I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, And Policymaking On The U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1999

Scholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles cancerning the court\u27s New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court\u27s issuance of these special opinions and the justices\u27 policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, and decisionmaking on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices\u27 policy preferences and their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court\u27s policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices\u27 behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking. © 2004 by The Policy Studies Association. All rights reserved

Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability Of Women And Minorities To Attain Seats On State Supreme And Appellate Courts

Representation in political institutions, including the judiciary, is an important consideration for both political scientists and citizens. What factors systematically influence diversity among judges? In particular, does the method of selection affect the relative success of political minorities in attaining a seat on the bench? The answers to these questions have substantial normative and theoretical implications. We examine judges on all state supreme and intermediate appellate courts in 1985 and 1999 to assess the influence of various structural, political, and demographic factors on judicial diversity. We demonstrate that the ability of political minorities to attain a place in the judiciary is not solely a function of any single factor. Instead, their success is influenced by a multifaceted combination of factors contingent on time and the level of the court, and these influences differ for women and for minorities

I Respectfully Dissent: Consensus, Agendas, and Policymaking on the U.S. Supreme Court, 1888-1999

Scholars have been intrigued by the abrupt change in the rate of nonconsensual opinions that the Supreme Court has published over time, which substantially increased beginning with the battles concerning the court's New Deal transition in the 1930s. Notwithstanding, none of the prior studies on this topic has made any link, whether theoretical or empirical, between the Supreme Court's issuance of these special opinions and the justices' policy preferences. We utilize fractional cointegration to examine the relationship between consensus, agendas, and decisionmaking on the Supreme Court. We find that there is a systematic interrelation between the justices' policy preferences and their issuance of nonconsensual opinions that is dependent upon the policy agenda before the court. In turn, this connection influences the court's policy outcomes, demonstrating that the justices' behavior regarding nonconsensual opinion writing is a classic example of judicial policymaking. Copyright 2004 by The Policy Studies Association..

Dissensual Decision Making: Revisiting The Demise Of Consensual Norms Within The U.S. Supreme Court

This analysis seeks to understand the decline of Supreme Court consensual norms often attributed to the failed leadership of Chief Justice Stone. A new unit of analysis-justice-level dissent and concurrence rates-supports an alternative view of observed increases in dissensual decision making. When these measures are estimated with time-series techniques, results offer evidence of multiple changepoints in this norm of the Court that both lead and lag Stone\u27s elevation. Broader contextual explanations related to the alteration of the Court\u27s discretionary issue agenda and its ideological and demographic composition also contribute to fractures in the once-unanimous voting coalitions. © 2012 University of Utah