which sovereign risk is stripped of its conventional effects. In such an equilibrium, foreigners hold domestic debts and resell them to domestic residents before enforcement. In the presence of (even arbitrarily small) default penalties, this equilibrium is shown to be unique. As a result, sovereign risk neither constrains welfare nor lowers credit. At most, it creates some additional trade in secondary markets. The results presented here suggest a change in perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies. To argue that sovereign risk constrains credit, one must show both the insufficiency of default penalties and the imperfect workings of secondary markets. To relax credit constraints created by sovereign risk, one can either increase default penalties or improve the workings of secondary markets.

Enforcement Problems and Secondary Markets

There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies. But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.

Sovereign risk and secondary markets

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties. Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will only happen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country. Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk have focused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countries might want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make them vulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.Sovereign risk, secondary markets, default penalties, commitment, international risk sharing, international borrowing