Using data network metrics, graphics, and topology to explore network characteristics

Yehuda Vardi introduced the term network tomography and was the first to propose and study how statistical inverse methods could be adapted to attack important network problems (Vardi, 1996). More recently, in one of his final papers, Vardi proposed notions of metrics on networks to define and measure distances between a network's links, its paths, and also between different networks (Vardi, 2004). In this paper, we apply Vardi's general approach for network metrics to a real data network by using data obtained from special data network tools and testing procedures presented here. We illustrate how the metrics help explicate interesting features of the traffic characteristics on the network. We also adapt the metrics in order to condition on traffic passing through a portion of the network, such as a router or pair of routers, and show further how this approach helps to discover and explain interesting network characteristics.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/074921707000000058 in the IMS Lecture Notes Monograph Series (http://www.imstat.org/publications/lecnotes.htm) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost

Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these games. We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most general version of our model has constant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any network creation game.Comment: To appear at SAGT'1

Geometric Network Creation Games

Network Creation Games are a well-known approach for explaining and analyzing the structure, quality and dynamics of real-world networks like the Internet and other infrastructure networks which evolved via the interaction of selfish agents without a central authority. In these games selfish agents which correspond to nodes in a network strategically buy incident edges to improve their centrality. However, past research on these games has only considered the creation of networks with unit-weight edges. In practice, e.g. when constructing a fiber-optic network, the choice of which nodes to connect and also the induced price for a link crucially depends on the distance between the involved nodes and such settings can be modeled via edge-weighted graphs. We incorporate arbitrary edge weights by generalizing the well-known model by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03] to edge-weighted host graphs and focus on the geometric setting where the weights are induced by the distances in some metric space. In stark contrast to the state-of-the-art for the unit-weight version, where the Price of Anarchy is conjectured to be constant and where resolving this is a major open problem, we prove a tight non-constant bound on the Price of Anarchy for the metric version and a slightly weaker upper bound for the non-metric case. Moreover, we analyze the existence of equilibria, the computational hardness and the game dynamics for several natural metrics. The model we propose can be seen as the game-theoretic analogue of a variant of the classical Network Design Problem. Thus, low-cost equilibria of our game correspond to decentralized and stable approximations of the optimum network design.Comment: Accepted at 31st ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA '19). 33 pages, 11 figure

Coalition Resilient Outcomes in Max k-Cut Games

We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the \emph{max $k$-cut game}, where we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a set $\{1,\ldots, k\}$ of $k$ colors. Nodes represent players and edges capture their mutual interests. The strategy set of each player $v$ consists of the $k$ colors. When players select a color they induce a $k$-coloring or simply a coloring. Given a coloring, the \emph{utility} (or \emph{payoff}) of a player $u$ is the sum of the weights of the edges $\{u,v\}$ incident to $u$, such that the color chosen by $u$ is different from the one chosen by $v$. Such games form some of the basic payoff structures in game theory, model lots of real-world scenarios with selfish agents and extend or are related to several fundamental classes of games. Very little is known about the existence of strong equilibria in max $k$-cut games. In this paper we make some steps forward in the comprehension of it. We first show that improving deviations performed by minimal coalitions can cycle, and thus answering negatively the open problem proposed in \cite{DBLP:conf/tamc/GourvesM10}. Next, we turn our attention to unweighted graphs. We first show that any optimal coloring is a 5-SE in this case. Then, we introduce $x$-local strong equilibria, namely colorings that are resilient to deviations by coalitions such that the maximum distance between every pair of nodes in the coalition is at most $x$. We prove that $1$-local strong equilibria always exist. Finally, we show the existence of strong Nash equilibria in several interesting specific scenarios.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of the 45th International Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM'19

Greedy Selfish Network Creation

We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations over radical strategy-changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents which do not have enough computational resources to play optimally. In the model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Internet Service Providers which buy network links to improve their quality of network usage. It is known that computing a best response in this model is NP-hard. Hence, poly-time agents are likely not to play optimally. But how good are networks created by such agents? We answer this question for very simple agents. Quite surprisingly, naive greedy play suffices to create remarkably stable networks. Specifically, we show that in the SUM version, where agents attempt to minimize their average distance to all other agents, GE capture Nash equilibria (NE) on trees and that any GE is in 3-approximate NE on general networks. For the latter we also provide a lower bound of 3/2 on the approximation ratio. For the MAX version, where agents attempt to minimize their maximum distance, we show that any GE-star is in 2-approximate NE and any GE-tree having larger diameter is in 6/5-approximate NE. Both bounds are tight. We contrast these positive results by providing a linear lower bound on the approximation ratio for the MAX version on general networks in GE. This result implies a locality gap of $\Omega(n)$ for the metric min-max facility location problem, where n is the number of clients.Comment: 28 pages, 8 figures. An extended abstract of this work was accepted at WINE'1

The Pervasive Effect of Aesthetics on Choice: Evidence From a Field Study

Do people think logically and carefully before buying an expensive item, or are more superficial forces such as product appearance at work? To investigate this question, six months of car sales were predicted using objective measures of a design's typicality and complexity. The data revealed that cars conforming closely to a morph of designs of all cars outsell cars conforming less closely to the morph, but only when the design is visually complex. These design factors explain 42% of the sales variance and are independent of retail price, brand associations, technological specifications, and advertising. Subjective measures controlling for brand recognition further confirm the considerable impact of design factors on real purchases involving large financial commitments

Correlation of the Cd-to-Te ratio on CdTe surfaces with the surface structure

We report here that reconstruction on (100), (1lIlA, and (1l1lB CdTe surfaces is either C(2X2), (2X2), and (l X I) or (2X I), (l X I), and (l X I) when they are Cd or Te stabilized, respectively. There is a mixed region between Cd and Te stabilization in which the reflected high-energy electron-diffraction (RHEED) patterns contain characteristics of both Cd- and Te-stabilized surfaces. We have also found that the Cd-to-Te ratio of the x-ray photoelectron intensities of their 3d$_{3/ 2}$ core levels is about 20% larger for a Cd-stabilized (1lIlA, (1lIlB, or (100) CdTe surface than for a Te-stabilized one. According to a simple model calculation, which was normalized by means of the photoelectron intensity ratio of a Cd-stabilized (lll)A and aTe-stabilized (1l1lB CdTe surface, the experimental data for CdTe surfaces can be explained by a linear dependence of the photoelectron-intensity ratio on the fraction of Cd in the uppermost monatomic layer. This surface composition can be correlated with the surface structure, i.e., the corresponding RHEED patterns. This correlation can in turn be employed to determine Te and Cd evaporation rates. The Te reevaporation rate is increasingly slower for the Te-stabilized (Ill) A, (l1l)B, and (100) surfaces, while the opposite is true for Cd from Cd-stabilized (Ill) A and (Ill)B surfaces. In addition, Te is much more easily evaporated from all the investigated surfaces than is Cd, if the substrate is kept at normal molecular-beam-epitaxy growth temperatures ranging from 2oo·C to 300 ·C

Prostate Brachytherapy Seed Migration to the Heart Seen on Cardiovascular Computed Tomographic Angiography

Brachytherapy consists of placing radioactive sources into or adjacent to tumors, to deliver conformal radiation treatment. The technique is used for treatment of primary malignancies and for salvage in recurrent disease. Permanent prostate brachytherapy seeds are small metal implants containing radioactive sources of I-125, Pd-103, or Cs-131 encased in a titanium shell. They can embolize through the venous system to the lungs or heart and subsequently be detected by cardiovascular computed tomography. Cardiovascular imagers should be aware of the appearance of migrated seeds, as their presence in the chest is generally benign, so that unnecessary worry and testing are avoided. We report a case of a patient who underwent brachytherapy for prostate cancer and developed a therapeutic seeds embolus to the right ventricle

Band structure of semimagnetic Hg1-yMnyTe quantum wells

The band structure of semimagnetic Hg_1-yMn_yTe/Hg_1-xCd_xTe type-III quantum wells has been calculated using eight-band kp model in an envelope function approach. Details of the band structure calculations are given for the Mn free case (y=0). A mean field approach is used to take the influence of the sp-d exchange interaction on the band structure of QW's with low Mn concentrations into account. The calculated Landau level fan diagram and the density of states of a Hg_0.98Mn_0.02Te/Hg_0.3Cd_0.7Te QW are in good agreement with recent experimental transport observations. The model can be used to interpret the mutual influence of the two-dimensional confinement and the sp-d exchange interaction on the transport properties of Hg_1-yMn_yTe/Hg_1-xCd_xTe QW's.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figure