What will happen to Catalans after 1 October?

With only days to go before the scheduled date for Catalonia's independence referendum, it remains unclear what will take place and how the Catalan and Spanish governments will react. Victor Lapuente writes that while he is unsure of what will happen to Catalonia, his real concern lies with the fate of ordinary Catalans, with the independence issue likely to drive a wedge between the two sides of an already highly polarised debate

Corruption and use of antibiotics in regions of Europe

The aim of this article is to investigate the association between corruption and antibiotic use at sub-national level. We explore the correlation between, on the one hand, two measures of corruption (prevalence of corruption in the health sector and prevalence of bribes in the society) at regional level from the European Quality of Government Index; and, on the other, the consumption of antibiotics in those European regions from a 2009 Special Euro Barometer. In a multivariate regression model, we control for potential confounders: purchasing power of standardized regional gross domestic product, inhabitants per medical doctor and age-standardized all-cause mortality rates. We find that there is a strong positive association between both measures of corruption (i.e. in the health sector, and in the society at large) and antibiotics use; and that this association is robust to the introduction of the control variables. These results support previous findings in the literature linking corruption to higher antibiotic use at cross-national level. We show that corruption does seem to account for some of the remarkable between-region variation in antibiotic consumption in Europe

Do City Managers Improve Government Performance?

Why do some local governments perform better than others that are socioeconomically, culturally, and geographically close? This paper examines variation in local government performance across 209 Catalan municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants. We test whether the municipality’s adminis-trative structure affects local government performance. In particular, we explore the effects of re-placing a traditional public administration structure (i.e., headed by bureaucrats) with a new public management model (i.e., headed by city managers) in two dimensions: first, transparency and ac-countability; and, second, financial performance. Results indicate that, ceteris paribus, municipalities with a city manager are more transparent, responsive and open to citizens, but do not perform better in financial indicators. Financial performance seems to be more driven by political factors: Right-wing governments are associated with higher debt levels but a faster ability to reduce debt; and, conversely, coalition governments are less indebted than single-party governments but are slower in debt reduction

Lower levels of inequality are linked with greater innovation in economies

Can countries be both economically efficient and have equal societies? Conventional wisdom suggests that this is not the case. Jonathan Hopkin, Victor Lapuente and Lovisa Moller take a close look at the empirical evidence. They find that the less unequal a country is, the more likely it is to be innovative. They argue that, while the US is a powerful force for innovation, whilst having high levels of inequality, other countries with much lower inequality levels are also high performers in innovation

Uncooperative society, uncooperative politics or both? Trust, polarization, populism and COVID-19 deaths across European regions

Why have some territories performed better than others in the fight against COVID-19? This paper uses a novel dataset on excess mortality, trust and political polarization for 165 European regions to explore the role of social and political divisions in the remarkable regional differences in excess mortality during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, we investigate whether regions characterized by a low social and political trust witnessed a higher excess mortality. Second, we argue that it is not only levels, but also polarization in trust among citizens – in particular, between government supporters and non-supporters – that matters for understanding why people in some regions have adopted more pro-healthy behaviour. Third, we explore the partisan make-up of regional parliaments and the relationship between political division – or what we refer to as ‘uncooperative politics’. We hypothesize that the ideological positioning – in particular those that lean more populist – and ideological polarization among political parties is also linked to higher mortality. Accounting for a host of potential confounders, we find robust support that regions with lower levels of both social and political trust are associated with higher excess mortality, along with citizen polarization in institutional trust in some models. On the ideological make-up of regional parliaments, we find that, ceteris paribus, those that lean more ‘tan’ on the ‘GAL-TAN’ spectrum yielded higher excess mortality. Moreover, although we find limited evidence of elite polarization driving excess deaths on the left-right or GAL-TAN spectrums, partisan differences on the attitudes towards the European Union demonstrated significantly higher deaths, which we argue proxies for (anti)populism. Overall, we find that both lower citizen-level trust and populist elite-level ideological characteristics of regional parliaments are associated with higher excess mortality in European regions during the first wave of the pandemic

Small is Different Size, Political Representation and Governance

In the theoretical literature on government design, few variables have received more attention than the size of the polity. Since Plato’s famous prediction that the optimal size of a political unit should be 5040 free citizens, the list of thinkers concerned about state size would include Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many of the founding fathers, among many others. One of the fathers of modern political science, Robert Dahl, devoted great attention to what he called the “elemental question of what is appropriate unit for a democratic political system … Among the vast number of theoretically possible ways of dividing up the inhabitants of this globe into more or less separate political systems, … are there any principles that instruct us as to how one ought to bound some particular collection of people, in order that they may rule themselves?” (Dahl 1967: 953). Economists have not neglected these issues, as they conform the core of the fiscal federalism literature (Oates 1972). A more recent literature, pioneered by Alesina and Spolaore’s work (1997, 2003), provides an elegant formal theoretical framework incorporating both political and economic elements in order to highlight the fundamental trade-off that the choice of the size of the policy inevitably faces: Large polities find it easier to provide more public goods, but confront the costly political problem of greater heterogeneity of preferences among the population

Careers, connections and corruption risks

Why do officials in some countries favor entrenched contractors, while others assign public contracts more impartially? This article emphasizes the important interplay between politics and bureaucracy. It suggests that corruption risks are lower when bureaucrats’ careers do not depend on political connections but on their peers. We test this hypothesis with a novel measure of career incentives in the public sector—using a survey of more than 18,000 public sector employees in 212 European regions—and a new objective corruption risk measure including over 1.4 million procurement contracts. Both show a remarkable subnational variation across Europe. The study finds that corruption risks are indeed significantly lower where bureaucrats’ career incentives exclusively follow professional criteria. In substantial terms, moving EU regions so that bureaucrats’ merit and effort would matter as much as in, for example, Baden-Wüttemberg (90th percentile) could lead to a 13–20 billion Euro savings per year.Funding for this project comes from the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development of the European Union, project number 290529. This research project is part of ANTICORRP, (http://anticorrp.eu/ )

Our five most read articles on the Catalan independence referendum

With the planned Catalan independence referendum intended to be held today (1 October), this is a list of our five most read articles on the referendum

Activity monitoring in professional soccer goalkeepers during training and match play

The purpose of the present study was to quantify the external load of professional soccer goalkeepers. Twenty professional goalkeepers participated in the study. Data were classified according to the number of days before or after the match day (MD) as follows: MD-4, MD-3, MD-2, MD-1 for the sessions before the match, and MD+1 for the session after the match. The total running distance covered (TD), the high metabolic load (HMLD), the number of high metabolic load efforts (HMLE) were progressively reduced from MD-4 to MD-1 but the values of these variables were always inferior to MD (ES: -3.79 to −1.11). There was a tendency for a progressive reduction in the number of high-intensity accelerations (ACC) and decelerations (DEC) from MD-4 to MD-1 although the values of ACC/DEC were superior to MD (ES: 0.19 to 2.05). Overall, MD-2 was the day with the lowest external load. During training sessions, starter goalkeepers performed more TD (ES: 0.36) and more HMLE (ES: 0.29) than non-starters. External load was progressively decreased in the days before match play for goalkeepers which is reflective of appropriate recovery and preparation practices within the cohort analysed. However, habitual goalkeepers training has an excess of accelerations/decelerations and a lack of running actions performed at high metabolic loads