288 research outputs found
AFPTAS results for common variants of bin packing: A new method to handle the small items
We consider two well-known natural variants of bin packing, and show that
these packing problems admit asymptotic fully polynomial time approximation
schemes (AFPTAS). In bin packing problems, a set of one-dimensional items of
size at most 1 is to be assigned (packed) to subsets of sum at most 1 (bins).
It has been known for a while that the most basic problem admits an AFPTAS. In
this paper, we develop methods that allow to extend this result to other
variants of bin packing. Specifically, the problems which we study in this
paper, for which we design asymptotic fully polynomial time approximation
schemes, are the following. The first problem is "Bin packing with cardinality
constraints", where a parameter k is given, such that a bin may contain up to k
items. The goal is to minimize the number of bins used. The second problem is
"Bin packing with rejection", where every item has a rejection penalty
associated with it. An item needs to be either packed to a bin or rejected, and
the goal is to minimize the number of used bins plus the total rejection
penalty of unpacked items. This resolves the complexity of two important
variants of the bin packing problem. Our approximation schemes use a novel
method for packing the small items. This new method is the core of the improved
running times of our schemes over the running times of the previous results,
which are only asymptotic polynomial time approximation schemes (APTAS)
Generalized selfish bin packing
Standard bin packing is the problem of partitioning a set of items with
positive sizes no larger than 1 into a minimum number of subsets (called bins)
each having a total size of at most 1. In bin packing games, an item has a
positive weight, and given a valid packing or partition of the items, each item
has a cost or a payoff associated with it. We study a class of bin packing
games where the payoff of an item is the ratio between its weight and the total
weight of items packed with it, that is, the cost sharing is based linearly on
the weights of items. We study several types of pure Nash equilibria: standard
Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, strictly Pareto optimal equilibria, and
weakly Pareto optimal equilibria. We show that any game of this class admits
all these types of equilibria. We study the (asymptotic) prices of anarchy and
stability (PoA and PoS) of the problem with respect to these four types of
equilibria, for the two cases of general weights and of unit weights. We show
that while the case of general weights is strongly related to the well-known
First Fit algorithm, and all the four PoA values are equal to 1.7, this is not
true for unit weights. In particular, we show that all of them are strictly
below 1.7, the strong PoA is equal to approximately 1.691 (another well-known
number in bin packing) while the strictly Pareto optimal PoA is much lower. We
show that all the PoS values are equal to 1, except for those of strong
equilibria, which is equal to 1.7 for general weights, and to approximately
1.611824 for unit weights. This last value is not known to be the (asymptotic)
approximation ratio of any well-known algorithm for bin packing. Finally, we
study convergence to equilibria
Improved approximation guarantees for weighted matching in the semi-streaming model
We study the maximum weight matching problem in the semi-streaming model, and
improve on the currently best one-pass algorithm due to Zelke (Proc. of
STACS2008, pages 669-680) by devising a deterministic approach whose
performance guarantee is 4.91+epsilon. In addition, we study preemptive online
algorithms, a sub-class of one-pass algorithms where we are only allowed to
maintain a feasible matching in memory at any point in time. All known results
prior to Zelke's belong to this sub-class. We provide a lower bound of 4.967 on
the competitive ratio of any such deterministic algorithm, and hence show that
future improvements will have to store in memory a set of edges which is not
necessarily a feasible matching
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