Results of a cluster randomized controlled trial to promote the use of respiratory protective equipment among migrant workers exposed to organic solvents in small and medium-sized enterprises

Background: Existing evidence shows an urgent need to improve respiratory protective equipment (RPE) use, and more so among migrant workers in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The study aimed to assess the effectiveness of a behavioral intervention in promoting the appropriate use of RPE among internal migrant workers (IMWs) exposed to organic solvents in SMEs. Methods: A cluster randomized controlled trial was conducted among 1211 IMWs from 60 SMEs in Baiyun district in Guangzhou, China. SMEs were deemed eligible if organic solvents were constantly used in the production process and provided workers with RPE. There were 60 SMEs randomized to three interventions on a 1:1:1 ratio, namely a top-down intervention (TDI), a comprehensive intervention, and a control group which did not receive any intervention. IMWs in the comprehensive intervention received a module encompassing three intervention activities: An occupational health education and training component (lectures and leaflets/posters), an mHealth component in the form of messages illustrative pictures and short videos, and a peer education component. The TDI incorporated two intervention activities, namely the mHealth and occupational health education and training components. The primary outcome was the self-reported appropriate RPE use among IMWs, defined as using an appropriate RPE against organic solvents at all times during the last week before measurement. Secondary outcomes included IMWs’ occupational health knowledge, attitude towards RPE use, and participation in occupational health check-ups. Data were collected and assessed at baseline, and three and six months of the intervention. Generalized linear mixed models were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the trial. Results: Between 3 August 2015 and 29 January 2016, 20 SMEs with 368 IMWs, 20 SMEs with 390 IMWs, and 20 SMEs with 453 IMWs were assigned to the comprehensive intervention, the TDI, and the control group, respectively. At three months, there were no significant differences in the primary and secondary outcomes among the three groups. At six months, IMWs in both intervention groups were more likely to appropriately use RPE than the control group (comprehensive intervention: Adjusted odds ratio: 2.99, 95% CI: 1.75–5.10, p < 0.001; TDI: 1.91, 95% CI: 1.17–3.11, and p = 0.009). Additionally, compared with the control group, the comprehensive intervention also improved all three secondary outcomes. Conclusions: Both comprehensive and top-down interventions were effective in promoting the appropriate use of RPE among IMWs in SMEs. The comprehensive intervention also enhanced IMWs’ occupational health knowledge, attitude, and practice. Trial registration: ChiCTR-IOR-15006929. Registered on 15 August 2015.The study was funded by National Science Foundation of China (81402767), the Medical Science and Technology Research Fund of Guangdong Province (WSTJJ20140116510124198504200421), China Medical Board (13-175) and Sun Yat-sen University (15ykpy08). The sponsors are not involved in study design; in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data; in the writing of the report and in the decision to submit the paper for publication.https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph1617318716pubpub1

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Pollution and carbon reduction is a key strategic direction for ecological civilization in China, and a hot issue of concern for the government and the whole society. The main goal of this paper was to consider the regional externalities of traffic emissions and clarify the relationship between provincial and central government strategies under the government reward and punishment mechanism. This paper considers the unevenness of regional transportation emissions, constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among transportation carbon deficit provinces, transportation carbon surplus provinces, and the central government, discusses the evolutionary stability of the game under different strategies of the three parties, and analyzes the influence of each element on the game structure. The study shows that: Environmental losses can increase the evolutionary speed of active emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces, and the probability of supporting cross-regional carbon emission reduction in transportation carbon surplus provinces decreases slightly with the increase and the probability of central government regulation increases. The central government has a certain binding effect on transportation carbon deficit provinces and carbon surplus provinces through fines, and cross-zone cooperation subsidies are conducive to promoting carbon deficit provinces to actively reduce emissions. The cross-region compensation of carbon deficit provinces can promote the governments of carbon surplus provinces to support cross-region carbon emission abatement, and the cost of regulation will reduce the probability of central government regulation. Finally, Matlab simulation is used to verify the conclusions and provide countermeasures and suggestions for cross-regional abatement of regional transportation emissions by the central government

Retailer involvement in carbon emission reduction under the Cap-and-Trade mechanism

ABSTRACTUnder the ‘ Cap-and-Trade’ mechanism of carbon emission, the low carbon management of supply chain is an indispensable link in the process of enterprise emission reduction. Constrained by carbon price and consumers’ environmental awareness, this paper establishes a two-stage game model between retailers and manufacturers under decentralized and centralized decisions. Under the decentralized decision, this paper analyzes the optimal carbon emissions before and after the transfer, the conditions of transfer and the changes of profits with the proportion of transfer. Under the centralized decision, Nash equilibrium is used to study the distribution of additional profits. Conclusions are obtained as follows. (a) There are thresholds for carbon price and consumers’ environmental awareness on carbon emissions, and the optimal emissions on both sides of the threshold will vary with the cost of emission reduction. (b) In a decentralized decision, the participation of retailers in abatement depends on the market abatement costs and abatement benefits, while a certain range of transfer rates can optimize the profitability of retailers. (c) In the centralized decision, manufacturer and retailer formulate emission reduction strategies jointly and share the extra profits equally

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Pollution and carbon reduction is a key strategic direction for ecological civilization in China, and a hot issue of concern for the government and the whole society. The main goal of this paper was to consider the regional externalities of traffic emissions and clarify the relationship between provincial and central government strategies under the government reward and punishment mechanism. This paper considers the unevenness of regional transportation emissions, constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among transportation carbon deficit provinces, transportation carbon surplus provinces, and the central government, discusses the evolutionary stability of the game under different strategies of the three parties, and analyzes the influence of each element on the game structure. The study shows that: Environmental losses can increase the evolutionary speed of active emission reduction in transportation carbon deficit provinces, and the probability of supporting cross-regional carbon emission reduction in transportation carbon surplus provinces decreases slightly with the increase and the probability of central government regulation increases. The central government has a certain binding effect on transportation carbon deficit provinces and carbon surplus provinces through fines, and cross-zone cooperation subsidies are conducive to promoting carbon deficit provinces to actively reduce emissions. The cross-region compensation of carbon deficit provinces can promote the governments of carbon surplus provinces to support cross-region carbon emission abatement, and the cost of regulation will reduce the probability of central government regulation. Finally, Matlab simulation is used to verify the conclusions and provide countermeasures and suggestions for cross-regional abatement of regional transportation emissions by the central government

Study on the Carbon Emission Spillover Effects of Transportation under Technological Advancements

Regional transportation emissions reduction is the key to realizing deep emission reduction and the neutralization of transportation. Transportation development is accompanied by technological progress, and inter-regional transportation technological progress and carbon emission spillover effects are issues worthy of study. Based on the 2011–2020 provincial data of 30 provinces and cities in China, a spatial Durbin model was constructed to explore the impact of technological progress on regional spillovers of carbon emissions and the driving effect of emissions reduction. The conclusions show that the “community effect” causes direct interactions between transportation carbon emissions reduction practices in various provinces; the “acquired effect” and “leakage effect” drive technological progress between regions and cause indirect interactions between transportation carbon emissions reduction practices; transportation technology progress is more likely to occur between regions with similar transportation development. Finally, some suggestions are put forward in terms of establishing a mechanism for the coordinated reduction of regional carbon emissions, strengthening the interactions and economic connections between inter-regional transportation technologies, optimizing the spatial layout of transportation infrastructure, and building a low-carbon transportation system, so as to lay a solid foundation for the coordinated reduction of regional transportation carbon emissions

Design and Experiment of an Ultrasound-Assisted Corneal Trephination System

According to the advantages of ultrasonic vibration cutting, an ultrasound-assisted corneal trepanation robotic system is developed to improve the accuracy of corneal trephination depth and corneal incision quality in corneal trephination operations. Firstly, we analyzed the reasons for the difficulty in controlling the depth of trephination in corneal transplantations from the perspective of the biomechanical properties of the cornea. Based on the advantages of ultrasonic vibration cutting, we introduced an ultrasonic-vibration-assisted cutting method for corneal trephination and analyzed the cutting mechanism. Secondly, we described the surgical demands of corneal trephination and listed the design requirements of a robotic system. Thirdly, we introduced the design details of said system, including the system’s overall structure, the ultrasound-assisted end effector, the key mechanisms of the robotic system, and the human–machine interaction interface. We designed the end effector based on ultrasonic vibration cutting and its eccentric adjustment system in an innovative way. Additionally, we then presented a procedure for robot-assisted corneal trephination. Finally, we performed several cutting experiments on grapes and porcine eyeballs in vitro. The results show that, compared with manual trephine, ultrasound-assisted corneal trephination has a better operation effect on the accuracy of corneal trephination depth and corneal incision quality