Morbidity and Mortality After Living Kidney Donation, 1999 2001: Survey of United States Transplant Centers

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75563/1/j.1038-5282.2001.00400.x-i1.pd

Optimization and Simulation of an Evolving Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) Program

The old concept of barter exchange has extended to the modern area of living-donor kidney transplantation, where one incompatible donor-candidate pair is matched to another pair with a complementary incompatibility, such that the donor from one pair gives an organ to a compatible candidate in the other pair and vice versa. Kidney paired donation (KPD) programs provide a unique and important platform for living incompatible donor-candidate pairs to exchange organs in order to achieve mutual benefit. We propose a novel approach to organizing kidney exchanges in an evolving KPD program with advantages, including (i) it allows for a more exible utility-based evaluation of potential kidney transplants; (ii) it takes into consideration stochastic features in managing a KPD program; and (iii) it exploits possible alternative exchanges when the originally planed allocation cannot be fully executed. Another primary contribution of this work is rooted in the development of a comprehensive microsimulation system for simulating and studying various aspects of an evolving KPD program. Various allocations can be obtained using integer programming (IP) techniques and microsimulation models can allow tracking of the evolving KPD over a series of match runs to evaluate different allocation strategies. Simulation studies are provided to illustrate the proposed method

Decision making in kidney paired donation programs with altruistic donors

In recent years, kidney paired donation has been extended to include living non-directed or altruistic donors, in which an altruistic donor donates to the candidate of an incompatible donor candidate pair with the understanding that the donor in that pair will further donate to the candidate of a second pair, and so on; such a process continues and thus forms an altruistic donor-initiated chain. In this paper, we propose a novel strategy to sequentially allocate the altruistic donor (or bridge donor) so as to maximize the expected utility; analogous to the way a computer plays chess, the idea is to evaluate different allocations for each altruistic donor (or bridge donor) by looking several moves ahead in a derived look-ahead search tree. Simulation studies are provided to illustrate and evaluate our proposed method

Developing Organ Offer and Acceptance Measures: When ‘Good’ Organs Are Turned Down

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/75521/1/j.1600-6143.2007.01784.x.pd

Efficacy of plasmapheresis on donor‐specific antibody reduction by HLA specificity in post–kidney transplant recipients

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111098/1/trf12923.pd

Kidney and Pancreas Transplantation in the United States, 1998–2007: Access for Patients with Diabetes and End-Stage Renal Disease

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73092/1/j.1600-6143.2009.02566.x.pd

Association of Center Volume with Outcome After Liver and Kidney Transplantation

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73934/1/j.1600-6143.2004.00462.x.pd

Kidney and pancreas transplantation

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/106710/1/j.1600-6135.2004.00399.x.pd

Transplanting Kidneys Without Points for HLA‐B Matching: Consequences of the Policy Change

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/87103/1/j.1600-6143.2011.03606.x.pd