Achieving Intertemporal Efficiency and Symmetry through Intratemporal Asymmetry: (Eventual) Turn Taking in a Class of Repeated Mixed-Interest Games

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings. We study when and how turn taking can be supported as an equilibrium outcome in a class of repeated games, where the stage game is a symmetric two-player mixed-interest game with asymmetric joint-payoff-maximizing outcomes that may or may not be Nash equilibria. We consider the "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR) strategy that achieves the following three objectives: (a) helping the players get onto a joint-payoff-maximizing turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who gets to start with the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection. The TTIR strategy is simpler than those time-varying strategies considered in the Folk Theorem for repeated games. We determine conditions under which a symmetric TTIR subgame-perfect equilibrium exists and is unique. We also derive comparative static results, and study the welfare properties of the TTIR equilibrium.Conflict, Coordination, Randomization, Turn Taking, Repeated Games

Using Turn Taking to Mitigate Conflict and Coordination Problems in the Repeated Battle of the Sexes Game

The Battle of the Sexes game, which captures both conflict and coordination problems, has been applied to a wide range of situations. We show that, by reducing conflict of interests and enhancing coordination, (eventual) turn taking supported by a ???turn taking with independent randomizations' strategy allows the players to engage in intertemporal sharing of the gain from cooperation. Using this insight, we decompose the benefit from turn taking into conflict-mitigating and coordination-enhancing components. Our analysis suggests that an equilibrium measure of the ???intertemporal degree of conflict??? provides an intuitive way to understand the sources of welfare gain from turn taking in the repeated Battle of the Sexes game. We find that when this equilibrium measure is higher, players behave more aggressively and the welfare gain from turn taking is smaller.Battle of the Sexes game, turn taking, conflict-mitigating, coordinationenhancing

Mortality transition and differential incentives for early retirement.

Many studies specify human mortality patterns parametrically, with a parameter change affecting mortality rates at different ages simultaneously. Motivated by the stylized fact that a mortality decline affects primarily younger people in the early phase of mortalitytransition but mainly older people in the later phase, we study how a mortality change at an arbitrary age affects optimal retirement age. Using the Volterra derivative for a functional, we show that mortality reductions at older ages delay retirement unambiguously, but that mortality reductions at younger ages may lead to earlierretirement due to a substantial increase in the individualʼs expected lifetime human wealth.incentive for early retirement; lifetime human wealth effect; years-to-consume effect; mortality decline;

A framework for assessing and predicting the environmental health impact of infectious diseases: a case study of leptospirosis

This article demonstrates the practical application of an integrated environmental health impact assessment (IEHIA) methodology to investigate an infectious disease (leptospirosis) and the value of using such an approach to estimate future health impact. The assessment described the current health impact (using leptospirosis seroprevalence as a proxy measure) and estimated the future health impact based on scenarios that included indicators of different risk factors. The application of an IEHIA methodology to assess the health impact of an infectious disease was shown to enhance the ability to quantify associations between a disease agent and its health impact by taking into account the environmental drivers of transmission, human behaviour, socioeconomic factors, and the multiple pathways through which exposure and infection could occur

Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game

History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.Learning, Teaching, Assignment Game, Laboratory Experiment, Repeated Games, Turn Taking, Common-Pool Resources

Using turn taking to achieve intertemporal cooperation and symmetry in infinitely repeated 2 x 2 games

Turn taking is observed in many field and laboratory settings captured by various widely studied 2 × 2 games. This article develops a repeated game model that allows us to systematically investigate turn-taking behavior in many 2 × 2 games, including the battle of the sexes, the game of chicken, the game of common-poolresources assignment, and a particular version of the prisoners' dilemma.We consider the "turn taking with independent randomizations" (TTIR) strategy that achieves three objectives: (a) helping the players reach the turn-taking path, (b) resolving the question of who takes the good turn first, and (c) deterring defection.We determine conditions under which there exists a unique TTIR strategy profile that can be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium. We also show that there exist conditions under which an increase in the "degree of conflict" of the stage game leads to a decrease in the expected number of periods in reaching the turn-taking path. © The Author(s) 2011.published_or_final_versionSpringer Open Choice, 21 Feb 201

Dynamics of face and annular seals with two-phase flow

A detailed study was made of face and annular seals under conditions where boiling, i.e., phase change of the leaking fluid, occurs within the seal. Many seals operate in this mode because of flashing due to pressure drop and/or heat input from frictional heating. Some of the distinctive behavior characteristics of two phase seals are discussed, particularly their axial stability. The main conclusions are that seals with two phase flow may be unstable if improperly balanced. Detailed theoretical analyses of low (laminar) and high (turbulent) leakage seals are presented along with computer codes, parametric studies, and in particular a simplified PC based code that allows for rapid performance prediction: calculations of stiffness coefficients, temperature and pressure distributions, and leakage rates for parallel and coned face seals. A simplified combined computer code for the performance prediction over the laminar and turbulent ranges of a two phase flow is described and documented. The analyses, results, and computer codes are summarized