The Economics of Climate Change

Global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other living things through impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity, and human health. Climate change economics attends to this issue by offering theoretical insights and empirical findings relevant to the design of policies to reduce, avoid, or adapt to climate change. This economic analysis has yielded new estimates of mitigation benefits, improved understanding of costs in the presence of various market distortions or imperfections, better tools for making policy choices under uncertainty, and alternate mechanisms for allowing flexibility in policy responses. These contributions have influenced the formulation and implementation of a range of climate change policies at the domestic and international levels.climate change, global warming, energy

The Economics of Climate Change

Global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other living things through impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity, and human health. This paper briefly surveys recent research on the economics of climate change, including theoretical insights and empirical findings that offer guidance to policy makers. Section 1 frames the climate change problem and indicates the ways that economic research can address it. Section 2 describes approaches to measuring the benefits and costs associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In Section 3 we discuss the implications of uncertainty for the timing and stringency of policies to address possible climate change. We then present issues related to policy design, including instrument choice (Section 4), flexibility (Section 5), and international coordination (Section 6). The final section offers general conclusions.

A Unified Rationale for Section 2-607(3)(A) Notification

The premise of this Article is that the approach drafted by Professor Speidel is far superior to the original approach. The denial of any remedy to an aggrieved party because it stumbles with respect to some aspect of a notification is draconian, and section 2-607(3)(a) should not be retained in its present form. The original provision\u27s requirement that notification be given within a reasonable time and its silence as to the required contents give the courts a great deal of discretion, and they can do much to ameliorate its harsh effects by using only the prejudicial effect of a delay or lack of sufficiency as the basis for determining whether proper notification has been given. Under our suggested approach, a buyer would lose all remedial rights only if its notification failure significantly prejudiced an interest of the seller

A Unified Rationale for Section 2-607(3)(a) Notification

An aggrieved buyer that fails to give its seller timely notification of breach, or that gives a timely but insufficient notification, suffers serious and sometimes catastrophic consequences under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code). On the serious end, a buyer entitled to reject must provide its seller with a timely notification that makes it clear that the goods again belong to the seller, with failure as to either timeliness or sufficiency resulting in acceptance rather than rejection. Obvious policy rationales support both requirements. The timeliness requirement creates an incentive for a buyer to exercise its inspection rights quickly. Prompt detection and reporting of a nonconformity is desirable because a cure can be effectuated more quickly, thereby mitigating the harm to both parties. If there is no cure, the seller can maximize the goods\u27 resale value by recovering them quickly and, as nearly as practicable, in the same condition as when they were tendered. Regarding sufficiency, if a notification merely states that there is a problem, the seller could legitimately assume that the buyer intends to accept the goods and that the purpose of the notification is to preserve its right to recover monetary damages. This level of information will not suffice for a rejection: The seller must be made aware that the buyer does not intend to keep the goods so that it can exercise its cure rights or recover the goods. A revocation of acceptance also requires a timely notification that advises the seller that the seller owns the goods, and the underlying policies are the same as in cases of rejection. Section 2-607(3)(a) provides that the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. This rule is a nuclear bomb that, if triggered, eradicates all remedies. One would anticipate that such a catastrophic result must be grounded in appropriate policies but, as we shall see, many of the rationales that have been advanced to support it are thoroughly unconvincing. Note at the outset that the policies underlying the notification requirements in cases of rejection and revocation of acceptance do not apply in this context because the buyer rather than the seller owns the goods and the seller does not have statutory cure rights. Professor Richard Speidel, to whose memory this tribute issue is dedicated, sought through the Article 2 revision process to ameliorate the harsh effects of section 2-607(3)(a). After he resigned as Reporter in 1999 and the scope of the project was scaled back, the solution he drafted retained the support of the reconstituted drafting committee and was included among the amendments promulgated by the Code\u27s sponsors in 2003. His solution captures the essence of the need for postacceptance notification and articulates a viable standard to satisfy that need

A Unified Rationale for Section 2-607(3)(A) Notification

The premise of this Article is that the approach drafted by Professor Speidel is far superior to the original approach. The denial of any remedy to an aggrieved party because it stumbles with respect to some aspect of a notification is draconian, and section 2-607(3)(a) should not be retained in its present form. The original provision\u27s requirement that notification be given within a reasonable time and its silence as to the required contents give the courts a great deal of discretion, and they can do much to ameliorate its harsh effects by using only the prejudicial effect of a delay or lack of sufficiency as the basis for determining whether proper notification has been given. Under our suggested approach, a buyer would lose all remedial rights only if its notification failure significantly prejudiced an interest of the seller

Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law

A rolling contract is a deal in which the contract either is not formed until, or is modified when, the last terms are presented for assent. The issue raised by rolling contracts is whether the seller\u27s additional standard terms are enforceable. This article criticizes two distinct approached advanced by advocates of the rolling contract concept. Judge Easterbrook\u27s approach is based upon principles of contract formation. This essay shows that his analysis is replete with distortion and avoidance of the relevant contract principles. Professor Robert Hillman focuses on the contract terms, arguing that, irrespective of faulty analysis concerning contract formation, the terms included in the box should nevertheless be part of the contract between the parties. This essay challenges his doctrinal bases to support inclusion of the terms in the contract and argues, in addition, that inclusion of the terms represents an inappropriate normative choice

When is diabetes distress clinically meaningful?: establishing cut points for the Diabetes Distress Scale.

ObjectiveTo identify the pattern of relationships between the 17-item Diabetes Distress Scale (DDS17) and diabetes variables to establish scale cut points for high distress among patients with type 2 diabetes.Research design and methodsRecruited were 506 study 1 and 392 study 2 adults with type 2 diabetes from community medical groups. Multiple regression equations associated the DDS17, a 17-item scale that yields a mean-item score, with HbA(1c), diabetes self-efficacy, diet, and physical activity. Associations also were undertaken for the two-item DDS (DDS2) screener. Analyses included control variables, linear, and quadratic (curvilinear) DDS terms.ResultsSignificant quadratic effects occurred between the DDS17 and each diabetes variable, with increases in distress associated with poorer outcomes: study 1 HbA(1c) (P < 0.02), self-efficacy (P < 0.001), diet (P < 0.001), physical activity (P < 0.04); study 2 HbA(1c) (P < 0.03), self-efficacy (P < 0.004), diet (P < 0.04), physical activity (P = NS). Substantive curvilinear associations with all four variables in both studies began at unexpectedly low levels of DDS17: the slope increased linearly between scores 1 and 2, was more muted between 2 and 3, and reached a maximum between 3 and 4. This suggested three patient subgroups: little or no distress, <2.0; moderate distress, 2.0-2.9; high distress, ≥3.0. Parallel findings occurred for the DDS2.ConclusionsIn two samples of type 2 diabetic patients we found a consistent pattern of curvilinear relationships between the DDS and HbA(1c), diabetes self-efficacy, diet, and physical activity. The shape of these relationships suggests cut points for three patient groups: little or no, moderate, and high distress