Terrorism and signalling A theory of terrorist campaigns

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Hiding in plain sight – using signals to detect terrorists

This paper studies the interaction between a governmental security agency, as the Transportation Security Agency, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a terrorist organization, like Al Qaeda. The governmental agency wants to stop the terrorists, but first must infer whether a visa applicant or an airline passenger is a terrorist on the basis of some observable signal. The terrorist organization's objective is to get past security to commit murder and mayhem. We derive the equilibrium strategy for this signaling model, and evaluate specific anti-terrorist policies, as the creation of the new Homeland Security Agency and increased airport security screening. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006Terrorism, Deterrence, Signaling game, Non cooperative game, Nash equilibrium,

Terrorism as theater: Analysis and policy implications

In some regards the production of terrorism resembles the production of culture, especially television and theater. Terrorism is a spectacle produced for viewers, many of whom live apart from the violent staged events. Spectacular theater and the telling of memorable stories are inputs for fundraising and motivating subsequent terrorists. This understanding of terrorist motivation has concrete policy implications. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006Terrorism, Public goods, Focality, Spectacle,

A law and economics perspective on terrorism

This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. It considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006Terrorism, Penalty enhancements, Communal liability, Organized crime, Basic crime model, Deterrence, Incapacitation,