With only days to go before the scheduled date for Catalonia's independence referendum, it remains unclear what will take place and how the Catalan and Spanish governments will react. Victor Lapuente writes that while he is unsure of what will happen to Catalonia, his real concern lies with the fate of ordinary Catalans, with the independence issue likely to drive a wedge between the two sides of an already highly polarised debate

Lapuente, Victor

LSE Research Online

What	will	happen	to	Catalans	after	1	October?With	only	days	to	go	before	the	scheduled	date	for	Catalonia’s	independence	referendum,	itremains	unclear	what	will	take	place	and	how	the	Catalan	and	Spanish	governments	will	react.Victor	Lapuente	writes	that	while	he	is	unsure	of	what	will	happen	to	Catalonia,	his	real	concernlies	with	the	fate	of	ordinary	Catalans,	with	the	independence	issue	likely	to	drive	a	wedgebetween	the	two	sides	of	an	already	highly	polarised	debate.Credit:	vx_lentz	(CC	BY-SA	2.0)While	attending	college	in	Barcelona,	I	used	to	have	friends	on	both	sides	of	the	independence	debate.	In	arelaxed	intellectual	environment,	Catalan	secessionists	and	Spanish	unionists	teased	each	other,	like	FCBarcelona	and	Real	Madrid	fans	after	a	Clásico.	And,	most	of	all,	I	had	many	friends	in	the	middle,	in	the	thenhighly	populated	no	man’s	land	between	supporters	of	an	independent	Catalonia	and	of	remaining	within	Spain.Now,	the	middle-ground	position	has	few	vocal	defenders.	The	positions	regarding	the	territorial	debate	havesharply	polarised,	and	the	jokes	between	political	adversaries	have	given	way	to	wrath.	Angry	zealots	on	eachside	have	taken	the	leading	voices	in	the	discussion.	The	storm	created	by	radicals	on	both	sides	eclipses	anyreasonable	exchange	of	arguments.The	old	spirit	of	tolerance	toward	dissenting	opinions	–	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	the	commercial	and	culturalsuccess	of	Catalonia	and	Barcelona	across	the	centuries	–	seems	to	have	vanished.	When	I	engage	in	debateswith	colleagues,	what	emerges	is	no	longer	happiness,	the	joy	of	mental	challenge,	but	bitterness,	the	frustrationof	intellectual	isolation.Still,	data	indicates	that	many	Catalans	are	somewhere	between	the	two	extremes.	While	support	for	secessionhas	increased	in	recent	years,	what	unites	most	Catalans	is	not	the	willingness	to	create	a	new	state,	butdissatisfaction	with	the	status	quo:	around	67	percent	of	Catalans	demand	further	self-government	for	theirregion.Likewise,	an	overwhelming	majority	of	Catalans	supported	the	2006	Estatut.	This	Statute	of	Autonomy	updatedthe	relationship	between	Spanish	and	Catalan	authorities,	recognising,	among	other	symbolic	and	substantiveadvances	in	the	level	of	self-government,	the	existence	of	a	“Catalan	nation”.LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: What will happen to Catalans after 1 October? Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-09-26Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/26/what-will-happen-to-catalans-after-1-october/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/It	was	political	opposition	to	the	enactment	of	this	Statute	of	Autonomy	at	the	Spanish	Parliament	–	led	by	theconservative	Popular	Party	(PP)	now	ruling	Spain	–	that	triggered	a	reaction	in	Catalan	society.	Within	a	fewyears,	those	in	favour	of	a	Catexit	moved	from	around	15-20	percent	of	the	Catalan	population	to	40-45	percent.Some	surveys	have	recorded	support	levels	above	50	percent.A	couple	of	exogenous	factors	help	in	explaining	why	the	secessionist	movement	was	able	to	gain	ground	in	sucha	small	space	of	time.	First,	the	economic	hardship	of	the	Great	Recession	in	Spain,	with	unemployment	reaching25	percent,	fostered	the	dream	that	an	independent	Catalonia	would	become	a	small,	highly-productive,	openeconomy	–	the	Denmark	of	the	Mediterranean.Second,	the	endless	procession	of	corruption	cases	and	the	crisis	of	political	representation	which	formed	thebasis	of	the	Indignados	movement	transformed	Spain	from	being	one	of	the	European	societies	with	the	highestlevels	of	trust	in	their	national	and	supranational	institutions,	into	a	country	with	one	of	the	broadest	gaps	betweencitizens	and	political	elites.	A	breach	larger	than	in	most	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries.Consequently,	Spain’s	national	political	landscape	was	shaken	by	the	arrival	of	two	new	parties,	Podemos	andCiudadanos,	which	currently	compete	neck	and	neck	with	the	old	establishment	parties	–	the	PP	and	PSOE.	And,similarly,	the	regional	party	system	in	Catalonia	also	mutated,	allowing	the	emergence	of	new	electoral	platformswith	an	explicit	secessionist	agenda.It	is	the	case	of	the	ruling	coalition	in	Catalonia,	Junts	Pel	Si,	which,	with	the	parliamentary	support	of	the	anti-capitalist	CUP,	are	pushing	for	the	independence	referendum	on	1	October.	The	referendum	has	been	declaredillegal	by	Spain’s	Constitutional	Court.	And	it	is	unrealistic	to	believe	the	international	community	will	recognise	itsoutcome,	irrespective	of	the	turnout	–	to	start	with,	because	there	is	no	way	of	validating	it	in	the	absence	of	anofficial	electoral	census,	ballot	boxes	and	other	guarantees	of	a	due	electoral	process.	The	members	of	theelectoral	commission	allegedly	in	charge	of	supervising	the	referendum	resigned	last	week,	following	a	dictum	bythe	Constitutional	Court	condemning	them	to	fines	of	up	to	12,000	euros	per	day.Officially,	the	referendum	will	not	take	place.	On	2	October,	Catalonia	will	remain	a	region	in	Spain.	Yet	theSpanish	government	should	not	rest	on	its	laurels,	or	expect	the	Catalan	separatists	to	change	course.	Thecurrent	level	of	support	for	independence	–	around	41	percent,	although	it	fluctuates	substantially	–	is	stillinsufficient	for	the	pro-independence	Catalan	institutions	to	break	from	Spain.However,	the	separatist	movement	has	shown	nothing	if	not	resilience.	They	are	capable	of	mobilising	thousandsof	committed	activists	with	a	long	history	of	support	for	the	cause.	And	those	Catalans	who	have	recently	becomeseparatists	show	the	same	resistant	faith	of	those	newly	converted	to	a	religion.	Meanwhile,	the	camp	in	favour	ofremaining	in	Spain	cannot	provide	the	selective	incentives	that	believers	in	independence	enjoy:	a	channel	toexpress	their	discontent	with	the	status	quo	and	their	hope	for	a	promised	land.	A	sense	of	identity	in	times	ofglobal	uncertainties.	And	flowers.I	do	not	know	what	will	happen	to	Catalonia.	What	concerns	me	is	what	will	happen,	and	is	actually	happening,	toordinary	Catalans.	The	open-minded,	pragmatist,	funny,	life-loving	Catalans	I	encountered	two	decades	ago,among	the	ranks	of	both	separatist	and	unionist	camps	alike,	have	become	a	bit	more	close-minded,	idealist,suspicious	and	bitter.Now,	not	even	Messi’s	goals	seem	to	bring	them	together.Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	theLondon	School	of	Economics._________________________________About	the	authorLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: What will happen to Catalans after 1 October? Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-09-26Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/26/what-will-happen-to-catalans-after-1-october/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/Victor	Lapuente	–	University	of	GothenburgVictor	Lapuente	is	Associate	Professor	and	Research	Fellow	in	the	Quality	of	Government	Instituteat	the	University	of	Gothenburg.	His	research	deals	with	comparative	politics	and	publicadministration,	combining	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods.	He	is	on	Twitter@VictorLapuenteLSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: What will happen to Catalans after 1 October? Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2017-09-26Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/26/what-will-happen-to-catalans-after-1-october/Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/

What will happen to Catalans after 1 October?

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