Additive twists of Fourier coefficients of symmetric-square lifts

We study the sum of additively twisted Fourier coefficients of a symmetric-square lift of a Maass form invariant under the full modular group. Our bounds are uniform in terms of the spectral parameter of the Maass form, as well as in terms of the additive twist.Comment: 13 pages. v2: fixed the relation between T and t_j on p.2 and added clarification to some reference

A Direct Limit for Limit Hilbert-Kunz Multiplicity for Smooth Projective Curves

This paper concerns the question of whether a more direct limit can be used to obtain the limit Hilbert-Kunz multiplicity, a possible candidate for a characteristic zero Hilbert-Kunz multiplicity. The main goal is to establish an affirmative answer for one of the main cases for which the limit Hilbert-Kunz multiplicity is even known to exist, namely that of graded ideals in the homogeneous coordinate ring of smooth projective curves. The proof involves more careful estimates of bounds found independently by Brenner and Trivedi on the dimensions of the cohomologies of twists of the syzygy bundle as the characteristic p goes to infinity and uses asymptotic results of Trivedi on the slopes of Harder-Narasimham filtrations of Frobenius pullbacks of bundles. In view of unpublished results of Gessel and Monsky, the case of maximal ideals in diagonal hypersurfaces is also discussed in depth.Comment: Minor typos fixe

On the (non)rigidity of the Frobenius Endomorphism over Gorenstein Rings

It is well-known that for a large class of local rings of positive characteristic, including complete intersection rings, the Frobenius endomorphism can be used as a test for finite projective dimension. In this paper, we exploit this property to study the structure of such rings. One of our results states that the Picard group of the punctured spectrum of such a ring $R$ cannot have $p$-torsion. When $R$ is a local complete intersection, this recovers (with a purely local algebra proof) an analogous statement for complete intersections in projective spaces first given in SGA and also a special case of a conjecture by Gabber. Our method also leads to many simply constructed examples where rigidity for the Frobenius endomorphism does not hold, even when the rings are Gorenstein with isolated singularity. This is in stark contrast to the situation for complete intersection rings. Also, a related length criterion for modules of finite length and finite projective dimension is discussed towards the end.Comment: Minor changes in Example 2.2 and Theorem 2.9. Conjecture 1.2 was added

Iterative Row Sampling

There has been significant interest and progress recently in algorithms that solve regression problems involving tall and thin matrices in input sparsity time. These algorithms find shorter equivalent of a n*d matrix where n >> d, which allows one to solve a poly(d) sized problem instead. In practice, the best performances are often obtained by invoking these routines in an iterative fashion. We show these iterative methods can be adapted to give theoretical guarantees comparable and better than the current state of the art. Our approaches are based on computing the importances of the rows, known as leverage scores, in an iterative manner. We show that alternating between computing a short matrix estimate and finding more accurate approximate leverage scores leads to a series of geometrically smaller instances. This gives an algorithm that runs in $O(nnz(A) + d^{\omega + \theta} \epsilon^{-2})$ time for any $\theta > 0$, where the $d^{\omega + \theta}$ term is comparable to the cost of solving a regression problem on the small approximation. Our results are built upon the close connection between randomized matrix algorithms, iterative methods, and graph sparsification.Comment: 26 pages, 2 figure

When bigger isn’t better : bailouts and bank behaviour

Lending retail deposits to SMEs and household borrowers may be the traditional role of commercial banks: but banking in Britain has been transformed by increasing consolidation and by the lure of high returns available from wholesale Investment activities. With appropriate changes to the baseline model of commercial banking in Allen and Gale (2007), we show how market power enables banks to collect „seigniorage‟; and how „tail risk‟ investment allows losses to be shifted onto the taxpayer. In principle, the high franchise values associated with market power assist regulatory capital requirements to check risk-taking. But when big banks act strategically, bailout expectations can undermine these disciplining devices: and the taxpayer ends up „on the hook‟- as in the recent crisis. That structural change is needed to prevent a repeat seems clear from the Vickers report, which proposes to protect the taxpayer by a „ring fence‟separating commercial and investment banking